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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
3	MONROE DIVISION
4	x
5	THE STATE OF MISSOURI :
6	et al.,
7	Plaintiffs, : No.
8	v. : 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM
9	JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., :
10	et al., :
11	Defendants. :
12	x
13	
14	Videotaped Deposition of BRIAN J. SCULLY
15	Thursday, January 12, 2023
16	9:06 a.m.
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	Job No.: 138046
22	Pages 1 through 376
23	Reported by: Cassandra E. Ellis, RPR
24	
25	

1	Deposition of BRIAN J. SCULLY, held
2	pursuant to agreement, before Cassandra E. Ellis,
3	Certified Shorthand Reporter Hawaii #475,
4	Certified Court Reporter - Washington #3484,
5	Certified Shorthand Reporter - California -
6	#14448, Registered Professional Reporter #823848,
7	Certified Realtime Reporter, Realtime Systems
8	Administrator, and Notary Public of the District
9	of Columbia.
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	Stamped MOLA DEFSPROD 00008353-355,
	9676-680,8356-358, 10679-682,
	10603-605, 13661-663,13511-517,
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1	10449-453, 13603-609, 8739-741, 8696-700,
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-	19	10298-300, 8188-189, 10718, 9703,	
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are on the
3	record. Today's date is January 12th, 2023, and
4	the time is now 9:06 a.m. This is the video
5	recorded deposition of Brian Scully in the
6	matter of the State of Missouri, et al.,
7	plaintiff, versus Joseph R. Biden, Junior, et
8	al., defendants, Case Number
9	3:22-CV-01213-TAD-KDM in the United States
10	District Court for the Western District of
11	Louisiana, Monroe Division.
12	This deposition is being held via
13	Zoom.
14	The reporter's name is Cassandra
15	Ellis. My name is Robyn Ellis. I'm the legal
16	videographer. We are with Lexitas Legal.
17	Would the attorneys present please
18	introduce themselves and parties they represent.
19	MR. SAUER: John Sauer, from the
20	Missouri Attorney General's Office, on behalf of
21	the plaintiffs. And I'm joined by my colleague,
22	Todd Scott, who's in the room with the witness,
23	also of the Missouri Attorney General's Office.
24	MR. GARDNER: And this is Josh
25	Gardner, with the United States Department of

1	That is an habile of the defendants and
1	Justice, on behalf of the defendants, and
2	witness does reserve the right to read and sign.
3	With me today is Jessica Nelson,
4	with CISA. Matt Fleischman, with the Department
5	of Homeland Security and Indraneel Sur, with my
6	office, the Department of Justice. We all
7	represent the defendants.
8	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Would the court
9	reporter please swear in the witness.
10	(Witness sworn)
11	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: You may proceed.
12	BRIAN J. SCULLY
13	having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
14	EXAMINATION
15	BY MR. SAUER:
16	Q. Mr. Scully, could you please state
17	your full name for the record?
18	A. Sure. Brian Joseph Scully.
19	Q. How long or what is your current
20	job title?
21	A. Brand P for the MDM branch, at the
22	National Risk Management Center, which is part
23	of the Department of Homeland Security.
24	Q. How long have you had that
25	particular job?

1	A. Almost almost four years, I
2	started in January 2019.
3	Q. What did you do before that?
4	A. I was a deputy for the countering
5	and foreign influence task force, starting in
6	April-ish, April/May 2018.
7	Q. And what was your what was your
8	job before that one?
9	A. I was a director for policy and
10	strategy in the Office of Infrastructure
11	Protection.
12	Q. Have you ever given a deposition
13	before?
14	A. I have not.
15	Q. So this is your first one?
16	A. This is my first deposition.
17	Q. Can I just go over some common
18	ground rules with you?
19	First of all, obviously what you
20	and I say is being transcribed by the court
21	reporter, so can we make an effort not to talk
22	too fast?
23	A. Yep.
24	Q. And could you give I saw you nod
25	your head there, and then you said yes. Could

1	you try and give a verbal answer to my
2	questions, you know, don't rely on uh-huh or
3	uhn-uhn or head shaking as we go forward today.
4	A. Yes, I can do that.
5	Q. Can we make an effort not to
6	interrupt each other, because that results in a
7	kind of confused transcript.
8	A. Of course.
9	Q. Okay. And then can you make an
10	effort to listen carefully to the question that
11	I'm asking you, and respond to the question that
12	I ask, instead of discussing some other
13	tangential topic as the day goes forward?
14	A. Of course.
15	Q. And you understand
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. You understand that at the end of
18	the day, if your attorney wants to ask you some
19	follow-up questions he may have the opportunity
20	to do that.
21	But when as I ask questions, I
22	would ask you to focus on the questions I'm
23	asking you, and respond to those; is that fair?
24	A. That's fair.
25	(Exhibit No. 61 was marked for

1 identification.) 2 BY MR. SAUER: 3 Ο. Let me start by showing you an exhibit, and I apologize, this exhibit is out of 4 5 numerical order already, so I'm e-mailing it to 6 your counsel right now. It's pre-marked Exhibit 7 61, but it will be the first exhibit we look at today. 9 And I'm going to pull it up on the 10 screen share. Can you see that screen share? 11 I'm going to zoom in a little bit. 12 MR. GARDNER: Hey, John, it hasn't 13 come through yet, the e-mail, so it's just --14 unfortunately, that's kind of far away, it's a 15 little challenging to see, but as soon as we get 16 your e-mail we'll pull it up. 17 MR. SAUER: You said you can't see 18 what's on the screen share if I zoom in? 19 MR. GARDNER: As you make it larger 20 it's easier, but I don't want to speak for what 21 the witness can and can't see. 22 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I can see it. 23 BY MR. SAUER: 24 I'm happy to wait until it Q. Okay. 25 arrives on the e-mail. I just want to make

1	sure, because I think the day's going to go more
2	smoothly, if I can direct your attention to
3	stuff on the screen share.
4	So you can see the screen share,
5	sir?
6	A. Yes, I can.
7	Q. Okay. Just looking at the top of
8	this document, do you recognize it as an org
9	chart for August 2022, of a subdivision of CISA?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. And what what are you
12	familiar with this org chart?
13	A. Somewhat familiar with it, yes.
14	Q. I just want to direct your
15	attention over here on the right side of the
16	page, you see here where it lists you as the
17	chief of the mis, dis and mal-information team?
18	A. Okay.
19	Q. Is that your job title?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. Yeah, what, exactly generally
22	speaking, what do you do as the chief of the
23	mis, dis and mal-information team for CISA, the
24	Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security
25	Agency?

1	A. So I obviously I manage the
2	team, as a team lead. So I manage the staff,
3	set priority, things like that.
4	The purpose of the team is to build
5	national resilience to MDM, targeting critical
6	infrastructure.
7	Q. Generally speaking, what kind of
8	activities are involved in building resilience
9	to critical infrastructure or sorry
10	A. We felt sure.
11	So principally what we do is
12	develop products for public awareness and
13	education or products for key stakeholders to
14	help them understand how MDM works and steps
15	they can take to mitigate the risks.
16	Q. Do you do anything else, besides
17	developing products?
18	A. We engage with different
19	stakeholders, civil society groups, obviously
20	other federal partners, private sector
21	organizations, and then we we do some
22	analysis of open source reporting, and we do
23	obviously, you know, in 2020 we did some
24	switchboard work on behalf of election
25	officials.

1	Q. Switchboard work, what does that
2	mean?
3	A. It was essentially an audit
4	official to identify something on social media
5	they deemed to be disinformation aimed at their
6	jurisdiction. They could forward that to CISA
7	and CISA would share that with the appropriate
8	social media companies.
9	Q. And what was the purpose of sharing
10	it with social media companies?
11	A. Mostly for informational awareness
12	purposes, just to make sure that the social
13	media companies were aware of potential
14	disinformation.
15	Q. Was there an understanding that if
16	the social media platforms were aware of
17	disinformation that they might apply their
18	content moderation policies to it?
19	A. Yes. So the idea was that they
20	would make decision on the content that was
21	forwarded to them based on their policies.
22	Q. Whereas, if it hadn't been brought
23	to their attention then they obviously wouldn't
24	have moderated it as content; correct?
25	A. Yeah, I suppose that's true, as far

1 as I'm aware of it. 2 Directing your attention to the org 3 chart again, can you -- I would sort of walk through the people here on your team and ask 5 you, kind of who they are and what they do, so 6 starting on the right column, I see Lauren 7 Protentis on as the engagements lead; who is she and what does she do for your team? 9 So she was -- she's a -- she's the 10 engagements lead. So her job was engaging with 11 key stakeholders, interagency partners, private 12 sector partners, essentially a majority of 13 our outreach and engagement efforts, she managed 14 those. 15 Ο. Outreach and engagement to key 16 stakeholders, does that include social media 17 platforms? 18 Α. It did, yeah. 19 When you say: "It did," does she Q. 20 still do this or does she no longer communicate 21 with social media platforms? 22 Well, she's on the -- she's been on 23 maternity leave since September, so she's --24 she's not currently doing it, when she returns 25 to CISA that would be her role.

1	Q. Who's doing it while she's gone?
2	A. And she I'm sorry, could you
3	repeat that?
4	Q. Who's who's playing that role in
5	her absence?
6	A. I am.
7	Q. Okay. And so for the past, I
8	guess, three or four months you've served as
9	essentially the active engagements lead for the
10	MDM team?
11	A. Correct.
12	Q. And that goes back, I think you
13	said, to September of 2022; is that right?
14	A. Correct.
15	Q. When do you expect Ms. Protentis to
16	return?
17	A. Her maternity leave ends in a
18	couple of weeks, I believe the 23rd, potentially
19	being gone on a detail assignment, so probably
20	January 2024.
21	Q. Oh, so you don't expect her back
22	for another year, because of the detail?
23	A. Correct.
24	Q. Is the detail in relate to
25	anything having to do with mis, dis or

1	mal-information?
2	A. I believe that will be part of her
3	portfolio on the detail, yeah.
4	Q. Where is she going, if I may ask?
5	A. The National Security Council.
6	Q. And in her absence, you're serving
7	as the kind of person who directly communicates
8	with social media platforms, among other
9	stakeholders?
10	A. Correct.
11	Q. I should mention, you used the
12	shorthand earlier, MDM, and I assume it will
13	come up again today. When you use that, you're
14	referring to mis, dis and mal-information;
15	right?
16	A. Correct.
17	Q. I think sometimes CISA refers to MD
18	to refer to mis and disinformation; is that
19	right?
20	A. I'm not sure I've ever seen us use
21	MD, but that would be proactive in the context,
22	yeah.
23	Q. Turning your attention back to the
24	period from September of 2022 to the present,
25	what sorts of communications have you had with

1	social media platforms in Ms. Protentis's stead?
2	A. Two I would say two general
3	types of communications, one, we did regular
4	sync meetings between government and industry,
5	so federal partners and different social media
6	platforms. So it's just a coordinated meeting.
7	Facebook was the industry lead, so
8	I would have coordination calls with them prior
9	to the meetings, just to set the agenda for the
10	meetings, so that was one.
11	And then two, if a platform was
12	putting out a public statement or not public
13	statement public report on policies or
14	activities, we would often get a briefing on
15	that or at least get an awareness that it was
16	going out.
17	Those are the two main types of
18	communications.
19	Q. Did you were you involved in the
20	last in the period since September 2022, and
21	have you been involved in flagging any
22	misinformation or disinformation issues for
23	social media platforms?
24	A. No, not that we recall. We didn't
25	do switchboarding in 2022.

1	Q. So when was that decision made not
2	to do switchboarding in 2022?
3	A. I believe it was back in April that
4	that decision was made?
5	Q. Who made that decision?
6	A. April 2022.
7	Q. Was that early or late April, do
8	you know?
9	A. I don't. I don't recall.
10	Q. Who made that decision?
11	A. I I heard about it through Geoff
12	Hale, who is is a senior org chart would be
13	my supervisor. I believe he received that
14	guidance from the director, Director Easterly.
15	Q. So in some time around was
16	this late April?
17	A. Honestly, I don't recall. It's
18	even possible it was in May by the time my
19	memory's a little foggy on it but the
20	earliest it was is probably mid April.
21	Q. Do you know
22	A. And it could have gone any time
23	into early May.
24	Q. So the earliest would have been
25	late April, but possibly early May is when that

1	
1	decision was made; correct?
2	MR. GARDNER: Objection.
3	BY MR. SAUER:
4	Q. Correct?
5	MR. GARDNER: Sorry. Objection,
6	mischaracterizes the witness's previous
7	testimony.
8	A. Yeah, the earliest would have been
9	mid April
10	Q. The earliest would have been mid
11	April?
12	A probably.
13	Q. Okay. And then possibly beginning
14	of May?
15	A. Yeah.
16	Q. And you said you called this
17	switchboarding.
18	A. Mm-hmm.
19	Q. Switchboarding refers to routing
20	particular disinformation concerns to social
21	media platforms so they can evaluate them under
22	the content modulation modulation policies;
23	correct?
24	A. So switchboarding is CISA's role in
25	forwarding reporting received from election

1	officials, state/local election officials, to
2	social media platforms.
3	Q. CISA forwarded disinformation
4	concerns from many other sources, besides state
5	and local election officials, to social media
6	platforms?
7	A. I don't believe so, not that I
8	recall.
9	Q. Turning back to the two kinds of
10	interactions you had with social media
11	platforms, the last months since September of
12	2022, the first one you mentioned was, I
13	believe, a sync meeting between social media
14	platforms and the US government; correct?
15	A. Correct.
16	Q. How often did those occur?
17	A. They started as monthly, until, I
18	think, October. And then we did a couple of
19	biweekly, I believe two biweekly meetings
20	Q. What was the purpose of the
21	A prior to the election.
22	Q. What was the purpose of these
23	meetings?
24	A. Generally speaking, from a CISA
25	perspective, we would we would provide kind

1	of we would try to educate the platforms on
2	how elections actually function, how they're
3	administered, potential threats to the election
4	administration, things like that.
5	So CISA's you know, has some
6	expertise in the election security space. So
7	our role in the meetings was generally to
8	provide kind of expertise on how elections
9	actually work to the platforms.
10	Q. And you said that was your role.
11	Were there other federal agencies
12	involved in these meetings?
13	A. There were, and and that role
14	was generally Geoff Hale. My role in the
15	meetings was generally to just oversee them,
16	facilitate the meetings.
17	Other agencies would provide
18	high-level reviews or strategic intelligence
19	briefs, if they had any anything to share
20	that was unclassified.
21	Q. What sorts of first of all, what
22	agencies participated?
23	A. DOJ, FBI, ODNI, and then DHS.
24	Q. When you say DHS, was that just
25	CISA, you and Geoff Hale, or were there other

1	components of DHS involved?
2	A. The Office of Intelligence and
3	Analysis of DHS also participated.
4	Q. And that's called IA; is that
5	correct?
6	A. Correct.
7	Q. And what was what did they say
8	at these meetings, I&A?
9	A. If they put out unclassified
10	reporting, under their normal mandate, they
11	would just talk about the reporting that they
12	that they published, that was related to
13	election security.
14	Q. What kind of reporting did they do,
15	is it about foreign influence or is it about
16	domestic threats, what kind of reporting do they
17	do?
18	A. I'm not a hundred percent certain
19	of their their mission of authority. I
20	believe and recall what they talked about, they
21	certainly talked about foreign threats. I'm not
22	sure they may have also talked a little bit
23	about domestic terrorism threats, but I think
24	that but I'm not 100 percent certain.
25	Q. Like what sorts of things are they

1	saying to social media platforms, are they
2	saying, hey, you're going to see this kind of
3	content popping up on Facebook and Twitter and
4	so forth, and, you know, therefore, we want you
5	to be alert to it, what kind of what's the
6	purpose of giving them these briefings?
7	A. So generally speaking, it's hard
8	for me to speak directly to the I&A reporting
9	because, you know, I don't recall all the
10	details of it, but generally speaking, it was
11	more strategic-level. So high-level things that
12	they might be seeing, actors that might be
13	interested in undermining confidence in the
14	elections.
15	If they were seeing potential
16	domestic terrorism type threats, those sorts of
17	things, generally speaking, at least as long as
18	I recall, there was never any discussion of
19	specific content.
20	Q. Did they identify specific domestic
21	actors who they believed might try to undermine
22	confidence in election outcomes through social
23	media?
24	A. Not that I recall.
25	Q. Let me ask this: Who, on the

1	government side of these meetings, who
2	participates on behalf of who participated on
3	behalf of CISA?
4	A. Geoff Hale and myself were the
5	primaries, and then you might have others who
6	were in listen-only mode. So Kim Wyman, for
7	example, would sometimes be in listen-only mode.
8	Allison Snell would sometimes be essentially the
9	deputy or, slash, chief of staff of the
10	underneath Geoff, she would sometimes be in
11	listen-only mode. And then obviously when
12	Lauren was pre-maternity leave she would also be
13	on.
14	Q. And then for I&A, who was on these
15	meetings?
16	A. In 2022, I believe Luke Beckman was
17	the lead. And then they would, depending on,
18	you know, what product they were briefing, they
19	would bring an analyst on, so those would
20	change.
21	Q. Do you remember any other human
22	beings, besides Luke Beckman, from I&A, who
23	participated in these meetings in the period of
24	time we're talking about, from September 2022 to
25	the present?

1	A. I don't know. Like I Luke was
2	the kind of principal lead, and who I coordinate
3	with, I don't recall the analysts' names that
4	they might have on there now.
5	Q. What's his title?
6	A. Honestly, I don't know. I believe
7	he's in the cyber mission center, but they are
8	odd up there, so I'm not entirely sure what his
9	title was, sorry.
10	Q. You mentioned FBI had
11	representatives at these meetings; is that
12	right?
13	A. Correct.
14	Q. Who from FBI participated in these
15	meetings?
16	A. I recall Laura Dehmlow, at least
17	one, and I forget who who the other folks
18	were.
19	Q. How many FBI people?
20	A. Generally, there would be one,
21	maybe two.
22	Q. How about Elvis Chan, was he on
23	these meetings?
24	A. Oh, good reminder. Thank you.
25	Yes, he would be on some of them,

1	as well. I forgot about Elvis.
2	Q. Do you remember anyone else,
3	besides him?
4	A. There would be, again, periodically
5	other people would be on from different parts of
6	FBI, but again, Laura was usually who we
7	coordinated through, and I don't really
8	remember I don't really remember the other
9	names, sorry.
10	Q. When you say Laura, that's Laura
11	Dehmlow is who you coordinated through?
12	A. Correct.
13	Q. When you say: You coordinated
14	through them, what kind of coordination did CISA
15	do with FBI as it pertained to these meetings?
16	A. Yeah, so basically coordinating
17	time and the logistics of the meeting, and then
18	two, if they had any particular agenda items
19	they wanted to raise, you know, when we were
20	putting together the agenda, I would just check
21	with them to see if they had any any
22	particular agenda items they wanted to raise.
23	Q. What sort of agenda items did they
24	raise?
25	A. I don't believe in the time I was

1	working, you know, in the timeframe we're
2	talking about, I don't believe that they raised
3	any.
4	Q. Do you have how about before
5	that, when Ms. Protentis was still handling the
6	meetings?
7	A. Not not that I recall. Yeah, I
8	don't I don't I don't recall, in
9	particular, yeah, sorry.
10	Q. And I take it these meetings, we've
11	been talking about them in the period from last
12	September until now, but they're actually going
13	on intermittently, at least, for years; right?
14	A. Yeah, so the first meeting we had
15	with between federal and and industry was
16	in 2018.
17	Q. Yeah, we're talking we're now
18	kind of four years in, and then in terms of
19	their frequency I take it they they
20	they're less frequent when you're further away
21	from election, and they become monthly as the
22	election gets closer, and then they become
23	weekly or biweekly, you know, within the last
24	month or so before an election; is that right?
25	A. I would say 2018, 2019 they were

1	very infrequent, so we maybe did them quarterly
2	or less. And then sometime in 2020 we started
3	monthly. And then, like you said, as we got
4	closer to the election they would pick up. And
5	then after the election they would we would
6	spread them back out again.
7	But 2018 and 2019 was different
8	than 2020 and beyond.
9	Q. And is there a plan to have these
10	meetings continue in 2023?
11	A. Not currently.
12	Q. So you don't know you don't know
13	whether there's going to be quarterly meetings
14	or anything like that in 2023?
15	A. Correct.
16	Q. Who from DOJ was at these meetings?
16 17	Q. Who from DOJ was at these meetings? A. Rodney Patton Patton.
17	A. Rodney Patton Patton.
17 18	A. Rodney Patton Patton. Q. Anyone else?
17 18 19	A. Rodney Patton Patton.Q. Anyone else?A. No, not that I recall.
17 18 19 20	 A. Rodney Patton Patton. Q. Anyone else? A. No, not that I recall. Q. How do you spell his last name?
17 18 19 20 21	 A. Rodney Patton Patton. Q. Anyone else? A. No, not that I recall. Q. How do you spell his last name? A. I believe it's P-a-t-t-o-n.
17 18 19 20 21 22	 A. Rodney Patton Patton. Q. Anyone else? A. No, not that I recall. Q. How do you spell his last name? A. I believe it's P-a-t-t-o-n. Q. Like the general?
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. Rodney Patton Patton. Q. Anyone else? A. No, not that I recall. Q. How do you spell his last name? A. I believe it's P-a-t-t-o-n. Q. Like the general? A. Yes.

1	I boliovo bole in the national security
2	I believe he's in the national security division.
3	Q. Was national security division of
4	DOJ participating in these meetings leading up
5	to the 2020 election?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. Who from NSD participated in those
8	meetings?
9	A. I believe it was Rodney, back then,
10	as well.
11	Q. Do you remember anyone else?
12	A. Adam Hickey may have jumped on a
13	couple.
14	Q. Is he also from the national
15	security division of DOJ?
16	A. I believe so, yeah.
17	Q. Is that H-i-c-k-e-y?
18	A. Yes.
19	Q. What, if anything, did DOJ say in
20	these meetings?
21	A. Generally speaking, they didn't say
22	anything. Yeah, I don't recall in 2022 or even
23	back in 2020 that they were were particularly
24	active in the meetings.
25	Q. Do you remember anyone from DOJ

1	saying anything at any point?
2	A. I mean, I'm I'm sure they did,
3	but I don't recall.
4	Q. Do you remember anyone from DOJ
5	ever, you know, putting an agenda items on the
6	calendar for these meetings?
7	A. I don't, no.
8	Q. How about ODNI, the Office of the
9	Director of National Intelligence, what human
10	being from there participated in these meetings
11	in 2022?
12	A. Is it okay if I ask my attorneys a
13	quick question?
14	Q. The question
15	MR. GARDNER: Is it about a
16	privilege?
17	THE WITNESS: Yeah.
18	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, John, if you
19	want him to answer that question we'll need to
20	recess quickly so he can consult with counsel
21	about these issues of privilege.
22	MR. SAUER: Let's go off the
23	record.
24	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
25	9:32. We're off the record.

1	(Recess.)
2	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
3	9:34. We're back on the record.
4	MR. GARDNER: And counsel, I will
5	instruct the witness not to answer that question
6	on the basis of the National Security Act, that
7	information is extraordinarily protected.
8	MR. SAUER: Before we proceed, I
9	I'm announcing, for the record, that Mr. Kent
10	Capps, from the Missouri Attorney General's
11	Office joined the call on behalf of plaintiffs
12	in the last break.
13	BY MR. SAUER:
14	Q. Was there anyone how many
15	individuals from ODNI participated in these
16	meetings in 2022?
17	A. I believe there were two to three.
18	Q. Without telling me who they are, do
19	you remember who they are?
20	A. I remember one's name and one's
21	position, the second one's position.
22	Q. How about 2020, how many
23	A. Again, it was it was three or
24	four.
25	Q. Do you remember who they were?

1	A. I remember the lead person's name.
2	Q. Did people from ODNI speak in these
3	meetings during 2022?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. What did they say?
6	A. Again, generally speaking, if they
7	had some strategic intelligence, unclassified,
8	strategic intelligence reporting, they might
9	share a quick summary of that. It was fairly
10	limited in the timeframe from September
11	through through the election, though.
12	Q. Were you in the meetings prior to
13	September of 2022, when Ms. Protentis was still
14	at your team?
15	A. I joined several of them over the
16	summer, a couple couple of them over the
17	summer, prior to her departure. And that was
18	just the meetings, themselves, not necessarily
19	the coordination meetings prior to the actual
20	sync meetings.
21	Q. So the coordination meeting, is
22	that a bilateral meeting that happens between
23	CISA and Facebook?
24	A. Yes, CISA and Facebook, and then we
25	would do CISA with the interagency. We would

1	do federal interagency partners would do a
2	coordination meeting.
3	Q. That would be separate from the
4	meeting with Facebook?
5	A. Correct.
6	Q. Would there be two preparatory
7	meetings, one between CISA
8	A. Generally, yes.
9	Q. One between
10	A. Sorry.
11	Q CISA and Facebook, and one
12	between CISA and other federal agencies?
13	A. Yes, that is correct.
14	Q. Turning back to what ODNI said at
15	these meetings in 2022, what do you remember,
16	more specifically, that they said? Did they
17	ever raise a specific threat advisory?
18	A. Not that I recall. I again,
19	generally speaking, it was it was I don't
20	recall specifics, so I'll just say that upfront.
21	And generally speaking, it was
22	it was higher level, kind of strategic of what a
23	threat actor may be considering or thinking
24	about.
25	Q. And do they identify specific

4	
1	threat actors?
2	A. Potential state actors, yeah, so
3	other countries.
4	Q. How about domestic actors?
5	A. No, not that I recall.
6	Q. Did anyone on the US government
7	side, in these meetings, identify domestic
8	actors in the lead-up to the 2022 election?
9	A. They they may identify domestic
10	actors, generally, but not to my
11	recollection, there's no mention of specific
12	actors, individuals, or groups that I recall.
13	Q. What social media platforms
14	participated in these meetings?
15	A. So obviously Facebook, Twitter,
16	Microsoft, Google, Reddit generally
17	participated, I believe sometimes LinkedIn would
18	join. They're a subsidiary of Microsoft, so
19	generally we worked through Microsoft. Those
20	are the ones that I recall.
21	I believe there are others, as
22	well, at different times, that maybe
23	participated in a meeting or two.
24	But from September 2022 to the
25	election, I think it was principally the five I

1	mentioned.
2	Q. How about Wiki Media Foundation?
3	A. I know they participated in some, I
4	don't know how frequently, and if it I don't
5	recall them participating from September on, but
6	it's possible.
7	Q. Were concerns about misinformation
8	and disinformation on social media platforms
9	discussed in these meetings in the 2022
10	timeframe?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. What what was what was said
13	about those concerns and by whom?
14	A. Again, it was a more general
15	approach. So from a CISA MDM team perspective,
16	if we were developing any products we would
17	discuss those. We didn't we released, I
18	believe, two sets of products in that timeframe.
19	And in others, if there was the
20	intelligence community, if they're reporting
21	included foreign actors who were potentially
22	going to use information operations, they might
23	mention that in their briefings. But I don't
24	remember specific, you know, what the specifics
25	of every kind of mention were.

1	Q. But you
2	A. And then the platforms sorry, to
3	give you both sides, that was just the
4	government side the platforms, they might
5	share some high-level trend information from
6	public reporting that they put out. So a lot of
7	the platforms do their own regular reports on
8	what they're seeing on their platforms and what
9	they're what actions they're taking. And so
10	the platforms, themselves, would share that type
11	of information.
12	Q. So they would report to the
13	government on what sorts of mis and
14	disinformation they were seeing on their
15	platforms and what content moderation actions
16	they were taking with respect to it?
17	A. So they would share essentially
18	what they were getting ready to make public or
19	what they had already made public. So they
20	would share kind of what they're seeing in their
21	public reports, and then potentially provide
22	some additional context around that.
23	So as I mentioned, most of the
24	platforms would put out regular public reporting
25	on what they were doing and what actions they

1	were taking. And so they would share that, and
2	if the government had questions or was looking
3	for additional context they would often talk
4	about that, they would generally talk about any
5	new tactics that they were seeing.
6	Most of what they my
7	recollections for the time period we're talking
8	about here, from September 2022 to the election
9	in 2022, I recall most of it was foreign based.
10	But, you know, when we often
11	what you see overseas essentially makes its way
12	to the United States. So they would share kind
13	of trends and tactics that they were seeing, but
14	again, it was all based on public reporting that
15	they put out.
16	Q. And you say that this all these
17	things that they're doing all relate to
18	misinformation and disinformation on the
19	platforms; correct?
20	A. They don't call it misinformation
21	or disinformation, generally, on the platforms.
22	They generally define it as coordinated
23	inauthentic behavior.
24	So they so so that's how they
25	would describe it. They wouldn't normally kind
1	

1	of say misinformation or disinformation. And
2	they would each kind of define coordinated and
3	inauthentic behavior differently.
4	I don't so I don't know that
5	they would agree. I don't want to speak for the
6	platforms, obviously. I don't know if they
7	would agree that they were framing it as
8	misinformation or disinformation.
9	Q. From the CISA MDM teams
10	perspective, is coordinated inauthentic behavior
11	typically a kind of mis and disinformation?
12	A. It could lead to mis or
13	disinformation, for sure, yeah. But it's not
14	always mis or disinformation.
15	Q. So the coordinated and inauthentic
16	behavior may be a source of mis or
17	disinformation of particular concern?
18	A. It could be, yeah. It could be an
19	indicator.
20	Q. Let me ask this: Turning back to
21	the org chart, that should be on the screen,
22	below Ms. Protentis, is Chad Josiah, who's
23	described as the resilience lead. What is his
24	role on your team?
25	A. So he manages the production of our

1	products. So, you know, for putting out a fact
2	sheet or, for example, we have several graphic
3	novels that we've developed, he would work and
4	manage that process to get the products out, so
5	the review process, the drafting process, things
6	like that.
7	Q. These products you're referring to,
8	I take it those are written, publicly available
9	bulletins or other written work products
10	discussing disinformation and misinformation; is
11	that right?
12	A. Correct. All of our product are
13	available on our website.
14	Q. Below him is Alex Zaheer, analyst;
15	what does he do?
16	A. He's a more junior analyst. He
17	supports essentially across our three lines of
18	work. So he helps Chad on some, he helps Warren
19	on some of the engagement work, and then he
20	supports Rob Schaul, who leads our analysis work
21	in doing analysis activities, but he kind of
22	cuts across all three.
23	Q. And Rob Schaul is listed over there
24	on the left side as analysis and response lead;
25	correct?

1	A. Yes.
2	Q. What does he do?
3	A. So he does a couple things, so one,
4	he leads our engagement with international
5	partners; two, he builds relationships with the
6	research community, both in academia, across the
7	federal government, as well as in the private
8	sector; and then, three, he pulls that together
9	to identify new reporting or research about MDM
10	that might be of interest to the team; and then
11	the fourth bucket of it is he helps develop kind
12	of analytic type products.
13	So right now, for example, we're
14	working on a risk framework to help our
15	stakeholders understand how to determine if an
16	MDM campaign is a risk to them or not.
17	So he would help kind of on that
18	side of things.
19	Q. Okay. There was so he talks to
20	international partners; who are they?
21	A. It varies. Generally, all of our
22	engagements with international partners come
23	through the State Department or the CISA
24	international office.
25	We have engaged with NATO, G7 at

1	the kind of multilateral level, with the CFI,
2	counter foreign interference forum, that
3	includes several countries. And then we have
4	different bilateral engagements. A lot of
5	countries want to come and talk to us, and so
6	we'll do basically MDM 101 for different
7	countries at their request.
8	Q. So this is both these are both
9	foreign governments and foreign nongovernmental
10	organizations?
11	A. Yeah. I suppose if you consider
12	the multilateral organizations, like NATO and G7
13	as nongovernmental, but essentially we're only
14	talking to government foreign government
15	officials.
16	Q. So the purpose of those discussions
17	is to, what, track misinformation that is
18	circulating in foreign countries that might come
19	to the United States?
20	A. No, that's not the purpose of the
21	meetings.
22	Q. Then what's the purpose?
23	A. The purpose of the meetings is to
24	share information about from a CISA
25	perspective, share information about resilience

1	building. So there's some countries that are
2	much more mature and have been doing it for a
3	long time. So we try to learn from them kind of
4	what they're doing, what works, what doesn't
5	work.
6	So that's, again, from a CISA
7	perspective, that's primarily our engagement
8	with these groups.
9	Q. And then you mentioned that
10	Mr. Schaul coordinates with academic and
11	research partners; is that correct?
12	A. He doesn't coordinate, he builds
13	relationships with, so that we can you know,
14	if you have questions about reporting they put
15	out or public reports that they have, public
16	research, things like that, then we can have
17	conversations with them about that research.
18	Q. Who who who do you
19	have relationships like that with?
20	A. We have relationships with a range
21	of different entities. So from an academic
22	standpoint, we've talked to folks at Harvard, at
23	Clemson, University of Washington, Stanford, I
24	believe we talked to people at Georgetown and
25	American University, Michigan University,

1	University of Michigan.
2	Essentially, if there's an academic
3	research that puts out a report that we think is
4	of interest, and kind of reflects our work, we
5	try to have conversations with them to try to
6	understand what their research findings are, and
7	in a non-profit stage, you know, the Alliance
8	For Securing Democracy, the Digital Frameworks
9	Research Lab sorry, for the court reporter, I
10	know I'm talking quickly. So, you know, groups
11	like that.
12	And then from a private sector
13	perspective we talk to groups like Graphika,
14	Alethia Group (phonetic), and organizations like
15	those, who, again, kind of do that sort of work,
16	mandates, you know, different organizations.
17	So again, the idea is to have a
18	relationship with them so if they put out some
19	reporting or some research publicly, that we can
20	set up a meeting and kind of learn more about
21	what they're seeing and what they're doing.
22	Q. And has that kind of coordination
23	gone on not from the last year but before the
24	2020 election cycle?
25	A. Yeah.

1	Q. And I think you mentioned a few
2	entities there that includes Stanford and the
3	University of Washington, Graphika; correct?
4	A. Correct.
5	Q. And all those organizations were
6	were involved in something called Election
7	<pre>Integrity Partnership; right?</pre>
8	A. Yep.
9	Q. Yeah, what is the Election
10	Integrity Partnership?
11	A. I mean, it's a collaboration
12	amongst I believe in 2020 it's amongst those
13	four amongst four organizations, to to
14	better understand what was going on in the
15	information environment around elections.
16	Q. And you say were those four you
17	say those four organizations, I think I
18	mentioned three, Stanford, University of
19	Washington and Graphika, and was the Atlanta
20	Council involved in that?
21	A. Yeah, I believe the Digital
22	Forensic Research Lab was involved.
23	Q. And then were there other
24	collaborators, besides those four, on the
25	Election Integrity Partnership?

1	A. I think those were the official
2	members of the partnership. I I don't know
3	if you mean something different about
4	collaborators.
5	Q. Well, let me ask this: Was CISA
6	did CISA have any involvement in the Election
7	Integrity Partnership?
8	A. Involvement in the sense that a
9	couple of our interns came up with the idea and
10	that we had some communications with them, yes.
11	Q. What kinds of communications did
12	you have with them?
13	A. So we received some briefings on
14	the work that they were doing. And then, like I
15	said, we had some interns that ended up working
16	on it. Those are principally principally the
17	communications.
18	We had some communications early on
19	in the process, when they were making decisions,
20	when Stanford was trying to figure out what the
21	gap was.
22	So yeah, so it was just general,
23	like you would have with any other research
24	organization.
25	Q. So it was no different than the

1	communications you had with other research
2	organizations?
3	A. I think the one difference, I would
4	say, is that we we probably connected them
5	with other so we connected them with the
6	Center For Internet Security, and we connected
7	them with some of the election official groups,
8	so the National Association of Secretaries of
9	State and the National Association of State
10	Election Directors, and then we facilitated some
11	meetings between those three.
12	Q. Let me ask you this: You said you
13	had I take it you said some CISA interns came
14	up with the idea; is that right?
15	A. Correct.
16	Q. And who are those interns?
17	A. I'm not going to give their names.
18	Q. Who were those interns?
19	A. Yeah, I'm not going to give those
20	names.
21	Q. Who were you have no
22	A. The Stanford students Stanford
23	students have seen substantial amount of
24	harassment from public reporting. I'm not going
25	to include my interns in that.

1	Q. Are you you're declining to
2	answer the question without an instruction?
3	A. Correct.
4	Q. And you said those interns were
5	also involved in the Election Integrity
6	Partnership; correct?
7	A. I believe they worked for the
8	Stanford Internet Observatory, as well, so yes.
9	Q. And they were working for CISA and
10	Stanford Internet Observatory on the project?
11	A. When they came up with the idea,
12	they obviously they were just interns. After
13	their internships a couple of interns remained
14	as interns. Several others went back to
15	Stanford, as students, and did not remain as
16	interns. Two of the interns ended up working on
17	both in the fall; correct.
18	Q. You said two of the interns who
19	were CISA interns, in the fall of 2020, worked
20	on the Election Integrity Partnership; is that
21	right?
22	A. They worked at the Stanford
23	Internet Observatory, which was part of the
24	Partnership.
25	Q. Were there any other interactions

-1	
1	between CISA and the Election Integrity
2	Partnership, that you're aware of?
3	A. So just to say so we had some
4	initial conversation with the interns. We had a
5	conversation with the Stanford Internet
6	Observatory folks about the gap.
7	I believe we received a briefing
8	from them, or two, on kind of what they were
9	putting together.
10	We facilitated some meetings
11	between Stanford folks, the Center For Internet
12	Security, and election officials, where they had
13	discussions about how they would work together.
14	And then I I'm sure we had some
15	conversations, kind of throughout, when they
16	were particularly when they were putting out
17	public reporting about what they were seeing.
18	I wouldn't be surprised if there
19	were some other kind of brief conversations in
20	there, but I'm not recalling.
21	But those are generally the
22	categories of the conversations we had.
23	Q. Did the Election Integrity
24	Partnership, or a similar collaboration of any
25	kind, operate during the 2022 election cycle?

	<u> </u>
1	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.
2	BY MR. SAUER:
3	Q. You may answer.
4	A. So I believe the EIP did operate,
5	but I'm not I'm not certain what they did.
6	Q. How do you know they operated in
7	2022?
8	A. I believe they put out a public
9	some public reporting.
10	Q. Did you have
11	A. But I
12	Q. Go ahead.
13	A. We did not have communications with
14	them. They gave us a briefing, early on, about
15	what they were thinking about, and that was the
16	extent of our communications with them on that
17	stuff.
18	Q. When did that briefing occur?
19	A. I believe it was May/June of 2022.
20	Q. Who was at that briefing on your
21	end, CISA?
22	A. On my end, it was me, I believe
23	Geoff Hale. Who else was in that? I think one
24	of our I think that may have been it, but
25	there might have been one other staff person

1	there, as well. But it was primarily Geoff Hale
2	and myself, that I recall.
3	Q. Who was in the briefing on the EIP
4	side?
5	A. Renée DiResta was the lead, and
6	then one of their staff, I believe his name was
7	John, but honestly I forget what his name is.
8	Q. So just two people?
9	A. That I recall, yeah.
10	Q. What did they say in the briefing?
11	A. Essentially, they just walked
12	through what their plans were for 2022, some of
13	the lessons learned from 2020, that was
14	essentially the gist of the conversation.
15	Q. What were their plans for 2022?
16	A. It sounded like they were going to
17	do something similar to what they did in 2020 in
18	terms of trying to support election officials.
19	Q. Did they indicate that they were
20	coordinating with state and local election
21	officials?
22	A. I think that was their goal with
23	the with the work with state and local
24	election officials. I'm not sure how they would
25	describe it.

1	Q. Sorry, I think you said this
2	earlier, and I can't remember.
3	When did this briefing occur, would
4	you say it was in May or June of 2022?
5	A. I believe it was around that
6	timeframe. My timeline recollections are awful,
7	so I apologize for that, but I think it was
8	around that timeline.
9	Q. Did you
10	A. Things all blur together.
11	Q. Did they in fact, let me ask
12	you: Did they invite CISA to participate again?
13	A. No. CISA didn't I mean, I
14	wouldn't say CISA participated in 2020, so it
15	wouldn't have been again, so it would have been
16	participate for kind of for the first time.
17	Q. Did they invite CISA to have any
18	role, at all, in what they were doing?
19	A. Not that I recall.
20	Q. Why were they giving you a
21	briefing, then?
22	A. I think they should know our role
23	in the federal government for election security.
24	And we have, you know, an established
25	relationship with them. So I think they were

1	just going around and making sure again, I
2	don't I don't want to speak for them, but my
3	sense was that they were just kind of briefing
4	people who who were involved in election
5	security at the federal level.
6	Q. Do you do you know do you
7	have any knowledge of what they actually did,
8	after that briefing, during the 2022 election
9	cycle?
10	A. No. I know like I said, the
11	reason I I think they were operating was
12	there was a couple of public reports, one at
13	least one public report, that I recall, that I
14	thought was pretty good, but was it about
15	specific disinformation, it was basically how to
16	think about whether or not a narrative poses
17	risks.
18	As I mentioned earlier, we were
19	particularly interested in understanding how to
20	determine if MDM creates risk. And we thought
21	their products was pretty good on that.
22	Q. You used a phrase earlier, that I
23	did I passed over, and I didn't understand, a
24	specific gap that we were talking about putting
25	together the I&P in the first place. What's the

1	gap that you're referring to?
2	A. Sure. So we had a conversation
3	with the interns, and they were asking questions
4	about kind of needs that the election officials
5	have, generally.
6	One of the gaps that we identified
7	from 2018 is, as you know, most election
8	officials their offices are fairly low staff,
9	low resourced, and so there was no they
10	didn't have capabilities to try to identify
11	disinformation targeting their jurisdictions,
12	and so was essentially the gap is that most
13	election offices throughout the country just
14	didn't have that capacity or capability to be
15	monitoring so that they could identify anything
16	that would be potentially target their
17	jurisdictions, so that was the gap.
18	Q. So the gap is that state and local
19	election officials don't just don't have the
20	bandwidth or capacity to monitor mis and
21	disinformation on social media that may affect
22	their jurisdictions; right?
23	A. Correct.
24	Q. And then I take it was it the
25	interns' idea that the Election Integrity

1	Partnership could be set up to kind of fill in
2	that gap, was that the idea?
3	A. Again, I don't want to speak for
4	the interns. But at that point I don't think
5	they were necessarily thinking about more of a
6	partnership.
7	I think the conversation was more
8	along the lines of this may be something that
9	the Stanford Internet Observatory could look
10	into, and then I think they went back and talked
11	to their folks at the Stanford Internet
12	Observatory and the idea was formed from there.
13	So I don't think that was the
14	interns' initial thought was to have the EIP.
15	Q. Was there discussions of having
16	CISA fill that gap, for example, by doing
17	routing disinformation concerns to social media
18	platforms?
19	A. With the there's no conversation
20	with the interns about CISA filling the gap, no.
21	Q. How about internally to CISA, did
22	CISA view itself as kind of helping fill that
23	gap by, you know, helping state and local
24	election officials addressing this mis and
25	disinformation concern?

1	A. Our focus generally was not to play
2	that role, no. We we weren't looking to
3	identify monitor social media to share with
4	platforms.
5	Q. You mentioned that you I think
6	you mentioned you put EIP in touch with CIS, the
7	Center For Internet Security; is that right?
8	A. Correct.
9	Q. What is the Center For Internet
10	Security.
11	A. I don't I don't know how to
12	describe them. They're essentially, as I
13	understand it, they're non-profit that oversees
14	the multi-state ISAC and the election
15	infrastructure subsector information sharing and
16	analysis center, that's what ISAC stands for, so
17	that's my understanding of what they do. I
18	don't know what else they do. I know them in
19	those two contexts.
20	Q. And those two contexts are
21	overseeing an ISAC, I-S-A-C, that involves
22	multiple states; is that right?
23	A. Correct.
24	Q. Now, and that's a basically a
25	sharing collaborative that they facilitate

1	amongst state and local election officials; is
2	that right?
3	A. Yeah, it's a general woven artifact
4	is information sharing with the sector. So each
5	sector not each most sectors have their
6	own information sharing and analysis center.
7	They're independently stood up to serve those
8	sectors.
9	And so CIS was the one who was
10	responsible for kind of running the two that I
11	mentioned.
12	Q. I'm sorry, what were those two, can
13	you identify them again?
14	A. Sure. The multistate ISAC and the
15	election infrastructure subsector ISAC. And
16	just as a reminder of what ISAC is Information
17	Sharing and Analysis Center.
18	Q. And those are, I think, referred to
19	as the EI-ISAC and the MS-ISAC; is that right?
20	A. That's correct.
21	Q. And both of those, I take it,
22	involve basically information sharing amongst
23	state and local election officials; is that
24	right?
25	A. I believe only the election

1 infrastructure one is focussed on -- on election 2 officials. I believe the multistate one is 3 broader across state and local government, but includes a broader set. I'm not sure if election officials are involved in the 5 6 multistate. 7 Ο. Is the Center For Internet Security funded, in part, by CISA? 9 Α. To the best of my knowledge, CISA 10 provides funding for the EI-ISAC. 11 Okay. And do you know how -- how Q. 12 is that funding provided, is it grants or how is 13 it provided? 14 Α. I don't believe it's a grant, but 15 I'm not 100 percent certain what the -- what the 16 actual mechanism is, vehicle for the money to go 17 there. 18 Q. But they're --19 My understanding is that it's 20 statutory, as well, but I could be wrong, also, 21 so I don't want to speak too much. 22 But you're aware that CISA does 23 provide funding for CIS to operate the EI-ISAC; 24 is that right? 25 My understanding is that they

1 provide funding to the EI-ISAC. I don't know if 2 the goes -- if the EI-ISAC is an organization, 3 and the money goes to them or if the money goes to CIS, and then they filter it down to the 5 EI-ISAC. I'm not sure how it works, in 6 practice. 7 Q. Does CIS operate the EI-ISAC, I mean, does it kind of run it? 9 Α. Yeah, that's essentially how I see it, yeah. 10 11 Q. And then you say you put them in 12 touch, or CISA put the EIP in touch with CIS in 13 2020, do you remember that? 14 Α. Yes. 15 Ο. How did that happen? 16 So CISA's general position on -- on 17 the switchboarding role was that it wasn't a 18 role we necessarily wanted to play, because it's 19 very resource intensive. And so we had been 20 working with election officials to try to find 21 an alternate way for them to have that role, 22 somebody play that role. 23 They seemed to settle on the Center 24 For Internet Security. And so since the EIP was 25 working on the same mission, we wanted to make

1	sure that they were all connected.
2	Q. And so the same mission, I take it,
3	is the switchboarding role that you've talked
4	about before?
5	A. Correct.
6	Q. Yeah, so I take it CISA was playing
7	a switchboarding role in 2020, but you mentioned
8	that that's resource intensive and it wasn't
9	something that you guys wanted to be principally
10	responsible for; right?
11	A. Something we didn't want to be
12	responsible for, at all. But election officials
13	asked if we could continue serving in that role
14	until they kind of got something else set up.
15	Q. And you did do that, right, in 2020
16	you mentioned earlier that CISA performed a
17	switchboarding function; right?
18	A. Correct, in 2020.
19	Q. And then Center For Internet
20	Security performs a switchboarding function,
21	too; is that right?
22	A. Yeah. So yes, yes and no. So yes
23	in the sense they were receiving reporting
24	directly from election officials. In the early
25	part of 2020, they would forward what they were

1	receiving election officials to us at CISA, and
2	then we would push that to the social media
3	platform; as 2021 moved along, CIS more
4	frequently provided that directly to the
5	platforms, themselves.
6	And so I would say early on in the
7	process, the switchboarding generally came
8	through CISA. Later on in the process, it was
9	more of a mixed bag of how the switchboarding
10	worked.
11	Q. And then did EIP play a
12	switchboarding role, too?
13	A. I believe EIP did report stuff to
14	the platforms, themselves, yes.
15	Q. And was there coordination between
16	the switchboarders, so to speak, CISA and EIP
17	and CIS?
18	A. Most of the coordination was
19	between CISA and the Centers For Internet
20	Security.
21	There was a point where one of the
22	platforms was concerned about too much kind of
23	duplicate reporting coming in, and so we did
24	have some conversations with EIP and CIS on how
25	to kind of better manage that activity to make

1	sure we weren't overwhelming the platforms.
2	Q. In other words, like Twitter or
3	Facebook would be hearing from CIS and CISA and
4	EIP about a disinformation concern; correct?
5	A. Yeah. Generally speaking, yes,
6	I'll just leave it there, yes, that's correct.
7	Q. And then
8	A. Twitter, in particular, reached out
9	to us and had some concerns about that.
10	Q. And I take you talked to EIP and
11	talked to CIS about creating a more streamlined
12	process through the platforms?
13	A. I don't think it was necessarily a
14	streamlined process. We just wanted to make
15	sure that there was that there was awareness
16	for the platform.
17	So I think, to be honest with you,
18	I don't recall how we ended up following this,
19	in practice. But I think it was just we would
20	let everybody know when we were setting
21	something up through CIS. We would let CIS
22	know, and I think CIS, through that
23	relationship, would like EIP know.
24	But I don't recall, specifically,
25	how we ended up kind of solving that problem.

1	Q. But at least there was, I guess,
2	kind of communication among CISA, the EIP, and
3	CIS about who was reporting various concerns in
4	an attempt to kind of de-duplicate what's being
5	sent to the social media platforms?
6	A. Yeah, I don't recall being directly
7	from CISA to EIP. Like I said, I think we
8	mostly worked it through CIS.
9	Q. Was there for example, was there
10	direct e-mail communication between EIP and
11	CISA?
12	A. I'm sure there was.
13	Q. I mean, was it your practice to
14	copy the CISA's or sorry the EIP's tips,
15	e-mail address when you were you or CIS was
16	reporting a disinformation concern to a social
17	media platform?
18	A. No, that was not standard practice.
19	Q. Did CIS do that?
20	A. I don't know. That's a good
21	question. I don't know.
22	Q. Why don't we
23	A. Just to be clear, you're sorry,
24	just to be clear, you were asking if they were
25	sending EIP when they sent e-mail to social

1	media platforms; correct.
2	Q. Yeah.
3	A. Yeah, I'm not sure. Sorry.
4	Q. When when was EIP copied by CIS
5	or you on disinformation e-mails, if ever?
6	A. I don't believe we ever CISA
7	ever copied EIS on e-mails we sent to platforms.
8	I don't but where we were forwarding if we
9	were forwarding something we received from an
10	election official to the platform, I don't
11	believe CISA ever copied EIP, certainly not to
12	my recollection. It wasn't kind of our process.
13	I can't speak for the Center For
14	<pre>Internet Security. I don't I don't recall</pre>
15	who they were including on theirs.
16	Q. Did you notify EIP if you were
17	flagging a disinformation concern for a social
18	media platform in any way?
19	A. Not that I not directly, that I
20	recall. We would we would generally copy the
21	Center For Internet Security.
22	Q. Was it your understanding that they
23	were communicating with EIP?
24	A. CIS? Yeah, that was essentially
25	the their relationship was between those two,

1	yeah.
2	Q. So in other words, you had the
3	understanding that CIS had a relationship of
4	communication and coordination with the Election
5	Integrity Partnership; right?
6	A. Yes. Correct.
7	Q. And then you would notify CIS if
8	you were reporting something to a social media
9	platform on the understanding that they were
10	coordinating with EIP on what was being
11	reported; correct?
12	A. No. The reason we we would
13	coordinate with CIS was generally most of the
14	reporting we received from an election official
15	came through CIS. And so we just wanted to let
16	them know that we were we had set it up so
17	that they had awareness of kind of where the
18	report had gone. And so that was the rationale
19	for us coordinating with CIS.
20	Q. And did you have the understanding
21	that CIS was coordinating with EIP on what was
22	being reported?
23	A. I that would be speculating on
24	exactly what they were doing there. I'm not
25	sure.

1	Q. You didn't know what they were
2	doing?
3	A. I mean, I know they coordinated on
4	things. I don't know the full nature of what
5	they were coordinating on, I don't want to put
6	words in their mouth.
7	(Exhibit No. 1 was marked for
8	identification.)
9	MR. SAUER: Let's look at Exhibit
10	1. I've sent that to your counsel.
11	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, we've got it up
12	here.
13	BY MR. SAUER:
14	Q. Can you also see it on the screen
15	share?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Are you familiar with this
18	document?
19	A. Yes.
20	Q. In other words, is this the report
21	that the Election Integrity Partnership did in
22	2021, about its activities in the 2020 election?
23	A. Correct.
24	Q. Had you read it before or how did
25	it get on your attention?

1	A. Yeah, I've read portions of it
2	before, and some of the folks briefed us on it.
3	Q. Who are the folks that briefed you
4	on it?
5	A. Alex Stamos and Renée DiResta.
6	Q. When did that briefing occur?
7	A. I'm sorry, when or where?
8	Q. When did that briefing occur?
9	A. It was late spring, early summer
10	2021.
11	Q. This would have been around the
12	time that the report was released?
13	A. Yeah, sometime after that.
14	Q. And Alex Stamos is at Stanford
15	<pre>Internet Observatory; right?</pre>
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Does he also serve on some CISA
18	committees or subcommittees?
19	A. I don't know.
20	Q. Renée DiResta, is she also at
21	Stanford Stanford Internet Observatory; is
22	that right?
23	A. Yes. Yes, last I checked.
24	Q. Do you remember what they said in
25	the briefing?

1	A. I think they just walked through
2	kind of what they did and how they did it,
3	explained what they kind of learned, how they
4	viewed some of the issues, things like that.
5	Q. Who participated in the briefing,
6	other than you, for CISA?
7	A. So I received a briefing when I was
8	at the National Security Council. So it was a
9	National Security Council colleague of mine,
10	Marybeth Foley (phonetic).
11	Q. Did CISA receive a briefing?
12	A. I don't know for certain.
13	Q. Did you do I can't remember if
14	you said this did you do a detail on the
15	National Security Council in that timeframe?
16	A. From January 2021 to March 2022 I
17	was on detail to the National Security Council.
18	Q. Why did they report to the National
19	Security Council?
20	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
21	speculation.
22	BY MR. SAUER:
23	Q. You may answer.
24	A. Yeah, I don't know why.
25	Q. I mean, were they reporting back to

1	you because you had communicated with them back
2	in 2020 or was it a report to your agency?
3	MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound,
4	calls for speculation.
5	A. Yeah, again, I don't I don't
6	know why they why they wanted to brief us.
7	Q. Can you see the document on the
8	screen share?
9	A. Yep.
10	Q. Scrolling down here on the third
11	page of the document, they list the participants
12	here. Are these the same participants that you
13	talked about earlier?
14	A. Yeah.
15	Q. Yeah? And I think you mentioned
16	Stanford Internet Observatory includes Alex
17	Stamos and Renée DiResta; correct?
18	A. Yes.
19	Q. And then the University of
20	Washington, Center For an Informed Public, is
21	that where Dr. Kate Starbird works?
22	A. I believe so, yes.
23	Q. And is she also on a CISA
24	subcommittee? Actually, isn't she on the MDM
25	subcommittee for the CSAC?

1	A. I believe that's correct, yeah.
2	Q. And is she also involved in the
3	Election Integrity Partnership?
4	A. Yeah, that's my understanding.
5	Q. Jumping ahead just a tiny bit, past
6	the table of contents, here in the executive
7	summary, on page six, little Roman six, you see
8	here it says: Election Integrity Partnership
9	was formed to enable realtime information
10	exchange between election officials, government
11	agencies, civil society organizations, social
12	media platforms, the media, and the research
13	community; correct?
14	A. Yeah, I see that sentence.
15	Q. There's a reference to both
16	election officials and government agencies
17	engaging in realtime information exchange with
18	social media platforms; correct?
19	A. Yes.
20	Q. What do you know what government
21	agencies engaged in realtime information
22	exchange under the aegis of the EIP?
23	A. I don't know who they're referring
24	to.
25	Q. Did CISA do that, at all? Did CISA

1	share information with EIP?
2	A. Generally speaking, no.
3	Q. How about more specifically, did
4	anyone at CISA share information with the EIP?
5	A. I mean, that's very broad. Did we
6	share information? Can you be more specific
7	about what type of information you're asking
8	that we shared? We had conversations with them,
9	so in that sense we shared information. Is
10	there something in particular that you're asking
11	about?
12	Q. Sure. What conversations did you
13	have with them? I know you summarized them
14	earlier, can you be more specific?
15	A. Yeah, I mean, I think that summary
16	actually is is probably as specific as I can
17	get. Like I said, we we had conversations
18	with Stanford about the gap. They gave us some
19	briefings on what they were doing, how they were
20	doing it.
21	Prior to the election, we had some
22	conversations with them to facilitate and
23	coordinate meetings, as I mentioned. And then
24	when they put public reporting out, if we had
25	questions about it, we would probably have

1	conversations with them around that, as well.
2	Q. Was there any communication from
3	government officials to EIP about specific
4	disinformation concerns?
5	A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
6	Q. Who at CISA was involved in any
7	interactions with the Election Integrity
8	Partnership?
9	A. In addition to the two interns, the
10	primary interaction was myself and Matt
11	Masterson.
12	Q. Are you aware of anyone else at
13	CISA communicating with them?
14	A. It's possible, but I don't recall,
15	and it certainty wouldn't have been you know,
16	they would have just been part of a meeting with
17	either Matt or myself.
18	Q. How about Lauren Protentis, did she
19	communicate?
20	A. She wasn't part of the MDM team in
21	2020.
22	Q. How about
23	A. So she would not have been
24	communicating them.
25	Q. How about Geoff Hale?

1	A. I I wouldn't be surprised if
2	Geoff was on some of the conversations, but I
3	don't recall I don't recall him
4	participating.
5	Q. How about Director Easterly? I
6	guess she wasn't director back then. How about
7	Director Krebs?
8	A. I believe Director Krebs had a
9	relationship with Alex Stamos. So he may have
10	had conversations in that context. I don't I
11	don't believe he had necessarily had
12	conversations in relation to EIP.
13	Q. And then, in fact, when he left
14	CISA he joined Alex Stamos at the Stanford
15	Internet Observatory or he joined Alex Stamos in
16	some capacity, didn't he?
17	A. I believe they started a business
18	together, yes.
19	Q. Do you know what that business was?
20	A. I'm sorry?
21	Q. Do you know what that business was?
22	A. I believe the name of it is
23	Krebs Krebs/Stamos Group.
24	Q. Do you know what it does?
25	A. I believe cyber security theft.

1	I'm not entirely sure.
2	Q. Does it do anything related to
3	misinformation and disinformation?
4	A. I don't know, if they do it hasn't
5	been something they've been promoting, that I'm
6	aware of.
7	Q. Are you aware of any communications
8	between Director Krebs Krebs and Alex Stamos
9	while he while Krebs was still director?
10	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.
11	A. Yeah, it's really vague.
12	Again what
13	Q. Any communications is broad and not
14	vague.
15	I want to know if you have any
16	communications of any kind between Director
17	Krebs and Alex Stamos when Krebs was still
18	director of CISA?
19	MR. GARDNER: Same objection.
20	A. I believe they Director Krebs
21	may have participated in a couple of meetings
22	that I'm aware of, that Stamos was also in, but
23	beyond that I'm I'm not familiar with
24	obviously not going to be familiar with Krebs's
25	direct communications with Stamos.

1	Q. What meetings were they both
2	involved in, if you recall?
3	A. So I can recall an event that
4	occurred out in Stanford, that Krebs spoke at
5	for the Stanford Internet Observatory, for
6	example. I believe the first government
7	industry sync Stamos was the Facebook lead, at
8	the time. This was before he went to Stanford
9	Internet Observatory, and Director Krebs
10	participated in that meeting, so meetings like
11	that.
12	Beyond that, I don't have a real
13	understanding of how they communicated with each
14	other.
15	Q. Was there any discussion of the
16	Election Integrity Partnership at the meetings
17	you're aware of?
18	A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
19	Q. Turning back to the screen share,
20	it talks about election officials, engaging in
21	realtime information sharing with social media
22	platforms, among others; do you see that?
23	A. Yeah, as part of that same
24	sentence, right; is that what you're referring
25	to?

1	Q. Yeah.
2	A. Yeah.
3	Q. Are you aware of state and local
4	election officials engaging in realtime
5	information sharing with the election
6	integrity you know, with social media
7	platforms through the Election Integrity
8	Partnership?
9	A. I I don't know the relationship
10	between EIP and election officials. I'm not
11	sure if they're referring to direct reporting to
12	them from election officials or if they're
13	referring to reporting through the Center for
14	Internet Security, I'm just not sure what
15	they're referring to there.
16	Q. How about through the Center For
17	Internet Security, was there election reporting
18	through them?
19	A. Yeah, so generally speaking, the
20	reporting that CISA received came through the
21	Center For Internet Security.
22	Q. Gotcha.
23	And how about did
24	as to the extent you understand, did EIP
25	receive reporting through the Center of Internet

1	Security, you know, kind of from election
2	officials through the internet security to the
3	Election Integrity Partnership?
4	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
5	foundation.
6	BY MR. SAUER:
7	Q. You may answer. Do you know if
8	A. Yeah, I I'm not I'm not sure
9	what their full relationship was and how they
10	were sharing, what the specifics were. It
11	wouldn't surprise me if CIS had shared some with
12	EIP, but I just don't know.
13	Q. You mentioned Matt Masterson, and I
14	think you said that he was involved in briefing
15	with the EIP; is that correct?
16	A. No. He was involved involved
17	in in conversations with Stanford Internet
18	Observatory. He probably generally, all of
19	our so just to take a step back, generally
20	our communications, when VIPs stood up, were
21	still at the Stanford Internet Observatory.
22	So the conversations I'm aware of
23	with Masterson were generally at the Stanford
24	Internet Observatory. He was also briefed I
25	seem to recall he was probably in some of the

1	briefings I was in or conversations when we had
2	questions about reporting that they did, public
3	reporting.
4	So I don't know how to kind of
5	thread the needle between, you know, when they
6	were just conversations with Stanford Internet
7	Observatory and when they would be considered
8	conversations with the EIP.
9	Q. And that, I take it, you said
10	thread the needle, I take it that's kind of a
11	fuzzy distinction, because the EIP is a
12	collaboration that involves the Stanford
13	<pre>Internet Observatory; correct?</pre>
14	A. Right.
15	Q. Do you know do you know let
16	me ask you this: What discussions do you know
17	of between Matt Masterson and Stanford Internet
18	Observatory that related in any way to the EIP?
19	A. I think it would have just been if
20	we had questions about public reporting.
21	Q. What is
22	A. Kind of once they were up and
23	running.
24	So he was involved in some of the
25	conversations before, you know, the first couple

1	that I talked to about, kind of in our
2	engagement with Stanford Internet Observatory,
3	he was involved, I know, in at least one of the
4	conversations about that.
5	And then, after that, I don't think
6	he was particularly involved, but he may have
7	been involved, and we had some briefings for
8	or not briefings, I don't think is the right
9	word, where we had conversations with them about
10	public reporting we put out.
11	Q. When you say public reporting, what
12	do you mean?
13	A. So the EIP put out regular kind of
14	blog posts, excuse me, regular blog posts on
15	what they were seeing, so so it was publicly
16	available information.
17	Q. And and did you did they
18	discuss, you know, those blog posts with Matt
19	Masterson or you before they were posted?
20	A. Not that I recall.
21	Q. And what discussions did you have
22	with the public reporting?
23	MR. SCOTT: John, just one second,
24	it looks like the video is frozen on our end.
25	Does it appear frozen on your end, as well.

1	MR. SAUER: I see a little
2	interference. Shall we go off the record?
3	THE WITNESS: There's interference
4	with the top and the bottom. I'm not seeing
5	that. Still, we can go off we can go off the
6	record and try to fix that.
7	MR. SAUER: Let's go off the
8	record.
9	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
10	10:27. We are off the record.
11	(Recess.)
12	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
13	10:40. We are back on the record.
14	BY MR. SAUER:
15	Q. Mr. Scully, I think we were talking
16	about Matt Masterson before we had the
17	technical technical difficulty.
18	Generally speaking, do you know
19	what role he had, if any, in originating the
20	concept for the Election Integrity Partnership?
21	A. So his primary role was the same as
22	mine, in terms of just clarifying the gap that
23	election officials faced for the folks at the
24	Stanford Internet Observatory early on in the
25	process.

1	O And is that something that you
	Q. And is that something that you
2	discussed with the interns when they came up
3	with the idea? Did the interns come to you or
4	Mr. Masterson and talk about the gap?
5	A. I'm sorry, so are you referring
6	specifically to the gap?
7	Q. Yeah.
8	A. Yeah, so the gap came from our
9	the gap came from myself.
10	Q. That was your idea, that there is a
11	gap, and you shared that with the interns?
12	A. I'm not sure I would say that was
13	my idea. That was that was just kind of from
14	lessons learned from 2018, I think across the
15	election community.
16	I don't know that I would say that
17	that was that was something that we came up
18	with on our own.
19	Q. Is that something you shared with
20	the interns?
21	A. It is something I shared with the
22	interns, correct.
23	Q. And then the interns came up with
24	the idea of putting together the Election
25	Integrity Partnership as a way of assisting

1	state and local election authorities of filling
2	that gap; right?
3	A. I don't I don't know what the
4	exact process was, essentially they identified
5	the gap. They went back and talked to the folks
6	at the Stanford Internet Observatory. And
7	somewhere in that sausage making process, along
8	the way, they decided that this partnership
9	would be the best approach to take.
10	Q. In that timeframe, did they also
11	have discussions with you about putting together
12	something like this?
13	A. I'm sure they mentioned it to us
14	somewhere along the line, that this was
15	something they were thinking about, but I
16	don't I don't know that it went beyond that.
17	Q. How about Mr. Masterson, did they
18	discuss it with him?
19	A. Again, I'm not familiar with all of
20	Matt's communications with these folks, but he
21	was in the meeting where we talked about the gap
22	with Stamos, in particular. And I believe
23	Stamos mentioned that as an option during that
24	call. I don't know if he had any other
25	conversations with them. I don't know about

-	
1	that.
2	Q. When did that meeting with Alex
3	Stamos occur?
4	A. Sometime in the summer of 2020, it
5	would have yeah, I don't know. The exact
6	date would be hard for me to figure out, sorry.
7	Yeah, the interns sorry the interns
8	probably arrived in the May timeframe, so we
9	probably would have had had that conversation
10	the initial conversation sometime in June. And
11	then probably Stamos, you know, a week or two
12	after that, so probably June/July, I would say.
13	Q. Was Mr. Masterson in the meeting
14	where you discussed the gap with the interns?
15	A. Not that I recall, no.
16	Q. What did Mr. Stamos say in this
17	meeting you recall from the June to July
18	timeframe of 2020?
19	A. Essentially, he just wanted to
20	confirm that we agreed with the interns that
21	this was a gap.
22	Q. What what was said about the gap
23	in that meeting, that you remember?
24	A. Yeah, it was basically along the
25	lines he just said, hey, the interns told me

1 that there's a gap for election officials where 2 most of them don't have the resources to do --3 to identify disinformation that may be targeting their jurisdictions, is that -- did the interns 5 give me that information correctly. He was 6 thinking about potentially doing something, and 7 he obviously didn't want to spend time and resources doing something if there wasn't, in 9 fact, a gap. 10 Q. How long did this meeting occur or 11 last, do you think? 12 That's all of maybe 10 or 15 Α. 13 minutes. 14 Was there any other communications 15 with Mr. Stamos during this timeframe? 16 MR. GARDNER: Objection, vaque, 17 also calls for speculation. 18 BY MR. SAUER: 19 Q. Do you remember any? 20 So I don't recall any conversations Α. 21 I had with him in that timeframe. I obviously 22 can't speak for Masterson. 23 Scroll ahead to page XII. 0. Okay. There's a thank you there for contributors, and 24 25 you see Kate Starbird is on that list; do you

1	see that? You can look at the screen share.
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. You're there? Yeah, do you know
4	A. Yeah, I got it.
5	Q. Do you know how she contributed to
6	the Election Integrity Partnership?
7	A. I don't.
8	Q. And I see Alex Stamos up here,
9	obviously kind of set the thing off; right? Do
10	you know how else he was involved?
11	A. I don't.
12	Q. Okay. Down here it says the
13	Election Integrity Partnership would like to
14	thank Matt Masterson for additional feedback; do
15	you see that?
16	A. I do.
17	Q. Do you know what feedback
18	Mr. Masterson provided to the Election Integrity
19	Partnership?
20	A. I don't.
21	Q. When did Mr. Masterson leave CISA
22	and go to Microsoft?
23	A. So Matt left CISA, I believe, in
24	January 2021. I don't think he started at
25	Microsoft until early 2022.

1	Q. Oh, do you know what he did in the
2	intervening year?
3	A. I believe he he worked he was
4	a fellow at the Stanford Internet Observatory.
5	Q. Oh, so he went from CISA to work
6	with Alex Stamos's group at the Stanford
7	Internet Observatory?
8	A. That's my understanding, yes.
9	Q. And Mr. Masterson is thanked here,
10	in this spring of 2021, I take it he was at the
11	Stanford Internet Observatory by then?
12	A. I don't know when he officially
13	started.
14	Q. I'm going to jump ahead to page 2
15	of the executive summary. So if you're
16	following on the PDF it would be the 20th page
17	of the PDF.
18	There's a discussion here where it
19	says: The initial idea for the partnership came
20	from four students that the Stanford Internet
21	Observatory funded to complete volunteer
22	<pre>internships at CISA; right?</pre>
23	A. Correct.
24	Q. Okay. You've declined to identify
25	them, early in your testimony. Do you know who

1	they are? Who are those four students? Do you
2	know who they are?
3	A. I know for certain who two are, I
4	believe I know who the third is, I'm unsure who
5	the fourth is.
6	Q. What what were they doing in
7	their internships for CISA at the time they
8	originated this idea?
9	A. They had different activities, so
10	they supported across the election security
11	initiative, broadly. So tying to think if I can
12	recall specific tasks that they had.
13	Q. And then, if you look to the next
14	two sentences, it talks about responsibilities
15	for election information security is divided
16	across government offices, and it goes on to say
17	that, yet, no government agency in the United
18	States has the explicit mandate to monitor and
19	correct election mis and disinformation;
20	correct?
21	A. I'm sorry, is that the next page?
22	Q. If you look at the screen share,
23	can you read that? I can zoom in, if that
24	helps.
25	MR. GARDNER: A few sentences below

1 where he was reading. 2 THE WITNESS: Okay. Got you. 3 BY MR. SAUER: 4 Ο. So it says: Yet, no government 5 agency in the United States has the explicit 6 mandate to monitor and correct misinformation 7 and disinformation; correct? Α. Sorry, I'm just trying to read and 9 catch up. 10 Q. I'm just asking if you see where it 11 says that. 12 Yeah, I see where it says that. Α. 13 Q. And it seems to me that they're 14 talking about a slightly different gap than the 15 one you talked about earlier; right? They're 16 saying there's a gap in federal government 17 authority to monitor and correct election mis 18 and disinformation, right, as opposed to a gap 19 among the capacity for state and local election 20 authorities to do it; right? 21 To be honest, I don't know what Α. 22 they're referencing, so I don't -- I don't want 23 to speculate on what they're trying to say 24 there. 25 Q. Let me ask you this: Do you think

1	there's a gap in the authority of federal
2	government agencies to monitor and correct
3	election mis and disinformation?
4	MR. GARDNER: Objection to the
5	extent it calls for a legal conclusion.
6	BY MR. SAUER:
7	Q. Do you think that?
8	A. Yeah, I'm not a I'm not a
9	lawyer, I don't want to comment on the legal
10	authorities of the departmental agencies.
11	Q. I'm just asking whether you
12	think I'm not asking for your legal
13	conclusion, I'm asking whether you think there's
14	a gap in the authority of federal agencies that
15	makes them unable to monitor and correct mis and
16	disinformation?
17	MR. GARDNER: Same objection, calls
18	for a legal conclusion.
19	A. Yeah, by definition, an authority
20	is a legal determination I'm not comfortable
21	making.
22	Q. Let me ask you this: As a
23	practical matter, do you believe there's a gap
24	in the ability, as opposed to the authority, the
25	ability of federal government agencies to

1	monitor and correct mis and disinformation?
2	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.
3	BY MR. SAUER:
4	Q. You may answer.
5	A. Yeah, can you clarify exactly what
6	you're asking? I just want to make sure I
7	understand what you're trying to get at.
8	Q. I'm using your word, a gap; right?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. You just called it a gap, earlier,
11	and that's a practical word, it's not a legal
12	conclusion?
13	A. Correct.
14	Q. So I'm asking you, you talked about
15	a gap with respect to the capacities of state
16	and local election authorities; correct?
17	A. That's correct, yeah.
18	Q. Do you think there's a similar gap
19	with respect to the ability of federal
20	government agencies to respond to mis and
21	disinformation on social media?
22	MR. GARDNER: Same objection,
23	vague.
24	A. I I think the federal government
25	certainly would have the capability, if it chose

1	to use it, and had the authority to do it.
2	Q. Do you think it hasn't chosen to
3	use that capability?
4	A. So generally speaking, I'm trying
5	to understand your question. So is there a gap
6	in the federal government's ability to, what, to
7	provide information on social media about what's
8	online on their platforms, is that what you're
9	asking?
10	Q. I'm asking if there was a gap in
11	the federal government's ability to, you know,
12	take any kind of action to correct mis and
13	disinformation on social media?
14	MR. GARDNER: Same objection, to
15	the extent it calls for a legal conclusion.
16	A. Yeah, I don't know that there's a
17	gap in the federal government's ability to do
18	it.
19	Q. Well, let me ask this: It goes on
20	to say let me ask you this: This notion that
21	the report says that no government agency in the
22	United States has the explicit mandate to
23	monitor and correct election mis and
24	disinformation, is that something that was
25	discussed with the CISA interns who originated

1	the EIP?
2	A. Not that I recall, no.
3	Q. Do you remember any discussions of
4	that with anyone else, suggesting that, you
5	know, there's no government agency in United
6	States with an explicit mandate to monitor and
7	correct election mis and disinformation?
8	A. No, not that I not that I
9	recall. It's possible, though.
10	Q. It goes on to say: This is
11	especially true for election disinformation that
12	originates from within the United States, which
13	would likely be excluded from law enforcement
14	action under the first amendment, is not
15	appropriate for study by intelligence agencies
16	restricted from operating in the United States;
17	connect?
18	A. That's what the sentence says, yes.
19	Q. Do you agree with that sentence?
20	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
21	a legal conclusion.
22	BY MR. SAUER:
23	Q. Do you?
24	MR. GARDNER: Same objection.
25	A. I'm sorry, I'm reading the

1	sentence.
2	Yeah, this definitely gets into
3	legal authority stuff that I would not want to
4	comment on.
5	Q. And the next sentence says: As a
6	result, during the 2020 election local and state
7	election officials, who had a strong partner on
8	election system and overall cyber security
9	efforts in CISA, were without a clearinghouse
10	for assessing mis and disinformation targeting
11	their voting operations; correct?
12	A. Yeah, that's what this sentence
13	says.
14	Q. That, to me, sounds like it's
15	talking about the same gap you talked about
16	earlier, and that's state and local election
17	officials were without a clearinghouse for
18	assessing mis and disinformation targeting their
19	voting operations; right?
20	A. That's how I read that sentence,
21	yeah.
22	Q. Yeah, and I take it that this
23	report links that gap to gaps that they perceive
24	in federal authority; right?
25	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for

1	speculation.
2	A. Yeah, I don't want to speculate on
3	what they're trying to do there.
4	Q. Okay. Next sentence says:
5	Students approach SIO leadership in the early
6	summer, and in consultation with CISA and other
7	stakeholders a coalition was assembled with
8	like-minded partner institutions; do you see
9	that?
10	A. I do.
11	Q. What let me ask you this: It
12	says, in consultation with CISA, what
13	consultation with CISA do you recall relating to
14	the assembling of this coalition?
15	A. I don't recall any consultation
16	with relation to the assembly of the coalition.
17	Q. Well, you don't recall anyone
18	consulting with CISA about putting together the
19	Election Integrity Partnership?
20	MR. GARDNER: Objection,
21	mischaracterizes the witness's previous
22	testimony.
23	A. Yeah, so I don't recall any
24	consultation with us about who would be involved
25	in the in the EIP, who their members would be

1 c	or anything like that.
2	Q. Do you remember any consultation of
3 a	any kind about starting up the EIP in any
4 c	connection?
5	A. Just what I referred to earlier,
6 t	the conversations with the interns and the
7 c	conversation with Stamos about verifying the gap
8 €	existed.
9	Q. How about Mr. Masterson, is it
10 r	possible they consulted with him?
11	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
12 s	speculation.
13	A. Yeah, I don't know what
14 c	conversations Matt had with them.
15	Q. Do you know whether he had any
16 c	conversations with them relating to the
17 c	commencement of the EIP?
18	A. I don't.
19	Q. And the next page of the document,
20 t	they provide an operational timeline; do you see
21 t	chat?
22	A. I do.
23	Q. And here, the second entry in their
24 c	operational timeline, is I'm having trouble
25 h	nighlighting it says: July 9th of 2020,

1	meeting with CISA to present EIP concept; do you
2	see that?
3	A. Yep, I see that.
4	Q. Do you know what meeting that is
5	referring to?
6	A. I don't know specifically what
7	meeting that's referring to, no.
8	Q. Would that to your mind, would
9	that describe the 10 to 15 minute phone call you
10	had with Alex Stamos about the gap that you
11	talked about earlier? Would you have described
12	that phone call as a meeting with the EIP for
13	EIP to present for to present the EIP
14	concept to CISA?
15	A. That 10 to 15 minute phone call
16	only included Stamos, that I recall. So I don't
17	know that I would frame it as a meeting to
18	present the EIP concept.
19	As I mentioned earlier, he did kind
20	of raise the possibility of setting up some sort
21	of a partnership, during that call, so that
22	could be what his what his thinking was, but
23	I don't know what he's referring to there.
24	Q. What kind of a partnership did he
25	talk about in that call?

1	A. He just said he thought he he
2	was thinking about potentially just getting
3	other other similar institutions involved.
4	I don't recall it I don't even
5	recall if he mentioned any names or not. I
6	think it was more of a generic, where he didn't
7	think Stanford could necessarily do it on its
8	own, and would consider kind of forming some
9	sort of partnership.
10	Q. Did he talk about forming any kind
11	of partnership with CISA?
12	A. No.
13	Q. So he didn't ask CISA to play any
14	role in the concept he was putting together?
15	A. No. Again, beyond sorry, just
15 16	A. No. Again, beyond sorry, just to beyond what I've talked about earlier, you
16	to beyond what I've talked about earlier, you
16 17	to beyond what I've talked about earlier, you know, I think he knew he would need us helping
16 17 18	to beyond what I've talked about earlier, you know, I think he knew he would need us helping him connect with election officials.
16 17 18 19	to beyond what I've talked about earlier, you know, I think he knew he would need us helping him connect with election officials. Q. So he to the extent he okay.
16 17 18 19 20	to beyond what I've talked about earlier, you know, I think he knew he would need us helping him connect with election officials. Q. So he to the extent he okay. So he was asking for your help in
16 17 18 19 20 21	to beyond what I've talked about earlier, you know, I think he knew he would need us helping him connect with election officials. Q. So he to the extent he okay. So he was asking for your help in connecting with election officials in that
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	to beyond what I've talked about earlier, you know, I think he knew he would need us helping him connect with election officials. Q. So he to the extent he okay. So he was asking for your help in connecting with election officials in that meeting?

1	Q. Is there a later conversation with
2	Mr. Stamos?
3	A. I don't recall, but that's what I
4	think there was a fifth call. But again, I
5	don't you know, this was several years ago,
6	and my memory's a little foggy on timelines and
7	everything that happened.
8	Q. But to the best of your
9	recollection, at some point he asked for CISA's
10	assistance in connecting with state and local
11	election officials; right?
12	A. Yeah.
13	Q. Is that when you put him in touch
14	with the Center For Internet Security?
15	A. I think they way initially put him
16	in touch with the National Association, so the
17	two I mentioned earlier, the National
18	Association of Secretary's of State, and the
19	National Association of State Election
20	Directors. I'm not entirely I don't recall
21	when, exactly, Center For Internet Security got
22	involved.
23	Q. At some point, did you put him
24	put him in touch with CIS?
25	A. So we put the Stanford Internet

1	Observatory in touch with them. I forget if it
2	was Alex, himself, or if it was somebody from
3	the team there.
4	Q. So at some point you put them in
5	touch with CIS. And were you involved in
6	further communications with CIS and anyone at
7	EIP?
8	A. Yeah, so as I mentioned earlier, I
9	facilitated some meetings between them, involved
10	between them and election officials.
11	Q. What sort of can you unpack that
12	a little bit, you facilitated some meetings
13	between was that both EIP and CIS?
14	A. Right. So I facilitated meetings,
15	some meetings between EIP and CIS to make sure
16	that they were they didn't have relationship
17	before the they didn't know each other.
18	So we just facilitated getting them
19	together to talk and figure out how they were
20	going to work together.
21	Q. Got you. And who was at those
22	meetings from EIP?
23	A. I don't recall.
24	Q. How about CIS, who did you put them
25	in touch with at CIS?

1	A. I only recall the CIS person's
2	first name was Aaron. I'm blanking on his last
3	name, at this point. I suspect there were other
4	people from CIS on the call, as well, but he
5	was Aaron was my principal contact at CIS.
6	And that's Aaron, A-a-r-o-n.
7	Q. And I take it the purpose of that
8	meeting was to set up a direct line of
9	communication between CIS and EIP?
10	A. Correct.
11	Q. And then did you mention that you
12	facilitated other meetings, for example, between
13	EIP and NASED or National Association of
14	Secretaries of State?
15	A. Yeah, my recollection is that we
16	did facilitate. We put them in contact. I
17	don't I don't know if we were on the calls or
18	not, I don't recall, but but I seem to recall
19	we did put them in contact.
20	Q. Okay. And specifically you mean
21	you put EIP
22	A. EIP in.
23	Q in contact with NASED and NASOS;
24	is that what it's called?
25	A. Just NASS, but yes.
1	

1	Q. Okay. And so, yeah, sorry, for
2	clarity, you put EIP in contact with both NASED
3	and NASS; correct?
4	A. And just to be clear, we put SIO
5	folks in contact with them.
6	Q. Okay.
7	A. But they were part of EIP, so
8	that's kind of the I don't know when EIP was
9	stood up in relation to the conversations,
10	because I don't really know when the
11	conversations occurred, either. So just so
12	you're clear, we worked through the SIO when we
13	made those connections.
14	Q. Got you. Do you remember who at
15	the SIO was involved in those connections?
16	A. I don't.
17	Q. And again, SIO is short for
18	Stanford Internet Observatory; correct?
19	A. Correct.
20	Q. Do you know, what was the timeframe
21	of those, you know, connections that you
22	facilitated with, you know, Stanford Internet
23	Observatory folks and CIS, NASED and NASS?
24	A. I don't know for certain, but I
25	would guess they were late July or August.

1	Q. So this would have been around the
2	time that the EIP is kind of ramping up its
3	activities?
4	A. Yeah, I don't I mean, I don't
5	know when they were ramping up their activities,
6	but I would assume it was around that time.
7	Q. Let me scroll down, so you can see
8	this on the screen share, it's page 8. Is that
9	size on the screen share visible to you?
10	A. Somewhat.
11	Q. Do you see here on page 8 there's a
12	kind of graphic where the EIP report lists four
13	major stakeholders, government, civil society,
14	platforms and media; right?
15	A. Yep, I see that.
16	Q. You got an arrow from government, a
17	black arrow that flows from government to intake
18	queue; correct?
19	A. Yep.
20	Q. Do you know what that's referring
21	to, did the government do you know what
22	governments as stakeholders submitting
23	information for the intake queue for the EIP?
24	A. I don't know if, specifically, what
25	that's in reference to, no. I mean, I would

1	think it was election officials, but I don't
2	I don't know.
3	Q. How about CISA, would CISA ever
4	receive a report from election officials and
5	pass it along to EIP?
6	A. I don't recall us doing that. It
7	wasn't part of our process, and and we would
8	just send it to the platforms, ourselves, so I
9	don't know that we would send it to EIP.
10	Q. How about CIS, do you know if they
11	did that on behalf of state and local officials?
12	A. Did CIS forward messages that
13	election officials sent to them to EIP?
14	Q. Yeah, about disinformation.
15	A. I would think so, but I don't know
16	for certain.
17	Q. And you see there's a red arrow
18	down here at the bottom, from tier 3:
19	Mitigation, and then that flows back to
20	government.
21	Were you aware of EIP reporting
22	back to CISA about what happened with
23	disinformation or misinformation reports?
24	A. I don't recall that there was
25	communication when so just let me take a step

1 back. So you're asking if we were familiar with when EIP would send reports to the platforms, 2 3 were we aware of that? Ο. Correct. 5 Generally speaking, we were not --6 as far as I know we were not aware. I wouldn't 7 say generally. As far as I'm aware, we were not in 9 the loop when they were communicating with 10 platforms. 11 And I apologize, I split the screen Q. on screen share. Actually, stay with that 12 13 graphic for a minute. Up here in the corner, it 14 says, tier one: Detection intake. On-call data 15 gathering, triage, and response; do you see 16 that? I do. 17 Α. 18 Q. Do you know how the Election 19 Integrity Partnership gathered data about what 20 was being said on social media in 2020? 21 I don't know the specifics of how Α. 22 they did that, no. 23 Ο. Did you have any understanding at 24 all, other than obviously receiving reports from 25 CIS, NASED and NASS?

1 My understanding was that they Α. monitored social media in some way. 2 3 Yeah, do you have any idea how they 0. did it? I mean, there's different ways of doing 5 that, do you know how they did it? I don't know what tools or 6 7 capabilities they used, no. Q. Down here below the graphic, it 9 talks about tickets being submitted to the EIP, 10 it says tickets were submitted both by trusted 11 expert stakeholders detailed in section 1.4 on 12 page 11, an internal EIP analysts; correct? 13 Α. Yes. 14 Do you know who the trusted Ο. 15 external stakeholders were? 16 Α. I don't. 17 Q. Do you know whether CISA, at least 18 EIP considered CISA a trusted external stakeholder? 19 20 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for 21 separation. 22 BY MR. SAUER: 23 Q. Do you know. 24 Α. I suspect if we scroll down to page 25 11 we'll find out who the stakeholders were.

1	Q. Good idea. So here at the bottom
2	of page 11, section 1.4, discussing external
3	stakeholders; do you see where we are?
4	A. Getting there. And 11, external
5	stakeholders. Yep.
6	Q. It says: The EIP serve as a
7	connector for many stakeholders, who both
8	provided inputs and received outputs; correct?
9	A. Yep.
10	Q. Okay. And then flipping to the
11	next page, 12, first sentence: External
12	stakeholders include government, civil society,
13	social media companies, and news media entities;
14	correct?
15	A. Correct.
16	Q. It says: Government and civil
17	society partners could create tickets or send
18	notes to EIP analysts; right?
19	A. That's what it says, yes.
20	Q. It goes on to say: They use these
21	procedures to flag incidents to be emerging
22	narratives to be assessed by EIP analysts;
23	correct?
24	A. That's what it says, correct.
25	Q. And do you know what government's

1	partners were creating tickets to flag incidents
2	or merging narratives to the EIP?
3	A. I don't.
4	Q. Immediately below that paragraph,
5	they mention some government officials; right?
6	A. Yep.
7	Q. Right there, it says: Four major
8	stakeholder groups in that graphic in the middle
9	of page 12; right?
10	A. Yep.
11	Q. And there's three that are listed
12	there; right?
13	A. Mm-hmm.
14	Q. There's Election Infrastructure
15	ISAC; right?
16	A. Correct.
17	Q. And that's the EI-ISAC that CISA
18	funds the Center For Internet Security to
19	operate; is that right?
20	A. Again, I don't know if the money
21	goes directly to the EI-ISAC. I don't know how
22	the money flows, but EI-ISAC is part of CIS and
23	we do fund the EI-ISAC.
24	Q. Yeah, and then the next one listed
25	is CISA?

1	A. Mm-mmm.
2	Q. And the next one is listed as the
3	GEC; right?
4	A. Correct.
5	Q. So do you know why CISA is listed
6	there, why the EIP listed CISA as a major
7	stakeholder group in the EIP?
8	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
9	speculation.
10	A. Yeah, I don't know why.
11	Q. Down at the bottom, it says: Four
12	major stakeholder groups that collaborated with
13	the EIP. Do you believe that CISA collaborated
14	with the EIP?
15	A. Did we have conversations with
16	representatives of the EIP? Yes. If that's
17	considered collaboration then I guess we
18	collaborated with the EIP.
19	Q. Tell me about those conversations.
20	I know you mentioned a couple of them or a few
21	of them, already. I take it those included a
22	call with Alex Stamos to talk about the gap;
23	right?
24	A. Yep.
25	Q. And it included facilitating

1	meetings between the EIP and NASED and NASS;
2	correct?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. And it included in some I take
5	it, it included in some connection putting EIP
6	in touch with Center For Internet Security;
7	correct?
8	A. That's correct.
9	Q. And I take it were you kind of
10	putting them in touch with the EI-ISAC people
11	for the Centers For Internet Security?
12	A. I don't recall that we put them in
13	touch with the EI-ISAC people. We put them in
14	contact with CIS-specific people.
15	Q. And, in particular, I think you
16	mentioned someone called Aaron; is that right?
17	A. Yes, Aaron, Aaron, as far as I'm
18	aware, did not work for the EI-ISAC. He worked
19	just for CIS.
20	Q. What other conversations with
21	representatives of EIP do you recall, other than
22	those four we just listed?
23	A. As I mentioned earlier, I believe
24	we had some conversations when they put out
25	public reports. If we had any questions about

1 those public reports I believe we have had a 2 couple conversations about that. 3 Ο. Sorry, go ahead and finish. No, I think that's -- I think 4 Α. that's it, that I recall. 5 6 Who was involved in those Ο. 7 conversations about the public reports? Α. Again, it would likely be 9 Masterson, and then there probably would have 10 been some staff. So I don't know specifically, 11 but there would have been other election 12 security staff, and probably other MDM-specific 13 team staff. But I don't recall who, 14 specifically, it would have been. It could have 15 shifted, you know, based on who was available, 16 and things like that, so -- so I don't recall. 17 Ο. About how many conversations of 18 that nature, relating to public reports, do you 19 recall? 20 A. To be honest, I don't recall any, 21 specifically. I just know that we had a few. 22 And so I -- I don't want to make up a number for 23 you, but it was -- it was probably somewhere 24 between two and four. 25 Ο. And were you on the two and four

1	conversations or did other people have them?
2	A. I mean, those are the ones that I
3	recall, so those are the ones I would have been
4	on, I don't know if there are others that other
5	people from CISA would have been on, that I was
6	not.
7	Q. Okay. What was discussed in the
8	about their public reporting in the
9	conversations you were involved in?
10	A. We would just ask questions about
11	tactics and things like that, what they were
12	seeing.
13	Q. What kind of contacts would they
14	have?
15	A. They were just fairly brief
16	conversations sorry they were just fairly
17	brief conversations, based on blog posts. So if
18	we had a question about jurisdiction being
19	targeted or a new tactic or things like that, we
20	would just ask them kind of questions about that
21	sort of thing.
22	Q. And what when you said tactics,
23	those are kind of online tactics for spreading
24	social media misinformation and disinformation?
25	A. Correct. Like we were talking

1 about earlier, the coordinated inauthentic 2 behavior. So were they using things like bots 3 or stuff like that, kind of what was their -the technique that they were using to 5 distribute. 6 Were people at CISA following their Ο. 7 blog posts to sort of, you know, get information from them? 9 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for 10 speculation. 11 Α. Yeah, can you specify what you mean 12 by people? 13 Q. Was anyone at CISA following the 14 EIP's public reports? 15 MR. GARDNER: Same objection. 16 I can only speak for myself. I was 17 following the public reports. 18 Q. Okay. How about anyone -- how 19 about anyone on your team? 20 MR. GARDNER: Same objection. 21 Α. Yeah, I mean, I -- they likely 22 were, but, you know, I couldn't say for certain. 23 Ο. And so --24 Α. The only job requirement -- there's 25 nobody responsible on my team, as part of their

1 job, to regularly file to the EIP reporting. 2 Q. I take it you did it, and saw some 3 stuff you thought was interesting; is that 4 right? 5 Α. Yeah. 6 Ο. And then are you the one who 7 decided to reach out to them and ask questions about follow-up questions about stuff that they 9 posted? 10 Yeah. Α. 11 Q. And then do you remember anything 12 specific about the tactics they flagged in their 13 blog posts? 14 I don't. Α. 15 Ο. Who did you talk to at the EIP when 16 you reached out? 17 MR. GARDNER: Objection to the form 18 of the question. 19 Α. I don't recall. 20 Q. Was it Mr. Stamos? 21 It could have been Alex, it could Α. 22 have been Renée. I forget, kind of, how they --23 I forget how we connected with them. 24 Q. Did you already know Alex Stamos 25 and Renée DiResta when these conversations

1	started happening in the summer of '20?
2	A. I knew Alex Stamos from previous
3	from when he was at Facebook. And then, as I
4	mentioned, Masterson and I went out to an event
5	that Stamos hosted when he got to the Stanford
6	Internet Observatory. So I knew him. Renée, I
7	think I may have had a conversation or two with,
8	prior, but I didn't know her as well as Alex.
9	Q. You say you knew him when he was at
10	Facebook. What was your interactions with him
11	then?
12	A. He headed the team at Facebook that
13	we did the coordination for some of the initial
14	government industry meetings. So if you recall
15	back then, essentially the first meeting was
16	back in 2018, Alex was the Facebook lead for
17	that meeting.
18	Q. So he was the contact person at
19	Facebook that would be in those meetings that
20	involved CISA and ODNI and DOJ and the FBI?
21	A. Correct.
22	Q. I just want to flip one page in the
23	report. Up here on the screen share, do you see
24	up here they have a comment that says:
25	Additionally, the Countering Foreign Influence

1	Task Force, a subcomponent of CISA, aided in the
2	reporting process and in implementing resilience
3	efforts to counter misinformation; do you see
4	that sentence?
5	A. I do.
6	Q. I take it the counter countering
7	and foreign influence task force is now called
8	the MDM team that you lead; right?
9	A. Yeah, that's correct.
10	Q. Were you the leader of that team
11	then called the CFITF in 2020?
12	A. I was.
13	Q. Do you know what the report means
14	when at it says that the CFITF, which was your
15	team, aided in the reporting process?
16	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
17	speculation.
18	A. Yeah, I I don't know,
19	specifically, what they're referencing. My
20	assumption would be they're referencing a
21	switchboarding we discussed earlier.
22	Q. Tell me about that switchboarding.
23	I take it your testimony earlier was that you
24	you were switchboarding or routing
25	disinformation concerns to social media

1	platforms and that there was coordination with
2	CIS and EIP on how they should be reported;
3	correct?
4	A. No, that's not correct.
5	Q. Okay.
6	A. So I believe what my testimony said
7	earlier is that you would receive generally
8	receive reporting through one of three ways, one
9	of those was through the Center For Internet
10	Security, two-fifths of that we would then
11	forwarded to the platforms.
12	I don't recall any reporting
13	directly coming from EIP. So generally
14	speaking, that's, you know, adding EIP into your
15	question I think is incorrect.
16	Q. What were the other two ways, you
17	said there were three ways, one is you get
18	them
19	A. Yep.
20	Q through Center for Internet
21	Security, what are the other two?
22	A. So the other two ways, sometimes
23	election officials would send them in to CISA
24	central, which is CISA's kind of ops center
25	block room type setup. And then the third way

1	was they would just send direct to a CISA
2	employee, often often Matt Masterson, who had
3	relationships with many of the election
4	officials. So those were the principal ways we
5	received reporting from election officials.
6	Q. So through the CIS, kind of
7	directly to was there a kind of e-mail
8	address for reporting misinformation that CISA
9	maintained?
10	A. Not specific to misinformation. It
11	was CISA central had their own e-mail
12	address, and obviously Matt had his. We had an
13	internal CFITF e-mail address, but I don't
14	believe we we put that out for election
15	officials to send messages to, I don't recall us
16	doing that.
17	Q. And then sometimes they would go to
18	straight to Mr. Masterson?
19	A. Right.
20	Q. And then I take it you did you
21	coordinate with CIS on what you were reporting
22	to social media platforms?
23	A. Only in the sense that we would let
24	them know when we reported something to a
25	platform, again, to avoid duplication or, you

know, most of the reporting that I recall in
2020 came through CIS. And so we just wanted to
let them know that we were acting on what they
sent us.
For reporting that didn't come
through CIS, we would often let them know after
we had shared it with the platforms that we had
shared something with the platforms for their
arrangement.
Q. And then I take it you said
earlier, your understanding is that CIS was
coordinating with EIP?
A. Again, they had a relationship. I
don't know how I would characterize what they
were what they were doing with the EIP.
Q. Do you know what interactions they
had, at all, other than the ones we talked about
between CIS and EIP?
A. I mean, I can't specifically say
what they were doing. They had a relationship.
They shared information. I don't know kind of
the extent of that or kind of what their
policies and procedures were for what they were
policies and procedures were for what they were doing. So I know they were sharing stuff. I

1	questions.
2	Q. I'm going to jump ahead to page 35
3	of this report.
4	A. 35? All right.
5	Q. That's going to be on page 53 of
6	the PDF?
7	A. Almost there, sorry. All right.
8	I'm on 35.
9	Q. If you look here on the last
10	sentence before that heading on the page, it
11	says, according to the EIP, interestingly, just
12	one percent of tickets related to COVID-19, and
13	less than one percent related to foreign
14	interference; do you see that?
15	A. I do.
16	Q. Is that consistent with your
17	understanding of the reports that you were
18	making to social media platforms in that
19	timeframe that only a small minority related to
20	before and afters?
21	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
22	foundation, calls for speculation.
23	BY MR. SAUER:
24	Q. If you know.
25	A. So CISA does not do attribution.

1	We didn't do analysis of what we received from
2	election officials. So we would not know what
3	percentage were foreign derived.
4	Q. So you would receive reports and
5	you would forward them onto social media
6	platforms, you know, for consideration under
7	their content moderation policies, without
8	assessing whether they were originated from
9	foreign or domestics sources?
10	A. That's correct.
11	Q. In other words, a report would come
12	in, and you, like, didn't take steps to see
13	whether this came from a foreign or domestic
14	source?
15	A. Correct.
16	Q. You would just pass it along to the
17	social media platforms?
18	A. Right.
19	Q. Are you familiar with the gateway
20	pundit?
21	A. Am I familiar with it? Yeah.
22	Q. How do you know about it, what is
23	the gateway pundit, on your understanding?
24	A. It's some sort of a website.
25	Q. How do you know about it?

1	A. I believe they've written some
2	articles about CISA.
3	Q. How did that get on your radar
4	screen?
5	A. Articles probably in our clips.
6	Q. Do you remember hearing
7	A. I don't I don't
8	Q. Go ahead.
9	A. I don't recall specifically how
10	they got on my radar.
11	Q. Do you remember hearing of them in
12	any other connection, other than writing
13	articles about CISA?
14	A. I do think of the general kind of
15	recall. Yeah, I think probably just as a
16	general fact that it had news on it I think is
17	probably the extent of what I know.
18	I'm sure I've just seen them, you
19	know, in reading other stories and things like
20	that, I don't I don't honestly, I don't
21	know how I came to know them.
22	Q. Are you aware of anyone at CISA
23	raising concerns that the gateway pundit might
24	be spreading misinformation or disinformation?
25	A. No.

1 I'm going to jump far down in this Q. 2 document to page 196. 3 Α. Let me see if there's a quick way 4 for me to get down there. 5 Yeah, it's page 213 of the PDF. Q. 6 MR. GARDNER: I think you can go 7 here. That's a lot. THE WITNESS: Sorry. 9 MR. GARDNER: Yeah, you have to 10 scroll. All right, John, we're getting there. 11 THE WITNESS: It's two what in the 12 PDF? I'm sorry. 13 BY MR. SAUER: 14 Ο. It's page 214 of the PDF. 15 196. Almost there. Α. Okay. 16 Okay. Yep. 17 Q. Okay. Do you see here, there's a 18 whole section that begins: The gateway pundit 19 interval? 20 Α. I see that. 21 Q. In the first sentence of that says: 22 The gateway pundit was among the most active 23 spreaders of election-related misinformation in 24 our analyses; correct? 25 Α. That's what it says.

1	Q. Does that ring a bell, at all? Do
2	you recall anyone at CISA ever raising the
3	concern that the gateway pundit was a spreader
4	of so-called election-related misinformation?
5	MR. GARDNER: Objection. Asked and
6	answered.
7	BY MR. SAUER:
8	Q. Do you recall that?
9	A. Yep. As I said earlier, I don't
10	recall any examples of that, no.
11	Q. Jump ahead to page 211. This is
12	page 229 of the PDF.
13	A. Almost there. Okay. 211, policy.
14	Q. Yeah, chapter six.
15	A. Gotcha.
16	Q. There at the introduction, at the
17	very beginning, it says: Platform policies
18	establish the rules of participation in social
19	media communities; correct?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. It says: Recognizing the
22	heightened rhetoric and the use of mis and
23	disinformation during the 2020 election, all the
24	major platforms made significant changes to
25	election integrity policies, both as the

1	campaigns kicked off and through the weeks after
2	election day; correct?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. And let me ask you this: Are you
5	aware of social media platforms like Twitter and
6	Facebook and YouTube and so forth changing their
7	election integrity policies to limit
8	election-related misinformation and
9	disinformation during 2020?
10	A. I'm aware that they changed
11	policies. I don't know again, I don't know
12	that they needed mis and disinformation as their
13	terminology, so I don't want to go there. But I
14	do recall that they changed policies in 2020
15	related to election security.
16	Q. How did you know that, at the time,
17	did they report it to you?
18	A. They they did talk about some of
19	it in our regular sync meetings. And then I
20	believe there's some media coverage and public
21	statements that they made about their changes.
22	Q. In the sync meetings, were there
23	any questions on the government side? Did the
24	government ask: What are you doing to change
25	your policies?

1	A. I don't recall that. I think,
2	generally speaking, the platforms would just
3	talk, you know, on a regular course of the
4	conversation they would that would be one of
5	their briefing points, that they were making
6	significant changes. But it wasn't an essential
7	part of the conversations, generally speaking.
8	Q. Were you aware of anyone in the
9	federal government kind of asking or encouraging
10	them to change their content moderation policies
11	to address election integrity?
12	A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
13	Q. Do you recall, was it placed on the
14	agenda for the sync meetings?
15	A. Was what placed on the agenda?
16	Q. Changes in content moderation
17	policies.
18	A. Not that I recall.
19	Q. Do you know how it came up in those
20	meetings?
21	A. Again, I think, you know, part of
22	the meetings were generally different
23	participants providing updates on what they were
24	doing relating to election security. And my
25	recollection is, is that platforms might raise

1	those sorts of things during that portion of the
2	agenda.
3	Q. Did they ever separately e-mail you
4	to notify you of a content policy update?
5	A. Not that I recall, though it's
6	certainly possible. You know, I would get press
7	releases that they would put out sometimes, they
8	would forward to me. But I don't recall
9	specific e-mail on that.
10	Q. Do you know whether anyone at the
11	Center For Internet Security discussed content
12	policy changes with the social media platforms?
13	A. I don't.
14	Q. Do you know whether anybody at CISA
15	did so during the 2020 election cycle?
16	A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
17	Q. How about Mr. Masterson?
18	A. Not that I'm aware of.
19	Q. What was Mr. Masterson's title or
20	what was his role at CISA during this timeframe
21	in 2020?
22	A. He was the senior I don't know
23	what his exact title was, but he was a senior
24	election security person at CISA.
25	Q. So did you report to him when you

1	were the head the countering foreign influence
2	task force?
3	A. No. Matt was what I call a
4	political appointee, so for organizational
5	reasons I reported up to Geoff and Geoff
6	reported to a normal chain of command. So there
7	was something weird about Matt being a political
8	appointee and where he could sit in the org
9	chart, so none of us technically reported up to
10	him.
11	Q. So he was but he was as a
12	political appointee is higher than you in the
13	org chart?
14	A. Yeah.
15	Q. Okay. And did you coordinate with
16	him on the sort of sort of disinformation and
17	misinformation related activities that CISA was
18	engaged in, in 2020?
19	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.
20	A. Yeah, could you be a little more
21	clear in what you're asking, please?
22	Q. Well, did you work with Matt
23	Masterson on election disinformation and
24	misinformation related issues in 2020?
25	A. Yes.

1	Q. Okay. What sort of work did you do
2	with him?
3	
	A. Again, a majority of our work, as I
4	mentioned earlier, was resilience building, so
5	trying to develop products, public education,
6	public awareness, product to help election
7	officials, those sort of things. And then I
8	would have discussed with him he would have
9	been familiar with the switchboarding work that
10	we were doing.
11	Q. Did he participate in the
12	switchboarding work?
13	A. Not beyond when he would receive
14	e-mails, he forwarded them to us.
15	Q. Well, he would send them to you to
16	be switchboarded, so to speak?
17	A. Yeah, I mean, he would send them to
18	me or the team e-mail address.
19	Q. Oh, and you mentioned earlier that
20	he had close relationships with social media
21	platforms?
22	A. No, I don't think I ever said that.
23	He had close relationships with election
24	officials.
25	Q. Oh, okay. Did you also mention

1	that he was in he had contacts with social
2	media platforms?
3	A. Again, he would have participated
4	in the sync meetings that I talked about, the
5	government industry syncs. If we had a briefing
6	or something at other meetings he would likely
7	participate. Those are the only communications
8	I'm aware of, but he may have had others. I'm
9	not sure.
10	Q. Are you aware of anyone at the
11	Election Integrity Partnership communicating
12	with the social media platforms about changing
13	their policies to, you know, kind of restrict
14	election-related misinformation?
15	A. I am not, no.
16	Q. Is that something, that idea of
17	advocating to the social media platforms to
18	adopt more restrictive policies on
19	election-related misinformation, is that
20	something that's that you recall coming up in
21	any meetings or discussions you had in 2020?
22	A. So did we ever have so one, if
23	you can clarify who the meetings were with, that
24	you're asking about.
25	Q. I'm asking

4	
1	A. Or the general did anyone at
2	CISA meet to discuss changes in platform policy?
3	To the best of my recollection, the answer is
4	no, we never meant to discuss asking the
5	platforms to make any changes to their policies.
6	Q. Do you recall I take it that was
7	a response as to internal meetings, are you
8	aware of any meetings with anyone external to
9	CISA to discuss, you know, changes in platform
10	policies?
11	A. I'm not aware of any external
12	meetings along those lines.
13	Q. Do you recall any communications of
14	any kind that related to that in 2020?
15	A. Any communications that related to
16	what? To to platforms changing their
17	policies? Any communications with I mean,
18	that's a very broad I mean, it's possible
19	that somebody at CISA, along the way, had a
20	conversation about that, but I don't recall any
21	specific conversations where we sat down to talk
22	specifically about that. I don't I don't
23	recall any of that. It's a very broad answer,
24	so I don't want to say definitively that nobody
25	at CISA ever had any conversations in 2020 about

1	policy changes.
2	Q. How about you, do you recall
3	communicating with anyone outside of CISA about
4	social media platform policy changes in 2020?
5	A. I don't. I don't.
6	Q. Have you ever heard of the Virality
7	Project?
8	A. I have.
9	Q. What is the Virality Project?
10	A. My understanding, it was Stanford's
11	attempt to mimic the EIP for COVID.
12	Q. How do you know about that?
13	A. Good question. I believe they sent
14	me some of their public reports.
15	Q. The Virality Project did?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Who who would have sent those to
18	you? Was it the same people involved in same
19	people involved in the Election Integrity
20	Partnership?
21	A. I think Alex was involved, and I
22	believe Renée was involved. I don't know if the
23	rest were similar or not. I don't recall who
24	was sending it, the exact individual who was
25	forwarding me their reports.

1	Q. Was that
2	A. And to be honest, I'm not sure if
3	they sent them directly to me or if they went to
4	somebody else in government who forwarded it to
5	me.
6	Q. Okay. Was there did you have an
7	oral conversation with anyone associated with
8	the Virality Project about what they do?
9	A. Not specifically about what they
10	do, but I did have some conversations where they
11	were asking us for asking me, not us for
12	any connections I had with HHS or CDC.
13	Q. And did you provide them with
14	connections?
15	A. I did not.
16	Q. What did you what did you say in
17	that conversation?
18	A. I don't recall that I had any
19	any relevant points of contacts to provide them.
20	Q. Did you have any other
21	conversations with them relating to the Virality
22	Project?
23	A. Not not substantial. I'm trying
24	to think. I mean, I most of that work took
25	place when I was over at the National Security

1	Council, so I had substantially less
2	communication.
3	But I believe there were some
4	informal kind of not work conversations that I
5	may have had with Alex, in particular, and maybe
6	Renée, as well.
7	Q. You believe when you were detailed
8	to the National Security Council you had
9	conversations with Alex Stamos and Renée DiResta
10	about the Virality Project?
11	A. Just in the sense that it was
12	something that they were doing, and that was
13	when I think Alex asked if I had any contacts is
14	when I was at the National Security Council.
15	Q. Did you and Alex discuss anything
16	else about it? And let me ask you this: Did he
17	give you any kind of overview what they planned
18	to do in the Virality Project?
19	A. Not beyond that it was similar to
20	what they did with the with the EIP, that was
21	the extent. We didn't get into any details or
22	anything like that.
23	Q. And he asked you for contacts at
24	at kind of federal kind of health agencies?
25	A. Yeah, that's my recollection of

1	what he was asking for.
2	Q. And did you have any other
3	discussions with him that related to Virality
4	Project?
5	A. Not that I recall. I don't know
6	that we ever got briefed on their work, so I
7	don't think there was anything like that. So I
8	think to the extent was, you know, that
9	conversation about that, and then, like I said,
10	I believe I received some of their reports, the
11	public reports.
12	Q. And you say either they or someone
13	within government forwarded you with their
14	public reports?
15	A. Right, yeah, I don't recall exactly
16	how I got them. I think it was from from the
17	Virality Project, itself, but I'm not a hundred
18	percent certain of that.
19	Q. And let me ask you this: Was CISA
20	active in in or take any activities to
21	follow or address information misinformation
22	relating to COVID-19?
23	A. I believe we did at least one
24	product for our critical infrastructure
25	stakeholders related to COVID-19.

1 Q. How about
2 A. It should be on our sorry.
3 It should be on our public website.
4 Q. How about switchboarding, did CISA
5 do any switchboarding related to COVID-19
6 misinformation concerns?
7 A. No.
8 Q. And again, the switchboarding
9 that when I use that term I'm using your term
10 for kind of routing disinformation concerns and
11 misinformation concerns to the social media
12 platforms; correct?
13 A. Correct, yeah, as far as I'm aware
14 there was no there was none of that occurred
15 related to COVID.
16 MR. SAUER: I'm going to pull up
17 Exhibit 2 on the screen share, which has also
18 been e-mailed to you, which is the Virality
19 Project's public reporter.
20 (Exhibit No. 2 was marked for
21 identification.)
MR. GARDNER: Hold on one second,
23 John.
24 MR. SAUER: Which is the Virality
25 Project's public report, Virality,

1 V-i-r-a-l-i-t-y. 2 MR. GARDNER: Yeah, hold on, John. 3 Hold on, John. Hold on. Got it. BY MR. SAUER: 4 5 Ο. You mentioned -- before we turn to 6 the document, you mentioned that you had 7 conversations with Alex Stamos and Renée DiResta about the Virality Project. What were the 9 nature of the conversations with Renée DiResta? 10 They were at the same time as the Α. 11 conversations with Alex. I believe it was 12 similar content. And I don't -- it wasn't a 13 lengthy conversation, it was just, hey, we're 14 doing something, I believe. 15 Ο. Mm-hmm. Did she ask you for any 16 context or anything like that? 17 I'm sorry, could you repeat that? 18 Q. Did she ask you for any context or 19 anything like that? 20 Not that I recall, but I think she Α. 21 was with Alex when we had that conversation. 22 So you believe it was the same 23 conversation with Alex and Renée happened at the 24 same time? 25 A. Yeah, I believe we were having a

1 meeting, they were briefing us about -- so I 2 think this was connected to when I got the brief 3 on the report, the election report, when I was at the White House. I think that's when they 5 mentioned that they were going to potentially do 6 something similar around COVID, and asked if we 7 had any contacts. Q. And did you -- and I take it you 9 said earlier you didn't have any contacts; 10 right? 11 Α. Yeah, I didn't have any good contacts at CDC or HHS. 12 13 Did you ask anyone else in 14 government if they had contacts that would be 15 useful to them? 16 I don't recall doing that, so I 17 don't think so. 18 Q. Did you notify people at the White 19 House about, you know, the briefing you got from 20 them or the information you got from them? 21 So I'm sure I talked to my Α. 22 supervisor about the election briefing. I may 23 have mentioned, although I don't recall if I did 24 or not, that they were going to do something 25 similar for -- for COVID.

1	Q. What did you report back about the
2	election briefing? I take it that's the long
3	fuse report from the Election Integrity Project
4	right, or partnership; right?
5	A. Yeah, just to the extent we just
6	in general, we met with them kind of shared kind
7	of their lessons learned, kind of what some of
8	their big takeaways were. I don't recall what
9	the specifics were. It was a brief kind of
10	conversation in passing.
11	Q. Who was your supervisor at that
12	time?
13	A. Kaitlin Gegovich (phonetic).
14	Q. Looking at the Virality Project
15	report, skipping ahead to page 4 of the report?
16	A. 4, 4, or Roman numeral four?
17	Q. Regular four.
18	A. Gotcha.
19	Q. Is there's recommendations
20	A. Okay. Okay.
21	Q. Is there a recommendation here to
22	implement misinformation and disinformation
23	center of excellence housed within the cyber
24	security infrastructure security agency; do you
25	see that?

1	A. I do.
2	Q. So Stanford recommends that the
3	government create a misinformation and
4	disinformation center of excellence housed
5	within CISA; correct?
6	MR. GARDNER: Objection. He said
7	it calls for speculation.
8	A. That's what the sentence says.
9	Q. Did they ever discuss
10	A. What they meant by that, I don't
11	know what they meant.
12	Q. Did they ever did Alex Stamos or
13	Renée DiResta ever discuss that with you, you
14	know, having CISA take on a new and more
15	formalized roll with respect to misinformation
16	and disinformation?
17	A. Not that I recall. I don't think I
18	was ever briefed on this report, so I don't
19	recall having that conversation.
20	Q. Do you know of anyone they
21	talked to anyone else at CISA about that?
22	A. I don't know. I don't know.
23	Q. By the time of this report, in
24	2021, Matt Masterson was actually working for
25	the Stanford Internet Observatory; correct?

1	A. I believe so, yeah.
2	Q. Have you ever read this report
3	before?
4	A. I think I read a little bit of it,
5	but I don't think I read the whole I don't
6	recall. I haven't read the whole thing. I
7	shouldn't say I don't recall. I haven't read
8	the whole thing.
9	Q. Do you know when you read it?
10	A. I don't.
11	Q. Do you know why you read it?
12	A. I mean, I would read it, generally
13	speaking, I'm interested in understanding what
14	researchers find related to mis, dis and
15	mal-information.
16	Q. I'm sorry, relating to what?
17	A. What researchers find, understand,
18	what they're learning relating to mis, dis and
19	mal-information.
20	Q. And did you have any takeaways from
21	this report, that informed your work at the MDM
22	team?
23	A. I don't think there's anything
24	specific that we took from this, from a product
25	standpoint or anything like that.

1	Q. Do you know how do you know how
2	the Virality Project tracked, you know,
3	misinformation narratives about COVID vaccines
4	on social media?
5	A. I don't.
6	Q. I'm going to jump ahead to page 30
7	of the report, very usefully that's also page 30
8	of the PDF.
9	A. Making things easier.
10	Q. I think they learned a lesson after
11	the first report.
12	A. Yeah.
13	Q. Reference here to your
14	A. Okay. Got you.
15	Q. There's a reference here to tiered
16	ticket analysis, it says: Their analysis
17	consisted of lateral lateral research that
18	used Crowd Tangle and Google searches to assess
19	the spread of the incident or content and so
20	forth; do you see that?
21	A. I do.
22	Q. What Crowd Tangle is?
23	A. I believe Crowd Tangle was a
24	Facebook-owned social media monitoring service.
25	Q. And is that something that's

1 available to the public? Can the public kind of 2 subscribe to Crowd Tangle? 3 MR. GARDNER: Objection. BY MR. SAUER: 4 5 O. Or is it kind of a --6 MR. GARDNER: Objection. Sorry. 7 Sorry, thought you were done, John, please, are you done? 9 MR. SAUER: Yeah. 10 MR. GARDNER: Sorry, objection, 11 lack of foundation. 12 So I don't know -- I don't know the Α. nature of Crowd Tangle, if it's publicly 13 14 available or not. 15 0. Have you ever heard of it before? 16 Α. I have. 17 Q. In what connection have you heard 18 of it? 19 Α. Just talking, you know, in the 20 general, mis, dis, mal-information research 21 community, I know it's a tool that some 22 researchers use. 23 Okay. Next page of the report, 24 there's a reference to collecting video --25 there's a reference to -- it says: The

1	engagement data or video view data for links
2	associated with each ticket is collected
3	differently depending on the social media
4	platform in question, colon; do you see that?
5	A. I do.
6	Q. It talks about how Facebook and
7	Instagram, they used Crowd Tangle API; right?
8	A. I see that, yeah.
9	Q. What is do you know what API
10	stands for?
11	A. I don't.
12	Q. Okay. Same question, then, as to
13	Twitter, it says Twitter API, YouTube, API, do
14	you know what API refers to?
15	A. I
16	MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and
17	answered.
18	A. Yeah, I don't know, that's a little
19	above my technical knowledge.
20	Q. Let's jump ahead to page 143.
21	A. Okay.
22	Q. Okay. Here under: Maintain clear
23	channels of communication across all levels of
24	government; do you see that?
25	A. I do.

1	Q. And then there in this sentence it
2	says or sorry, in this paragraph it says:
3	For example, as voting-related mis and
4	disinformation arose in the 2020 presidential
5	election, the Election Infrastructure
6	Information Sharing and Analysis Center, EI-ISAC
7	served a critical role in sharing information in
8	the Election Integrity Partnership in pushing
9	its rapid response analysis back out to election
10	stakeholders across the states; right?
11	A. That's what the sentence says,
12	yeah.
13	Q. And I take it, we asked you this
14	before, but are you aware of the EI-ISAC
15	sharing serving a critical role in sharing
16	information with the EIP during 2020?
17	A. I I'm not. My understanding and
18	recollection it was Center For Internet
19	Security, it's of course possible that the
20	Stanford folks are conflating the EI-ISAC with
	_
21	the Center For Internet Security, kind of we
21 22	
	the Center For Internet Security, kind of we
22	the Center For Internet Security, kind of we talked about earlier, they're kind of part of
22 23	the Center For Internet Security, kind of we talked about earlier, they're kind of part of the same organization, but I'm not aware of

1	Q. What is the difference between the
2	EI-ISAC and the CIS? My understanding was that
3	the CIS was a non-profit, and EI-ISAC is kind of
4	like a program that it runs, that allows for
5	information sharing among state and local
6	election officials, is that the distinction of
7	what's the difference?
8	MR. GARDNER: Objection, form.
9	BY MR. SAUER:
10	Q. You may answer.
11	A. What's the difference between what,
12	CIS and EI-ISAC.
13	Q. Yeah, what's the distinction
14	between them.
15	A. I mean, I don't to be honest, I
16	don't fully know what the distinction is, my
17	understanding is it's roughly, as you kind of
18	stated it, right, is CIS is an umbrella
19	organization that has organizations underneath
20	it. I don't know what the operating
21	relationship is between the EI-ISAC and CIS. If
22	it's a direct line, I just don't know how they
23	operate that way.
24	But my understanding is that the
25	CIS has its own staff, and that those staff and

1	their own funding, and that that staff and
2	funding is what supported the 2020 election
3	switchboarding work.
4	Q. So, in other words, you think the
5	CIS was was switchboarding to EIP during
6	2020?
7	A. I'm not sure that's what I said. I
8	mean, the relationship that I understood was
9	between CIS and EIP, what specifically they were
10	doing as part of that relationship I'm not
11	again, I don't necessarily want to speak to,
12	because I'm not 100 percent sure how it worked.
13	Q. Well, is the EI-ISAC kind of a
14	vehicle in which CIS receives reports of
15	misinformation and disinformation from state and
16	local election officials?
17	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
18	foundation, calls for speculation.
19	A. Yeah, I don't know how how the
20	EI-ISAC played in this switchboarding role.
21	Q. Down here at the bottom of the same
22	page there's another reference to the
23	recommendations to implement a misinformation
24	and disinformation center of excellence housed
25	within the federal government; correct?

1	A. Yeah.
2	Q. And that there in that paragraph it
3	specifically recommends that it be housed within
4	the federal government at CISA; correct? See
5	where I've highlighted?
6	A. Yeah, I'm just reading that now.
7	Yeah, that's what the sentence
8	says, yeah.
9	Q. Do you have any recollection let
10	me ask you this: I think you testified earlier
11	you don't remember discussing that
12	recommendation with anyone; correct?
13	A. Correct.
14	Q. Okay. How about any discussions of
15	changing or increasing CISA's role in in kind
16	of tracking or monitoring online dis and
17	misinformation?
18	MR. GARDNER: Objection to the
19	extent that answers calls for the disclosure of
20	information, subject to the local process
21	privilege. I would instruct the witness not to
22	answer. To the extent that you can answer that
23	without disclosing information related to the
24	privilege you can do so.
25	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, can you

1 repeat the question, just to make sure I 2 understand it. 3 MR. SAUER: Let's break it down. BY MR. SAUER: 4 5 Do you recall any discussions with Q. 6 anyone outside of CISA about expanding CISA's role in addressing misinformation and 7 disinformation concerns on social media? CISA's role, expanding CISA's role, 9 yeah. Yes. 10 11 Q. Okay. What conversations do you 12 remember about that? 13 Α. So we were piloting a capability 14 that would allow us to monitor narratives 15 online. 16 Now, when was this piloted? Q. I believe it was -- we did one 17 short pilot, I believe, in summer 2020, so I 18 19 believe it was all 2020. 20 What -- what -- what sort of Q. 21 pilighting -- can you explain what you mean by 22 pilighting -- I'm sorry -- piloting something to 23 track mis and disinformation online? 24 Α. So it wasn't necessarily to track, 25 it was to understand the information

1	environment, what narratives were were kind
2	of perking up. The piloting was, as I'm sure
3	you're aware, there was extensive extensive
4	privacy rules around that sort of work, and so
5	it was just kind of piloting it to see if it
6	would work, if it did what we wanted it to do.
7	In particular, we were trying to
8	predict the likely impact of narratives on
9	stakeholders. And so we weren't sure if the
10	predictive activity that we were doing actually
11	worked, so we wanted to test that, and then we
12	wanted to just get a sense of the privacy and
13	other kind of rules that might be in play and if
14	it's something that we could we could do.
15	Q. What exactly was the pilot? I
16	mean, what what did you have a computer
17	program that would, you know, go out and track
18	what people were saying on social media? What
19	exactly was the pilot? I don't understand.
20	MR. GARDNER: I'll object on the
21	grounds that that calls for disclosure of
22	information subject to deliberative process
23	privilege. I instruct the witness not to
24	answer.
25	MR. SAUER: Yeah, the deliberative

1 process privilege only applies when there is no 2 indication of any government wrongdoing. 3 court has already found that there's at least a substantial concern that there were significant 5 first amendment violations, here, so I ask you 6 to withdraw the objection. 7 MR. GARDNER: I understand your position and I decline your invitation. 9 BY MR. SAUER: 10 Q. Are you declining to answer the 11 question, sir? 12 Α. Yes. 13 So in that case, can you kind of 14 explain more generally what this pilot project involved in 2020, to track social media on the 15 16 internet? 17 MR. GARDNER: To the extent that 18 that calls for the disclosure of information 19 subject to the deliberative process privilege I 20 instruct the witness not to answer. 21 To the extent that you can answer 22 that question at a high level of generality, you 23 may do so. 24 Yeah, so as I mentioned, our 25 mission is to build the variance to MDM

1	targeting critical infrastructure.
2	So essentially what we were trying
3	to understand is if we could predict the likely
4	impact of MDM narrative in terms of increasing
5	risks to critical infrastructure by a better
6	understanding the information environment, so
7	the pilot was essentially trying to test that
8	theory out.
9	Q. Yeah, kind of, again, at a high
10	level of generality, how do you test that theory
11	out?
12	A. So the predictive model essentially
13	was to say say you had an image, it would
14	pull particular components of an image out and
15	based on I don't want to get too I don't
16	know that I understand the black box that they
17	used all that well, if I were trying to test it,
18	but there was a methodology that they used to do
19	that, and so we were just trying to see if that
20	methodology, in fact, worked from a
21	disinformation standpoint.
22	Q. When you say: They, who's they?
23	Is this people at CISA or is there a contractor
24	that created a product?
25	A. It was a contractor.

1	Q. What contractor?
2	A. I believe the company was Limbik.
3	Q. Sorry, can you spell that?
4	A. L-i-m-b-i-k.
5	And then there was a separate
6	pilot, that's more generically around
7	situational awareness of potential narratives
8	online, that didn't feed into the into the
9	predictive modeling.
10	Q. Was that a Limbik product, too,
11	that second pilot?
12	A. No, that was a that was a
13	different contractor, and I forget who it was.
14	Q. Did either of these pilots ever get
15	any actual programming, something that you used?
16	A. No. The rules we operated the
17	pilot on was that none of it could be used for
18	operational purposes, because there's privacy
19	requirements around that. And so essentially we
20	were just using it for internal deliberations in
21	terms of if the if the tools were helpful or
22	not.
23	Q. Did you conclude that they were
24	helpful?
25	MR. GARDNER: Object on the grounds

1 of deliberative process privilege. I instruct 2 the witness not to answer. 3 MR. SAUER: To be clear, I'm asking for the conclusion, not the deliberation. 4 BY MR. SAUER: 5 6 Did you conclude that they would be Ο. 7 useful? MR. GARDNER: Same objections, same 9 instructions. 10 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I'm not going 11 to answer. 12 MR. SAUER: I've e-mailed around 13 Exhibit 9. 14 (Exhibit No. 9 was marked for 15 identification.) 16 BY MR. SAUER: 17 Ο. And if you have a minute to look at 18 it, I'm also putting on the screen share, it's a 19 collection of e-mails from October of 2020, 20 produced by the government, involving CISA. And 21 I think they relate to the switchboarding you 22 testified there about earlier. 23 Do you see the -- the document? 24 Α. I do. 25 Q. Just look here on the first page,

1 t	there's an e-mail, if you look here, kind of on
2 1	hursday, October 1st, at 4:23 p.m., it shows
3 m	isinformation reports sending an e-mail to you,
4 t	co CISA central, which I think you mentioned
5 e	earlier, to CFITF e-mail address, and and
6 m	isinformation reports; do you see that?
7	A. I do.
8	Q. And this is a I take it, some
9 r	eport that relates to misinformation in social
10 m	media from CIS; correct?
11	A. Let me just scroll to the beginning
12 c	of the e-mail chain.
13	Yeah, this is a report I received
14 f	from CIS.
15	Q. And when CIS e-mailed you this
16 r	eport, if you look here, towards the top or
17 r	right in the middle of the first page, CIS
18 f	First of all, it's signed by Walter Oberes and
19 A	aron Wilson; correct?
20	A. Yeah.
21	Q. And that Aaron, is that the Aaron
22 y	ou talked about earlier, as your CIS contact?
23	A. It is, correct.
24	Q. And how about who's Walter
25 c	beres?

1 A. I don't know.	
Q. Okay. And he they	y say:
3 Brian referring to you we kn	now many are
4 already aware of this case, but the	ne impact seems
5 to be escalating. Our hope is the	e platforms can
6 do more to take down the misinform	mation;
7 correct?	
8 A. That's what this says	s, correct.
9 Q. And then it goes on	to say: The
10 EIP has been tracking this spread	under ticket
EIP-243, and has more examples; co	orrect?
12 A. Correct.	
Q. Did they commonly tell	ll you when the
14 EIP was tracking online misinforma	ation, as well
15 as CIS?	
16 A. I don't think that wa	as common, no.
Q. Okay. Were you aware	e, at the time,
18 of what an EIP ticket was?	
19 A. I understood that EI	P was using a
20 ticketing system. That's the exte	ent of it, so
21 that's what I assumed it was.	
Q. And how did you know	that?
23 A. That they were using	a ticketing
24 system?	
25 Q. Yeah.	

1	A. So as I mentioned earlier, we did
2	get some briefs from them when they were setting
3	things up, to let us know how they would work,
4	and there was mention of a ticketing system
5	during that, those conversations.
6	Q. When you received this report you
7	forwarded it onto Facebook, correct, directly
8	above?
9	A. I did.
10	Q. And you said
11	A. Correct.
12	Q. And you said: This is not
13	Facebook-related reporting, but thought it would
14	be of interest to your team; right?
15	A. Right.
16	Q. Why did you forward it onto
17	Facebook if it appears to relate to tweets or
18	Twitter, as opposed to Facebook?
19	A. Well, it related to Twitter and I
20	believe YouTube, if I'm reading this correctly.
21	Q. Yeah, why did you forward it onto
22	Facebook?
23	A. There's a lot of ways that people
24	generate traffic to YouTube, in particular, but
25	Twitter, as well, is by posting it across

1	platforms.
2	So something like this, it would
3	sometimes share across other platforms that we
4	thought there might be it might be relevant
5	content showing up on their platforms.
6	Q. In other words, if the
7	disinformation or misinformation might be
8	spreading to other platforms you would notify
9	not just the platform reported, but other
10	platforms, as well, so that they could be aware
11	of this content; is that what you did?
12	A. Yeah. So if I'm reading this
13	correctly, it sounds like it literally jumped
14	platforms. So maybe I'm misreading. And so,
15	yeah, sometimes we would just we would share.
16	Q. When you say: We would share, you
17	mean you would share it with other platforms
18	than the one that was currently hosting the
19	reported content?
20	A. Correct.
21	Q. Okay. Just scrolling down a few
22	pages, there a page with a Bates number 9676 at
23	the bottom.
24	A. 9676.
25	Q. It's page 7 of the PDF.

1	A. Let me just make sure I got the
2	right one. Got it.
3	Q. And again, on this one, here's
4	another e-mail, and you said: Hi Richard, this
5	is not Google-specific reporting, but thought it
6	might be of interest to your team; correct?
7	A. Correct.
8	Q. And there's this other situation
9	where a misinformation report had come in that
10	related to a content of other platforms, and you
11	shared it with a different platform; right?
12	A. This looks like the same example we
13	talked about above.
14	Q. Oh, yeah, because this is the one
15	being tracked under ticket EIP243?
16	A. I believe it's the same. Reading
17	the e-mail it looks the same.
18	Q. Is this something that was kind of
19	a common practice when you were performing this
20	switchboarding function that you described in
21	2020, that you would report misinformation
22	concerns, not just platform directly affected,
23	but other platforms, as well, to get ahead of
24	it, so to speak?
25	MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and

1	answered. You can answer.
2	A. I wouldn't say it was a common
3	practice, but we did do it period do it
4	periodically.
5	Q. Let me jump ahead to Bates number
6	8356.
7	A. Which PDF page is that?
8	Q. That looks like it's going to be
9	page 12 of the PDF.
10	A. Okay. All right. Just so you
11	know, for the e-mail, the PDF page numbers are
12	going to be a lot more helpful.
13	Q. Sure.
14	A. So 8357, is that what I'm looking
15	at?
16	Q. 56, I think it's the page before.
17	A. Oh, the one above? I got you.
18	Q. So, yeah, and I think this still
19	relates to the same ticket; right? If you look
20	at the middle of the page, you're still dealing
21	with the same report from CIS that has that same
22	EIP ticket number; correct?
23	A. Yeah, it appears correct.
24	Q. And this one you passed this onto
25	Twitter; right?

1	A. Mm-hmm.
2	Q. And that was the platform that was
3	directly affected; right?
4	A. Correct.
5	Q. And then talking to Twitter, at the
6	very top, there, you said, you know, good
7	afternoon, suspect you are you all are
8	already aware of these issues, we wanted to pass
9	along this reporting from Sonoma County,
10	California, to see if there's anything you can
11	share on how you're approaching; right?
12	A. Mm-hmm.
13	Q. Is that sorry, can you answer it
14	with a yes or no?
15	A. Oh, I'm sorry.
16	Yes.
17	Q. Is that something you did when you
18	were serving the switchboarding function was ask
19	the social media platforms to report back how
20	they had addressed the contents reported?
21	A. Generally we would do that if the
22	election official asked.
23	Q. Why did you do that?
24	A. Well, the the election official
25	reported something, they just wanted to know if

1	a decision was made often, not often, sometimes.
2	And so if the platform was open to
3	sharing if they had made a decision or not, we
4	would just push that back to the election
5	officials so they were aware
6	Q. So
7	A of where the platform landed.
8	Q. So CISA would, if the state or
9	local official wanted to know, you know, whether
10	the reported misinformation had been actioned in
11	some way, CISA would ask the social media
12	platform to report that back, and then CISA
13	would relay that to the social media sorry
14	to the state or local official; is that right?
15	A. Yeah, we did that periodically,
16	where we would ask if the decision was made and
17	if we can share back.
18	Q. Did you do
19	A. The platforms got better, along the
20	way, of communicating directly with the election
21	officials, themselves.
22	Q. Sometimes they would report back
23	directly, later in the process, especially?
24	A. Yeah, I believe it got better kind
	A. Yeah, I believe it got better kind of as time went on.

1	Q. Did you do anything else with that
2	information, about whether and how the reported
3	misinformation had been actioned by the social
4	media platform?
5	A. Did we do anything else with it?
6	No. No. I mean, if it came to CIS
7	we would push the response from the platform
8	back up to CIS. If the information we received
9	from the election official came direct to us we
10	would push that back, just back to the election
11	official.
12	Q. How about anyone else, would anyone
13	else be notified how they acted?
14	A. I think we may have put a notation
15	in the tracking spreadsheet we kept, if a
16	platform said something returned. But that was
17	an internal set of documents that would go to
18	normally our attorneys, the privacy folks, would
19	let you see the tracking list review,
20	periodically.
21	Q. So there was an internal
22	spreadsheet created by CISA to track these
23	reports?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. And did you enter, you know, all of

1	your switchboarding activity reports into that
2	spreadsheet?
3	A. Yeah, we did the best we could to
4	make sure everything was captured in there.
5	Q. Does that spreadsheet still exist?
6	A. I believe I would assume so.
7	Q. Who else or who would enter the
8	information in this spreadsheet?
9	A. So the MDM team took shifts, in
10	terms of receiving and doing like I said, it
11	was very resource intensive for us, and so other
12	members of the MDM team would have asserted
13	stuff in there, as well, if it was their shifts.
14	Q. Who would have who took shifts,
15	other than you?
16	A. So back then it would have been
17	myself, Chad, Rob, from that org chart, sorry,
18	Rob Schaul, Chad Josiah, who else was doing it
19	back then, myself, Alex Zaheer, an intern, which
20	I'm not going to name, and I think that was it.
21	Q. Let me see if I caught all
22	A. I think that was it.
23	Q. Let me see if I caught all those
24	e-mails, Chad Josiah did that?
25	A. Mm-hmm.

1	Q. And then I think you said Rob
2	Schaul did that, S-c-h-a-u-l; corrects?
3	A. Correct, and then Alex Zaheer, who
4	also should be on the org chart.
5	Q. How do you spell letter name?
6	A. His name, Alex, A-l-e-x,
7	Z-a-h-e-e-r.
8	Q. Okay. Anyone else?
9	A. There's an intern.
10	Q. Can you name the intern, please?
11	A. No, I'm not going to name the
12	intern.
13	Q. Are you refusing to answer that
14	question without an instruction, again?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Okay. Anyone else?
17	A. I feel like there was, but I'm
18	forgetting names, right now. But those would
19	have been the principal oh, John Stafford,
20	sorry.
21	Q. What's his role at CISA?
22	A. He is not at CISA any longer. He
23	left sometime in 2021.
24	Q. Okay. What was his role?
25	A. He was an analyst by like the

others.
Q. And would all those people be
involved in e-mails like the ones we're looking
at here in October 9 sorry in Exhibit 9,
where word would come in from, you know, CIS or
somebody like that, they would forward it onto a
social media platform?
A. Yeah, so they would if if
they received something, they would play that
switchboard role and they would forward it to
the platforms.
Q. And then would they, like you,
report back sometimes to CIS or whatever
reporter on how things had been actioned?
A. I don't recall if they did that or
not. If the if the platform sent something
back on their own, which sometimes happened, as
well, they would report that. I don't know that
they did anything beyond that.
Q. Did any of them communicate with
anyone at the Election Integrity Partnership?
A. Well, the intern, I believe, worked
both, although, when he was on duty, he was only
working for us. Beyond that, I don't I don't
know. I don't know that we would have

1	conversations, not about the switchboarding, I
2	wouldn't think.
3	Q. You say the intern worked both, you
4	mean the intern part of the time was working for
5	CISA and part of the time was working for EIP?
6	A. So my understanding so the
7	intern was a Stanford student, so he worked part
8	time for us. On election day, when he would
9	have been on the agenda, he was just working for
10	us.
11	And my understanding is he also did
12	some work for the Stanford Internet Observatory.
13	I don't know what that work entailed, if it was
14	EIP-specific or not. But yeah, he was he did
15	do some stuff with the Stanford Internet
16	Observatory, I'm just not a hundred percent
17	certain of the nature of it.
18	Q. Do you know whether he was involved
19	in tracking misinformation and disinformation
20	for the Stanford Internet Observatory?
21	A. I don't know if that intern was
22	responsible for that or doing that work.
23	Q. Was that the only intern during
24	2020 who was simultaneously working part time
25	for CISA, and also working with Stanford

1	Internet Observatory?
2	A. No. There was one other, as I
3	mentioned earlier, there were two.
4	Q. And so, I see, in other words, it
5	wasn't sequential. Those two interns, did they
6	maintain their part-time internship at CISA
7	through the election the end of the election
8	cycle in 2020?
9	A. Correct. They were summer interns,
10	full-time summer interns, and then they went
11	back, they continued their studies at Stanford
12	and part-time interns of us.
13	Q. Okay. So they also, I take it,
14	when they went back to Stanford for the fall
15	semester they also worked for the Stanford
16	Internet Observatory?
17	A. That's my understanding, correct.
18	Q. And at least one of those interns
19	was involved in doing these switchboarding
20	e-mails like we're looking at in Exhibit 9;
21	right?
22	A. Correct.
23	Q. Okay. What what did the other
24	intern do during this timeframe for CISA?
25	A. He also did some of the

	<u> </u>
1	arritable and in a
1	switchboarding.
2	Q. Okay. So should we add intern
3	number two is also a a person who engages in
4	switchboarding e-mails?
5	A. Correct.
6	Q. Are you declining to disclose the
7	name of intern number two, as well?
8	A. Intern number two is on our staff
9	now.
10	Q. What's his name?
11	A. Alex.
12	Q. Alex what?
13	A. Zaheer.
14	Q. So Alex Zaheer was was he one of
15	the interns who originated the idea of the EIP?
16	A. Correct.
17	Q. What's his role in CISA now?
18	A. He is an analyst on the MDM team.
19	Q. What does he do for CISA?
20	A. He works on the MDM team. He
21	does we talked about him earlier in the org
22	chart discussion.
23	Q. I'm sorry, I don't remember, what
24	does he do?
25	A. So he steps across the range of

1 work, he does some analysis, he does some 2 engagement, he does some product development 3 work. What's engagement? Does he talk to Ο. 5 social media platforms for CISA? 6 Α. He does not, no. 7 Q. Does he still do any work for Stanford Internet Observatory? 9 Α. No, not that I'm aware of. 10 Q. When was he involved in working for 11 Stanford Internet -- Stanford Internet Observatory, to your knowledge? 12 I don't know. It would have been 13 Α. 14 before he graduated, as far as I'm aware. 15 I'm asking you again, what's the 16 name of intern number one, the one who was 17 involved in routing disinformation concerns to 18 social media platforms, during the 2020 19 election, whose name you haven't disclosed yet? 20 Α. I'm still not going to disclose his 21 name. 22 MR. SAUER: Counsel, on the break 23 let's talk about that. 24 BY MR. SAUER: 25 Q. Moving on a little bit, if I could

1 direct your attention back to -- or actually, 2 let's jump ahead in the Exhibit 9. Actually, 3 let me -- let's stay on this page. 4 Α. Which page? 5 Ο. I think we're on page 11 of the 6 PDF. 7 Α. Okay. Q. Or actually, I'm sorry, let's jump 9 ahead to page 10603 Bates, and then that's going 10 to be page 18 of the PDF. 11 Α. All right. Okay. I'm on page 18. Okay. If you look here, this is a 12 Ο. 13 reporting chain of a misinformation concern from 14 you to Twitter, on October 10th; correct? 15 Yes, that's what it appears to be. 16 And you're making this report at --Q. 17 on the Saturday afternoon; right? Or is that an 18 early Saturday morning? It looks like it's a 19 Saturday afternoon, at 12:52 p.m., there at the 20 bottom of the page; do you see that? 21 I do. Α. 22 Q. So you talked about this being 23 resource intensive. Were you guys staffing, you 24 know, the misinformation reports and doing the 25 switchboarding on nights and weekends?

1	A. So we ramped up as we got closer to
2	the election. At this stage I think it was
3	primarily me that would receive them over the
4	weekends. I forget when we started when I
5	started handing some of that off to my team to
6	also pick it up over the weekends.
7	But at some point, we did have
8	people on the schedule. It didn't mean that
9	they were 24/7 waiting for things, they just
10	needed to monitor their phones in case something
11	came in.
12	Q. How so somebody was kind of
13	tasked with I think you called them shifts,
14	earlier someone was tasked with covering a
15	shift at all times, not at all times, but at
16	times over the weekend?
17	A. Yeah, particularly as we got closer
18	to the election. I wouldn't say it was the
19	entire election cycle, it was I don't know
20	when it started, but probably sometime in
21	mid-October when when we started just shifts
22	so that people could review, before that it was
23	mostly me that would receive them from CIS.
24	Q. And and then how about did you
25	ever have it where you were doing shifts in the

1	meddling of the night.
2	A. No. I mean, technically, you would
3	be on for a day, if you're on your shift. But
4	there wasn't an expectation, if something came
5	in at 3:00 in the morning, that you were
6	forwarding it on.
7	Q. How because between 11:00 and 12:00
8	at night?
9	A. Yeah, I mean if you were awake at
10	11:00 or 12:00 at night, I think that we would
11	push it on, and then obviously on election
12	election night we were we were up until at
13	least midnight. So if we received anything we
14	would push it forward.
15	But again, it was more when we got
16	into kind of off hours you just ask people to
17	monitor their phones, if they could, and if
18	something came in just to push it forward. But
19	the expectation that, as per this e-mail, that
20	they would be responsible for forwarding
21	something.
22	Q. Let me ask you this: If you look
23	at this e-mail chain we're looking at, where it
24	says you would forward on a concern at 12:52
25	p.m., and looks like about 20 minutes later, on

1	a Saturday afternoon, maybe Saturday morning,
2	for them, Twitter responds and says: Thanks,
3	Brian, we will escalate; do you see that?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. So it looks like the people at
6	Twitter are monitoring their phones to respond
7	promptly to your reports; is that right?
8	A. I mean, that would I don't know
9	what their monitoring behavior was, in this case
10	she certainty responded relatively quickly on a
11	Saturday.
12	Q. And that's not the only case, it
13	happens again and again, where you get
14	almost immediate responses from not just
15	Twitter, but Facebook and others; correct?
16	A. I mean, don't know. I'd have to
17	I'm sure you could show me documents that would
18	who that, but I honestly don't know the
19	timelines of sends and returns.
20	Q. Well, you remember them pinging you
21	back promptly and being very responsive when you
22	would make reports like this?
23	A. They were generally responsive in
24	making sure that we knew that they received it,
25	yeah.

1	Q. And not just received it, for
2	example, in this case, not long after that, at
3	6:30 p.m. the same day, she notifies you: These
4	tweets have actioned for violations of our
5	policies; right?
6	A. That's what the e-mail says, yep.
7	Q. And was that timeframe typical,
8	were they turning around, you know, content that
9	was flagged and taking action on it within hours
10	of your reports?
11	A. It's hard to say, because they
12	didn't always get back to us if they hadn't
13	taken any action. So I don't know if I would
14	say that's typical.
15	You know, sometimes they would let
16	us know, sometimes they wouldn't. Generally
17	speaking, I think they made their decisions
18	relatively quickly. So I would assume if they
19	did get back to me it would be relatively
20	quickly. But I can't speak to their timing or
21	their processes or any of that stuff. A lot of
22	times they just didn't let us know
23	Q. But the more response
24	A to be honest, if they received
25	it.

1	Q. Sorry to interrupt.
2	A. Yeah, I just wanted to say,
3	normally we would get a note that they received
4	the messages I forwarded to them. We often
5	didn't receive any kind of notification that
6	they had taken action, no action, or what their
7	decision was, so it's hard to say kind of what
8	their typical timeline was for making decisions.
9	Q. Let me ask you this: Were they
10	more responsive to you, as a representative of a
11	federal national security agency, than they were
12	to ordinary people who made such reports, if you
13	know?
14	MR. GARDNER: Objection.
15	Objection, lack of foundation, calls for
16	speculation.
17	A. Yeah, I have no clue. I don't know
18	what the timeline was, generally.
19	Q. Were there ever discussions between
20	you or anyone at CISA and any one of the
21	platforms about making sure the platforms are
22	monitoring their e-mails for the the
23	government's reports of misinformation?
24	A. No.
25	Q. How about in the synch meetings

1	that you talked about, between the USG and the
2	industry, was it ever brought up that, hey, you
3	know, we're going to have people standing by and
4	watching for misinformation reports so we can
5	move quickly on them?
6	A. Not that I recall. I believe on
7	election night several of the platforms set up
8	their own operations center. But I don't know
9	that there's ever a conversation about from
10	the government expecting platforms to have any
11	particular timeline.
12	Q. Again, these sort of e-mail
13	e-mails that we're looking at here in Exhibit 9,
14	from you to the platform and the platforms
15	responding back about misinformation that you
16	guys have switchboarded to them, I take it
17	there's a set of e-mails like this, for not just
18	you, but also for Chad Josiah, Rob Schaul, Alex
19	Zaheer, John Stafford, and an intern that you
20	haven't named yet; right?
21	MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound.
22	A. So if I'm understanding your
23	question, would you find e-mails from those
24	individuals to platforms notifying them or
25	forwarding information from an election

1	official, so yes.
2	Would there likely be it's hard
3	for me to know if if they always responded
4	back, beyond the received, which I think was
5	pretty standard.
6	So I would assume that you would
7	find change with other members of the team,
8	where they sent something over to a platform and
9	the platform said received, so yeah, if that's
10	your question.
11	Q. So in other words, at least those
12	five individuals I just listed were involved,
13	separate from the e-mails that we're looking at
14	that involved you, they were sending their own
15	e-mails, when it was their shift, to social
16	media platforms, flagging disinformation
17	concerns?
18	A. Yeah, that's correct. But keep in
19	mind, over the entire course of the election I
20	think we forwarded about 200 e-mails, total. So
21	I would imagine the vast majority of them are
22	mine, because for a period of time I was the
23	principal one relaying it.
24	But then to answer your question,
25	yes, there's probably other e-mail chains with

1	those five representatives on it.
2	MR. GARDNER: So we've now been
3	going almost two hours. I think now would
4	probably be a good time for a break.
5	MR. SAUER: Let me ask one more
6	question, that's right on this topic, and how
7	about that or one little set of questions.
8	MR. GARDNER: Sure.
9	BY MR. SAUER:
10	Q. Did you ever discuss with Alex
11	Zaheer what he did for the Election Integrity
12	Partnership?
13	A. I'm sure I had conversations with
14	Alex about his work with SIO, which was part of
15	the larger integrity partnership.
16	Q. What did you discuss with him about
17	his work for SIO?
18	A. I think he just talked about that
19	he was participating in it, I don't know the
20	specifics of the conversation, but that he was
21	participating in it, and he was one of the
22	people that were working with the ticketing
23	system.
24	Q. When you say: Working with the
25	ticketing system, what did he say he was doing

1	with the ticketing system?
2	A. I don't recall. I mean, I was I
3	don't know how the ticketing system works, so I
4	don't know, kind of, how his role would have
5	played in there, what it was.
6	Q. When you refer to the ticketing
7	system, is that the system that Stanford had for
8	receiving reports of disinformation that they
9	would analyze?
10	A. Correct.
11	Q. How about the other intern, the one
12	you haven't named yet, did you ever discuss with
13	that intern the work he did for the Stanford
14	Internet Observatory?
15	A. I don't I don't recall. I don't
16	think certainly not in the level of detail
17	with Alex. Obviously Alex came to work for us,
18	so I have a little more familiarity with what he
19	did with SIO. So I don't I didn't have a
20	clear understanding of the other intern's role.
21	Q. What did the other intern go on to
22	do?
23	A. I don't know. As far as I know,
24	he's still at Stanford. But I don't know if he
25	graduated.

1	MR. SAUER: Why don't we take a
2	break there.
3	MR. GARDNER: Okay. I mean, it is
4	now oh, let's go off the record.
5	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
6	12:34. We're off the record.
7	(Recess.)
8	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
9	1:41 p.m. We are back on the record.
10	MR. GARDNER: Thank you. And as I
11	had mentioned before we got back on the record,
12	the witness wanted to say something before we
13	began.
14	THE WITNESS: So the intern that
15	did both SIO and CISA push forwarding was Pierce
16	Lowary.
17	BY MR. SAUER:
18	Q. And is that L-o-w-a-r-y?
19	A. I believe so, yeah.
20	Q. And that intern worked
21	simultaneously with CISA and the EIP?
22	A. And SIO was a member of the EIP.
23	Q. Right. What did he do for SIO
24	while this was going on, do you know?
25	A. I don't.

1	Q. What did he do for CISA while this
2	was going on?
3	A. Again, he was part-time in the
4	fall, so he would support the analytic stuff,
5	and then, as I mentioned, he did some work in
6	terms of the switchboarding. I'm not
7	obviously not sure the extent of the e-mails or
8	anything like that, that he would have forwarded
9	over to the platforms.
10	Q. Now, Pierce Lowary was involved in
11	forwarding e-mails over to the platforms?
12	A. Correct.
13	Q. And that's in addition to Chad
14	Josiah, Rob Schaul, Alex Zaheer, John Stafford,
15	and yourself; correct?
16	A. Correct.
17	Q. Anyone else, in 2020, who would
18	engage in those switchboarding e-mails?
19	A. I believe that was all.
20	Q. Was Pierce
21	A. From my recollection.
22	Q. Was Pierce Lowary one of the four
23	interns who originated the idea of the EIP?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. Okay. Who were the other two?

1	A. I don't
2	Q. Well, let me what about Alex
3	Zaheer, was he one of the ones?
4	A. Alex was one.
5	Q. The idea
6	A. It got
7	MR. GARDNER: Hold on, guys, you
8	keep talking over each other. So let Mr. Sauer
9	ask the question and then please answer.
10	John, can you re-ask it?
11	BY MR. SAUER:
12	Q. Was Alex Zaheer one of the four
13	interns who originated the idea of the EIP?
14	A. He was.
15	Q. And he went on, like Mr. Lowary, to
16	simultaneously work for CISA and for Stanford
17	Internet Observatory during the 2020 election
18	cycle?
19	A. Correct.
20	Q. Who were the other two interns who
21	originated the idea?
22	A. The fourth intern I do not know who
23	they're referring to, so I'm not sure who that
24	is.
25	The first intern is Isabella
1	

1	Camargo, I forget the rest of her last name, I'm
2	sorry. I'd have to look.
3	Q. Is it Isabella Garcia-Camargo?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. Okay. When did she intern for
6	CISA?
7	A. Over the summer of 2020.
8	Q. Did she do that into the fall?
9	A. She did not.
10	Q. Did she go on in the fall to work
11	for Stanford Stanford Internet Observatory?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. And did she work for Stanford
14	Internet Observatory during the summer, when she
15	was also working for CISA?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Who is Ayelet Drazen, D-r-a
18	A. Hold on a second, I'm sorry, can
19	you repeat that last question?
20	Q. Which question, who is Ayelet
21	Drazen?
22	A. No, the one before.
23	Q. Did she work for Stanford Internet
24	Observatory during the time she was also working
25	for CISA?

1	A. I don't believe so, but I'm not
2	sure kind of their arrangement in the SIO front.
3	I think SIO was I think SIO may have been
4	I'm not sure how that worked with SIO when
5	they're interns, but she did not work for us in
6	the fall, when she was working for SIO, that I'm
7	certain of, so I don't know what the
8	relationship was over the summer internship.
9	Q. What what did she do for CISA?
10	A. Again, like the other analysts,
11	typical intern stuff, supporting product
12	development, helping with, you know, any
13	research projects, standard kind of intern work
14	across the three panels I mentioned before,
15	engagement, product development, and analysis
16	research.
17	Q. Who is Ayelet Drazen, D-r-a-z-e-n,
18	first name A-y-e-l-e-t?
19	A. I don't know.
20	Q. Who is Ashwin Ramaswami?
21	A. I believe he was one of the
22	election security interns.
23	Q. During 2020 at CISA?
24	A. At least the summer of 2020. I
25	don't I don't know, kind of, how long he

1	stuck around. I didn't really work with him.
2	Q. Is he another Stanford intern?
3	A. Yeah, I believe so.
4	Q. Did he go on to work for the
5	Stanford Internet Observatory?
6	A. I don't know. I don't know.
7	Q. How about Jack Cable, C-a-b-1-e?
8	A. He was a Stanford intern. I
9	don't I don't know what he did, after, just
10	for the summer, that I'm aware of, but I'm not
11	entirely sure. He didn't work on the MDM stuff
12	with me.
13	Q. What did he do at CISA, do you
14	know?
15	A. He was more cyber-focused, so I'm
16	not entirely sure, really, what his projects
17	are.
18	Q. Just a second, I'm e-mailing you
19	two new exhibits.
20	Let me ask this: Were you involved
21	in Mr. Scully, were you involved in preparing
22	CISA's discovery responses to written discovery
23	in this case?
24	A. I believe I provided names of the
25	team. And the IT folks searched my records for

	-
1	me.
2	Q. You provided names?
3	A. Don't ask
4	Q. Names of the team, what does that
5	mean?
6	A. So I believe I provided names of
7	the people who are part of the MDM team or the
8	CFITF.
9	Q. So you provided names of key
10	custodians, for example, who might have relevant
11	e-mails in their inboxes, stuff like that?
12	A. Right.
13	Q. Okay. Were you involved in
14	drafting interrogatory responses?
15	A. If I recall correctly, I reviewed
16	some of them.
17	Q. Did you review the ones that were
18	submitted on behalf of CISA?
19	A. Yeah, those would have been the
20	only ones I reviewed.
21	Q. Before the break, you mentioned
22	that there were about 200 e-mails that CISA
23	forwarded to serve this switchboarding function
24	of routing disinformation concerns to the social
25	media platforms in 2020; right?

1	A. Yeah, give or take a few. I don't
2	know the exact number, but it's about 200.
3	Q. How do you know how many there
4	were.
5	A. Well, as I mentioned previously, we
6	kept a tracking spreadsheet. Everything we sent
7	over we logged.
8	Q. Would you consult that tracking
9	spreadsheet when you were preparing or working
10	on responding to written discovery in this case?
11	A. I don't recall that I did, it's
12	possible, but I don't recall doing it.
13	(Exhibit No. 12 was marked for
14	identification.)
15	BY MR. SAUER:
16	Q. Let me show you Exhibit 12.
17	A. Okay. That's a complaint.
18	Q. It should be amended interrogatory
19	responses that have also been filed publicly
20	with the Court as document 86-3?
21	MR. GARDNER: I'd like to take a
22	look. Hold on.
23	THE WITNESS: I don't know.
24	MR. GARDNER: Hold on one sec.
25	Yeah, that's right. That's right.

1	THE WITNESS: Okay.
2	BY MR. SAUER:
3	Q. Can you go to page 19 of that
4	document? I've also got it up on the screen
5	share.
6	A. All right. Page 19? Okay. I'm at
7	19.
8	Q. In here, at the bottom of page 19,
9	you see where it says: CISA, colon?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. It's identifying people with
12	relevant communications response to our
13	discovery requests.
14	CISA has identified the following
15	custodians as having relevant communications as
16	produced in the response to requests two and
17	three; correct? Do you see that?
18	A. I do.
19	Q. CISA custodians listed are Jen
20	Easterly, Christopher Krebs, Matt Masterson,
21	Geoff Hale, Brian Scully, and Lauren Protentis;
22	right?
23	A. Yep.
24	Q. So these other people, Chad Josiah,
25	Rob Schaul, Alex Zaheer, John Stafford, Pierce

1	Lowary, who were involved in forwarding e-mails
2	to social media platforms to flag them, were not
3	disclosed in this part of the interrogatories;
4	correct?
5	A. I think if you scroll down another
6	paragraph, you would see most of those names.
7	Q. Yeah, that's extremely interesting,
8	isn't it? Very next paragraph it says, oh,
9	we've also identified some other people as
10	appearing in the communications you produced,
11	and it lists four of those five people, Chad
12	Josiah, Robert Schaul, Alex Zaheer, John
13	Stafford; right?
14	A. Yes, that's who is listed there.
15	Q. It appears
16	A. I don't know that that's
17	interesting.
18	Q. It's interesting that CISA knew
19	about the involvement of these people and
20	relevant communications, but didn't search their
21	inboxes in response to our discovery requests;
22	isn't that what this indicates?
23	A. I have no idea what this indicates.
24	Q. Well, let me ask you this: You
25	testified before the break that those four

disclosed, all forwarded disinformation reports to social media platforms as part of the switchboarding function; isn't that right? A. They were all part of the switchboarding function. I don't know who sent e-mails or how many e-mails or any of that. Q. But you testified that they took shifts and sent e-mails to social media platforms reporting this information; correct? A. They took shifts, and if they received something they would have sent an e-mail. But without going through the spreadsheet that I mentioned I wouldn't know if an actual individual was on a shift, sent one, but that would be my expectation that they did. Q. What was the last A. There were generally two people per there were generally two people per there were generally two people per shift, so it's possible that just one of those two people were sending e-mails. Q. Pierce Lowary is not identified anywhere in these discovery responses, is he? A. I mean, he's not identified in	1	people there, plus Pierce Lowary, who you just
A. They were all part of the switchboarding function. I don't know who sent e-mails or how many e-mails or any of that. Q. But you testified that they took shifts and sent e-mails to social media platforms reporting this information; correct? A. They took shifts, and if they received something they would have sent an e-mail. But without going through the spreadsheet that I mentioned I wouldn't know if an actual individual was on a shift, sent one, but that would be my expectation that they did. Q. What was the last A. There were generally two people per there were generally two people per there were generally two people two people were sending e-mails. Q. Pierce Lowary is not identified anywhere in these discovery responses, is he? A. I mean, he's not identified in	2	disclosed, all forwarded disinformation reports
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8 Q. But you testified that they took 9 shifts and sent e-mails to social media 10 platforms reporting this information; correct? 11 A. They took shifts, and if they 12 received something they would have sent an 13 e-mail. But without going through the 14 spreadsheet that I mentioned I wouldn't know if 15 an actual individual was on a shift, sent one, 16 but that would be my expectation that they did. 17 Q. What was the last 18 A. There were generally two people 19 per there were generally two people per 20 shift, so it's possible that just one of those 21 two people were sending e-mails. 22 Q. Pierce Lowary is not identified 23 anywhere in these discovery responses, is he? 24 A. I mean, he's not identified in	6	switchboarding function. I don't know who sent
shifts and sent e-mails to social media platforms reporting this information; correct? A. They took shifts, and if they received something they would have sent an e-mail. But without going through the spreadsheet that I mentioned I wouldn't know if an actual individual was on a shift, sent one, but that would be my expectation that they did. Q. What was the last A. There were generally two people per there were generally two people per shift, so it's possible that just one of those two people were sending e-mails. Q. Pierce Lowary is not identified anywhere in these discovery responses, is he? A. I mean, he's not identified in	7	e-mails or how many e-mails or any of that.
10 platforms reporting this information; correct? 11 A. They took shifts, and if they 12 received something they would have sent an 13 e-mail. But without going through the 14 spreadsheet that I mentioned I wouldn't know if 15 an actual individual was on a shift, sent one, 16 but that would be my expectation that they did. 17 Q. What was the last 18 A. There were generally two people 19 per there were generally two people 19 per there were generally two people per 20 shift, so it's possible that just one of those 21 two people were sending e-mails. 22 Q. Pierce Lowary is not identified 23 anywhere in these discovery responses, is he? 24 A. I mean, he's not identified in	8	Q. But you testified that they took
11 A. They took shifts, and if they 12 received something they would have sent an 13 e-mail. But without going through the 14 spreadsheet that I mentioned I wouldn't know if 15 an actual individual was on a shift, sent one, 16 but that would be my expectation that they did. 17 Q. What was the last 18 A. There were generally two people 19 per there were generally two people 19 per shift, so it's possible that just one of those 20 two people were sending e-mails. 21 Q. Pierce Lowary is not identified 23 anywhere in these discovery responses, is he? 24 A. I mean, he's not identified in	9	shifts and sent e-mails to social media
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23 anywhere in these discovery responses, is he? 24 A. I mean, he's not identified in	21	two people were sending e-mails.
A. I mean, he's not identified in	22	Q. Pierce Lowary is not identified
, and the second se	23	anywhere in these discovery responses, is he?
OF those This is a small sostion. I don't know	24	A. I mean, he's not identified in
25 these. This is a small section. I don't know	25	these. This is a small section. I don't know

1	if he is elsewhere.
2	Q. Well, you said you reviewed them
3	when they were being prepared. Do you remember
4	seeing his name anywhere anywhere in the
5	government's discovery responses?
6	A. I don't recall, but I wouldn't
7	have I don't think I would have reviewed the
8	entire document, so I don't know.
9	Q. Who would have
10	A. Obviously, I didn't see the final
11	document.
12	Q. Who would have reviewed the final
13	document?
14	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
15	speculation.
16	BY MR. SAUER:
17	Q. If you know.
18	A. Yeah, I don't know.
19	MR. SAUER: Exhibit 62, which I've
20	also e-mailed you.
21	MR. GARDNER: John, did you say 62?
22	MR. SAUER: 62, should be the most
23	recent one in your inbox.
24	THE WITNESS: Okay. Okay.
25	(Exhibit No. 62 was marked for

1	identification.)
2	BY MR. SAUER:
3	Q. Here's Jack
4	A. Is it the sorry, go ahead.
5	Q. This is Jack Cable's publicly
6	available online LinkedIn profile; do you see
7	that?
8	A. I do.
9	Q. If you scroll down, a fifth page of
10	this document, it looks like he was a research
11	assistant at Stanford Internet Observatory from
12	2019 to 2021; correct?
13	A. That's what it says, yep.
14	Q. And that he ended in June of 2021,
15	correct, at SIO?
16	A. That's what it says, yeah.
17	Q. And immediately below that, it
18	looks like he was an election security technical
19	advisor at CISA from June 2020 to January 2021;
20	correct?
21	A. That's what he says.
22	Q. So he also overlapped, for an
23	entire year, in working simultaneously for CISA
24	and for the SIO; correct?
25	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of

1 foundation. 2 BY MR. SAUER: 3 Ο. According to his LinkedIn profile? 4 MR. GARDNER: Same objection. 5 Α. LinkedIn profile says he worked at 6 CISA for eight months. 7 (Reporter admonition.) THE WITNESS: Sorry. 9 The LinkedIn profile said he worked Α. at CISA for eight months. 10 11 Q. Right. Does the LinkedIn profile 12 also indicate that during those same eight 13 months, from June of 2020 to January of 2021, he 14 also was an intern -- a research assistant at 15 Stanford? 16 It appears that way, yep. 17 Q. Were you aware that Jack Cable was 18 working for Stanford Internet Observatory while 19 he was also interning for CISA? 20 Α. No. Jack didn't work for me, so I 21 didn't really pay attention to what he was 22 doing. 23 Ο. He shares this simultaneous employment with SIO and CISA, along with Alex 24 25 Zaheer and Pierce Lowary; correct?

1 MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of 2 foundation. 3 BY MR. SAUER: 4 Ο. Correct? 5 I'm sorry, could you repeat the 6 question? 7 Q. Pierce Lowary and Alex Zaheer also 8 simultaneously worked for CISA and SIO; correct? They did. 9 Α. 10 Q. And then, if you scroll up a little 11 bit, to the page before, it looks like he went 12 on to work for the Krebs-Stamos Group; were you 13 aware of that? 14 No, I don't think so. Α. 15 Ο. And then he went on to work for the 16 senate; correct? Does that ring a bell? 17 I mean, it's what it says here. 18 Q. So you didn't know what Jack Cable went on to do after he left CISA? 19 20 No, I didn't really pay attention Α. 21 to what -- like I said, he didn't work for me, 22 so I didn't really follow him. In fact, I'm --23 a couple of my interns I'm not sure what they're 24 doing, either. 25 Q. Let's go back to Exhibit 9.

1	Is it possible that Jack Cable was
2	another one of the interns who originated the
3	EIP? You mentioned there's one, and you're not
4	sure if it was them?
5	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
6	speculation.
7	A. Yeah, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't
8	know.
9	Q. Let's go to page 8769 in this
10	document, Exhibit 9.
11	A. Do you know what the PDF page is,
12	John?
13	Q. I'm scrolling down to it, so I'll
14	tell you as soon as I know the answer.
15	A. Okay.
16	Q. I think it's PDF page 62.
17	A. All right.
18	Q. All right. If you see here, it
19	looks like Alex Zaheer, on October 30th, sends a
20	report about misinformation to CFITF, which is
21	the CISA reporting e-mail address; correct?
22	MR. GARDNER: John, I'm sorry, are
23	you going to post this on the on the live
24	screen for us?
25	MR. SAUER: I'm sorry, I didn't

1 realize it wasn't up. Can you see it on the 2 screen share? 3 MR. GARDNER: Yeah, we got it now. 4 Thank you. BY MR. SAUER: 5 6 Ο. Alex Zaheer, on October 30th, sends 7 an e-mail to CFITF; correct? Α. Yep. 9 Q. And he's actually --10 Α. Yes. 11 He says: FYSA, EIP has reported Q. 12 the following to EI-ISAC and Twitter from EIP, 13 and then he reports on an EIP ticket; correct? 14 Α. Correct. 15 Ο. And then this -- you responded to 16 him, Thanks Alex; do you see that on the page 17 before? 18 Α. Yes. 19 And then you sent an e-mail, it's Q. 20 not clear to whom, saying: FYI, the EIP, 21 submitted the below to Twitter, no need to 22 respond. But it looks like you were saying that 23 to Twitter; right? 24 Α. Yeah, there's no header there, so 25 I'm not certain, but that's what it appears.

1	Q. It appears that from your intern,
2	who was simultaneously working for EIP, you
3	received a report of alleged misinformation and
4	submitted it onto Twitter; right?
5	A. Yeah.
6	Q. And then and that was an
7	EIP-specific report; correct?
8	A. Yep.
9	Q. And then Twitter responded and
10	said, thanks Brian, we received that report from
11	the EIP and escalated it; correct?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. And then she goes on to specify to
14	you the action they took against that; correct?
15	A. Yeah, on a contextual label
16	pursuant to their policy on civic integrity,
17	yeah.
18	Q. Were there other instances where
19	this occurred, where an EIP report was forwarded
20	to you, and you forwarded it onto to a social
21	media platform?
22	A. As I said earlier, it's possible,
23	but I don't recall.
24	Q. How about
25	A. It was our standard practice.

1	Q. How about the other five people who
2	were monitoring these misinformation reporting
3	e-mails, did they ever review that, do you know?
4	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
5	speculation.
6	A. Yeah, I don't know. Again, it
7	wasn't part of our normal process, so I'm not
8	sure.
9	Q. Would that be reflected in this
10	spreadsheet you referred to multiple times?
11	A. Yeah, it should be.
12	Q. So if there was if the EIP is
13	referenced or is the originator of the report
14	you would note that in the spreadsheet?
15	A. I believe so. I believe we would
16	have the case number.
17	Q. Can you scroll back up to page 33
18	of the PDF?
19	A. Yep.
20	Q. It's Bates 8349.
21	A. 8349, yep.
22	Q. You see at the top of this page
23	there's a misinformation report from Oregon,
24	that's being sent on by the CIS, Center For
25	Internet Security, reporting e-mail; do you see

1	that?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. And it's sent to you and a couple
4	other CISA e-mails or CISA e-mails, there in
5	the first line; right?
6	A. Yep.
7	Q. In the second line it's sent to
8	tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; do you see
9	that?
10	A. I do.
11	Q. What is that?
12	A. I don't know.
13	Q. Is that the reporting e-mail for
14	tips to the 2020 Election Integrity Partnership?
15	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
16	speculation, also, asked and answered.
17	A. Yeah, I don't know what it is.
18	Q. Is it your testimony that you're
19	not aware whether or not that's the reporting
20	e-mail for the EIP?
21	A. Yeah, I'm not aware the answer
22	is, I'm not aware of what e-mail that is.
23	Q. Were you aware that did you
24	notice that CIS was commonly forwarding these
25	reports to both you and that

1	
1	tips@2020partnership e-mail?
2	A. I'm not sure that I paid that much
3	attention to it, no.
4	Q. You didn't notice
5	A. Again, yeah, I wasn't I guess
6	that I wasn't aware of what processes they were
7	following.
8	Q. So you didn't know they were
9	looping in the EIP on their reports; is that
10	what you're saying?
11	A. I don't recall it, but again, as we
12	discussed earlier, it could have been part of
13	the effort to deconflate for the platforms.
14	Q. Up here on page 51 of the PDF,
15	scrolling to the bottom of that page down to 52,
16	here's another CIS report. Once again, it's
17	sent to you at to CISA e-mails and
18	tips@2020partnership@atlassian.net; correct?
19	A. Yeah, I see the e-mail address in
20	there.
21	Q. And you don't recall that being
22	you getting copied that being copied on
23	e-mails of this nature?
24	A. I don't.
25	Q. Really briefly, jumping ahead to

1 page 10539, page 55, once again, CIS is copying 2 you and tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; 3 correct? That's the e-mail, yes. Α. 5 Jumping ahead to page 7565, here's Q. 6 a report from the Colorado secretary of state's 7 office. Do you see, we're on page 59 of the PDF, where they're reporting it to EI-ISAC, 9 CISA, and Stanford Partners; correct? 10 That's what the e-mail says, yep. Α. 11 Q. It says Stanford is presumably --12 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for 13 speculation. 14 Α. Yeah, I don't know what they mean by Stanford. 15 16 Do you think Stanford might be some 17 other Stanford entity to which state and local 18 election officials are reporting disinformation 19 concerns --20 MR. GARDNER: Objection. 21 BY MR. SAUER: 22 Q. -- during the 2020 cycle? 23 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for 24 speculation, lacks foundation. 25 ///

1	BY MR. SAUER:
2	Q. Do you know?
3	A. I don't know.
4	Q. Scrolling above this, again, CIS
5	forwards this to you and tips22020partnership,
6	that reporting e-mail or that e-mail address;
7	correct?
8	A. Are you up on what page are you
9	on now?
10	Q. Page 58 of the PDF, immediately
11	above, shows CIS forwarding that report from
12	Colorado secretary of state's office to both you
13	and tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net?
14	A. So Colorado sends to CIS, CIS sends
15	to me, CISA, and atlassian.net, okay.
16	Q. And you forward this onto to
17	Twitter; correct, immediately above that?
18	A. So again, there's no header, but
19	the response is from Twitter, so that's what I
20	assume.
21	Q. And you they say you say:
22	Please see below reporting from Colorado. These
23	do not appear to be connected to the imposter
24	parody accounts previously shared; correct?
25	A. Correct.

1 Q. And Twitter responds within 15
2 minutes: We will escalate. Thank you; correct?
3 A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And if you scroll down a
5 couple pages, you see that Colorado secretary of
6 state's office has flagged some parody or
7 imposter accounts, including one with 14
8 followers; correct?
9 A. What page are you on?
10 Q. 59 of the PDF.
11 A. 59 of the PDF? I don't see what
12 you're talking about there. This is the same
13 e-mail chain we were just talking about.
Q. Maybe look up at the screen share,
can you see where secretary of state's office
16 has forwarded a screen shot of a Twitter
17 account, it's got 14 followers?
18 A. I do.
Q. And secretary of state's office in
20 Colorado says: These are concerning to us here
21 in Colorado because of their recent FBI/CISA
22 warnings about impersonation accounts; correct?
23 A. That's what it says, yep.
Q. So they say that we're reporting
25 this because it because it's the sort of

1	things that the FBI and CISA warned us may
2	warrant reporting; right?
3	A. I mean, I don't want to speak for
4	the secretary of state, but that's kind of how
5	the account sentence reads.
6	Q. Did you in fact, were you
7	involved in warning state and local election
8	officials about impersonation accounts spreading
9	false information about the election?
10	A. I'm sure I would have reviewed a
11	document that went out along those lines. I'm
12	not aware of the document, but I'm sure if it
13	went out I would have reviewed it.
14	Q. Do you remember reviewing it?
15	A. They put out in 2020 we put out
16	a couple of joint FBI and CISA products. I
17	don't remember specifically which one this is,
18	but it certainly sounds like something we would
19	do.
20	Q. Okay. Scrolling down, there's
21	another one they're flagging here, that if you
22	didn't know, it has two followers; correct?
23	A. So it appears.
24	Q. And you forwarded that onto
25	Twitter, and Twitter said: We'll escalate;

1	right?
2	A. Yes. They said they will escalate.
3	Q. Moving onto page 10512, just a few
4	pages down, that's going to be page 63 of the
5	PDF.
6	A. Okay.
7	Q. Do you see here in the middle,
8	here, it's an inquiry from Twitter, and she
9	says: Hey Brian, can we talk about CIS
10	misinformation reporting duplicate reports to
11	EIP, possible to have just you escalate;
12	correct?
13	A. Yeah, that's what the e-mail says.
14	Q. What is she talking about, is this
15	the duplicate reporting issue that you talked
16	about earlier, where they were getting reports
17	from you and EIP and CIS?
18	A. That's what I would imagine it is,
19	yeah.
20	Q. Okay. Do you remember anything
21	about this? We're talking about October 27th,
22	so, you know, maybe a week before the 2020
23	election, do you remember the social media
24	platform is having this concern about duplicate
25	reports from CIS and EIP?

1	A. I remember Twitter, in particular,
2	having that concern.
3	Our screen is screwy again.
4	THE REPORTER: Can we go off the
5	record?
6	MR. SAUER: Yeah, we can go off the
7	record.
8	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
9	2:11 p.m. We're off the record.
10	(Recess.)
11	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
12	2:13 p.m. We are back on the record.
13	BY MR. SAUER:
14	Q. Okay. So and then, Mr. Scully,
15	you responded to this: So here's the deal, EIP
16	will only report something to Twitter if they
17	have additional context to provided based on
18	their research; correct?
19	A. That's what I wrote, yes.
20	Q. How did you know that was going to
21	be their policy or their practice, did you talk
22	to EIP?
23	A. I would imagine I did.
24	Q. Who did you talk to?
25	A. I don't recall.

1	Q. And that he goes on or you go on
2	to say, they will not send Twitter reporting
3	unless it has that additional context that would
4	help you make a decision; correct?
5	A. Yep.
6	Q. And then it says: EIP will also
7	let CISA know when they are reporting something
8	to you so I can give you a heads up; correct?
9	A. Yep.
10	Q. Is that what happened after this
11	e-mail, did EIP report to you when they were
12	reporting something to the social media
13	platforms?
14	A. I don't recall that, in practice.
15	Although, obviously, we just went through each
16	one e-mail that did that. I don't remember it
17	being a common thing but, again, I don't I
18	don't know. It's possible.
19	Q. Okay. And then it says: EIP will
20	continue to use the CIA CIS case number to
21	facilitate identifying duplicative reports;
22	correct?
23	A. Yep.
24	Q. So EIP was talking to CIS enough to
25	know what CIS's misinformation reporting case

1	numbers were; right?
2	A. I don't know. I don't know if
3	that's true.
4	Q. Were you aware that EIP was using
5	CIS's case numbers, because you said it in this
6	e-mail?
7	A. Yep, I mean, if that's what I
8	wrote, that's probably what they were doing.
9	Q. Okay. Do you remember discussing
10	that with CIS or EIP that they were going to,
11	you know, kind of share case numbers?
12	A. I don't recall any such
13	specificity. I know we had a conversation. I
14	recall that we had conversations about how to
15	de-duplicate, make sure we weren't overtaxing
16	Twitter, in particular.
17	Q. And that de-duplication process
18	involved some kind of coordination between you,
19	EIP and CIS; correct?
20	A. Again, reading this, it appears we
21	are just making sure we are sending something
22	over and everybody is aware of it.
23	Q. Right. So everybody would tell
24	everybody else that they were sending something
25	over, and there was an attempt to avoid sending

1	duplicative reports to Twitter?
2	MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound.
3	BY MR. SAUER:
4	Q. Correct?
5	_
	A. Yeah, can you can you break
6	that can you start that over again?
7	Q. Was there an agreement for EIP and
8	CIS and CISA to coordinate and let each other
9	know what they were reporting to platforms like
10	Twitter?
11	A. I think that's generally right,
12	yeah.
13	MR. SAUER: Let me send you a
14	couple more exhibits, 10 and 11. I'm going to
15	pull up 10 on the screen share while you're
16	waiting.
17	MR. GARDNER: John, do you John,
18	did you send them over?
19	MR. SAUER: Yeah. They should be
20	in your inbox.
21	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, I'm looking.
22	MR. SAUER: They're in my sent box.
23	MR. GARDNER: Okay. I believe you.
24	Hold on.
25	(Exhibit No. 10 was marked for

1 identification.) 2 BY MR. SAUER: 3 Ο. Let me ask this: Can you see it on 4 the screen share? 5 Α. I can. 6 MR. GARDNER: You haven't shared it 7 yet, John. THE WITNESS: Trick question. 9 BY MR. SAUER: 10 Q. Now can you see it on the screen 11 share? 12 Α. Yes. 13 Q. Just looking here at the first 14 page, you know, this exhibit is a collection of 15 your switchboarding e-mails from November of 16 2020, do you see you, are copied here on 17 misinformation report from CIS on November 2nd 18 of 2020? 19 Α. Yes. 20 Once again, CIS continues to copy Q. 21 tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; do you see 22 that? 23 Α. I do. 24 Does that ring a bell for you about 25 what that e-mail is, after we talked about that

1	last e-mail, where you were arranging to
2	coordinate with EIP about de-duplicating reports
3	to social media platforms?
4	A. I forget. I don't recall the
5	e-mail. If you tell me that that was the tips
6	for the 2020 EIP I would believe you.
7	Q. Okay. Let me scroll down a page to
8	Bates 13603.
9	A. What page was that? I'm sorry.
10	Q. Bates 13603, 10 of the PDF.
11	A. Okay.
12	Q. You see here there's a report from
13	the Iowa secretary of state's office on November
14	2nd, that's sent to CIS; do you see that?
15	A. Just scrolling through it, sorry.
16	Give me a second. Yes.
17	Q. And then it looks like the Iowa
18	secretary of state's office also sent this to
19	three FBI e-mail addresses; right, with the
20	recipients redacted, FBI number two, FBI number
21	three, and FBI number four; correct?
22	MR. GARDNER: Lack of objection,
23	lack of foundation.
24	A. I don't see the e-mail addresses
25	you're referring to.

1	Q. Do you see @FBI, if you look on the
2	screen share, @FBI.gov?
3	MR. GARDNER: Same objections.
4	BY MR. SAUER:
5	Q. With the handle omitted, three
6	e-mails?
7	A. Okay.
8	Q. Were you aware of the FBI being
9	involved in receiving misinformation reports
10	from state and local elections officials?
11	A. Generally speaking, we tell
12	election officials to report what they saw to
13	either DHS or the FBI, and it would end up where
14	it needed to be.
15	Q. So you told them to report it to
16	either DHS or the FBI?
17	A. Correct.
18	Q. Who at the FBI was receiving those
19	kinds of reports?
20	A. I don't know. I think it
21	Q. Go ahead.
22	A. Generally speaking, the FBI has
23	field offices, and so the idea was if they
24	were election officials had established
25	relationships with the FBI field office and the

1	
1	elections coordinator in that office, and that's
2	where they wanted to report it, that they could
3	do so.
4	Q. So there was these FBI officials
5	tended to be FBI field officers officers?
6	A. I don't want to speculate, but
7	but again, that was, you know, us trying to
8	to help the election officials, just if they had
9	something they needed to report, if they had as
10	many different options to do that as possible.
11	Q. Okay. Do you know what FBI did
12	with its misinformation reports, was it
13	switchboarding them like you guys were doing?
14	A. I don't know, to be honest.
15	Q. Is that notion that you could
16	forward things to the FBI, is that something
17	that was discussed in those USG
18	industry-specific meetings you talked about?
19	A. I not that I recall, but it's
20	possible we we talked to them about the
21	guidance we gave to election officials, that
22	election officials could it either way, but I
23	don't recall specific conversations along those
24	lines.
25	Q. Can you scroll down to the page 27

1	of the PDF.
2	A. Let's go. Okay.
3	Q. If you look here, kind of at the
4	bottom of this text chain, Aaron Wilson, he's
5	your contact at CIS; right?
6	A. Correct.
7	Q. And he's forwarding something to
8	November 3rd, with a report about alleged
9	election misinformation; right?
10	A. Well, poll worker Erie PA says
11	announces on Instagram they will throw away
12	Pro-Trump votes, that's what you're talking
13	about?
14	Q. Yeah.
15	A. That's the subject of the e-mail.
16	Q. He uses the EIP case number for
17	this report; correct?
18	A. He does.
19	Q. And he sent it to CISA at the CFITF
20	e-mail; correct?
21	A. He does, correct.
22	Q. And the CFITF e-mail forwards it to
23	you, and you forward it to Matt Masterson at
24	Facebook; correct?
25	A. No, that's not correct. I Matt

1	was still at CISA at the time. I forwarded it
2	to Saleela Salahuddin at Facebook.
3	Q. Copying Matt Masterson?
4	A. I'm sorry?
5	Q. Copying Matt Masterson?
6	A. Yeah, who was at CISA. You said he
7	was at Facebook. I just wanted to make sure
8	that that was clear that he was still
9	Q. I'm sorry, I meant to say and
10	Facebook, not at Facebook?
11	A. Gotcha.
12	Q. And then Facebook came back to you
13	for clarification; right? Do you recall that?
14	A. So we sorry, go ahead.
15	Q. Go ahead, what were you going to
16	say?
17	A. I said, just to be clear, we
18	forwarded the statement from Pennsylvania about
19	that incident to Facebook and Matt Masterson.
20	Q. And so
21	A. That's what is here.
22	Q. And they and it looks like
23	Facebook asked you, could you please confirm
24	that, A, the worker in question who was
25	supposedly destroying Pro-Trump ballots is not a

1	poll worker, or B, that he did not, in fact,
2	destroy ballots or at least there's no evidence
3	he did.
4	So Facebook asked you, Brian Scully
5	and Matt Masterson, for that clarification;
6	right?
7	A. They did.
8	Q. Yeah, and then you responded: Not
9	sure I understand the distinction you're trying
10	to make, but both components of the narrative
11	are false. The person is not a poll worker and
12	no ballots were destroyed. I suppose that makes
13	the entire thing a hoax; correct?
14	A. Yeah, that was my response.
15	Q. What was your basis for concluding
16	that both components of the narrative were
17	false?
18	A. I believe the statements from
19	Pennsylvania. I assume if you have that
20	document we can take a look and confirm.
21	Q. You read the statement from
22	Pennsylvania and reported its content back to
23	Facebook?
24	A. Correct.
25	Q. Okay. Did you did that happen

1	from time to time, where you wouldn't just
2	forward the disinformation concern, but then you
3	would provide, you know, information that would
4	help debunk it through the social media network?
5	A. I think I frame it a little
6	differently, if social media platforms needed
7	additional information from an election official
8	we would try to support that. There was also
9	one time when I believe it was Facebook had a
10	question about DHS immigration and customs
11	enforcement having agents going places where we
12	also provided a response back on a specific
13	piece.
14	But generally speaking, we would do
15	what we did here, which is if the if the
16	jurisdiction made a public statement or if there
17	was additional information the jurisdiction
18	could provide, and the platforms asked for it,
19	that we would try to facilitate getting the
20	information they asked for.
21	Q. Did you merely relay that
22	information, the sort of debunking information
23	from the election official, would you sometimes
24	find it on your own and helpfully supply it to
25	the social media platform?

1	A. If it was a public statement, I'm
2	sure we pulled it ourselves. If there was not a
3	public statement, I would imagine we would go
4	back to the election official.
5	Q. But you might
6	A. I don't know
7	Q. Go ahead.
8	A. Sorry, I don't want to say that
9	every case was exactly like that, but again, if
10	there was a public statement that was put out by
11	the jurisdiction, we would we would defer to
12	that.
13	Q. Did you take any steps to find
14	out for example, suppose there's a public
15	statement that disputes what a private citizen
16	has said on Facebook or Twitter, would you do
17	further research to figure out who was telling
18	the truth or would you just relay the official
19	government explanation of the incident to the
20	social media platforms?
21	A. We would relay the the official
22	statement from the jurisdiction.
23	Q. I take it sometimes you would go
20	2
24	find that official statement on your own, and

1	local jurisdiction to see if they issued a
2	statement?
3	A. Yeah, we would find, I think it
4	implies that we were doing a rigorous search.
5	Generally, we would be aware if a jurisdiction
6	put out a statement and we would just pull it
7	ourselves.
8	Q. Look ahead to
9	A. And sometimes
10	Q. Go ahead.
11	A. Sorry.
12	Sometimes we would reach out to the
13	jurisdiction and they would just provide the
14	statements that they had already made public, as
15	well.
16	Q. Would you relay that to the social
17	media platform?
18	A. Yeah, if they were asking for
19	additional information we would.
20	Q. Here's another one, page 35 of the
21	PDF, Bates 8663. Do you see that on the screen
22	share?
23	A. I'm scrolling down to it. 8663?
24	Q. Yeah.
25	A. Yep.

looks like it's another situation where Twitters asked for some clarification, for example, she says, on November 6th, have Pennsylvania state officials provided initial information to you of the authenticity of the video or the circumstances under underpinning it; do you see that? A. I do. Q. And then you respond, scrolling back up, you say: There are two reports in the e-mail chain, and you explain what you understand what Pennsylvania is saying about the	n
says, on November 6th, have Pennsylvania state officials provided initial information to you of the authenticity of the video or the circumstances under underpinning it; do you see that? A. I do. Q. And then you respond, scrolling back up, you say: There are two reports in the e-mail chain, and you explain what you	
officials provided initial information to you of the authenticity of the video or the circumstances under underpinning it; do you see that? A. I do. Q. And then you respond, scrolling back up, you say: There are two reports in the e-mail chain, and you explain what you	
the authenticity of the video or the circumstances under underpinning it; do you see that? A. I do. Q. And then you respond, scrolling back up, you say: There are two reports in the e-mail chain, and you explain what you	
circumstances under underpinning it; do you see that? A. I do. Q. And then you respond, scrolling back up, you say: There are two reports in the e-mail chain, and you explain what you	ŀ
8 see that? 9 A. I do. 10 Q. And then you respond, scrolling 11 back up, you say: There are two reports in the 12 e-mail chain, and you explain what you	ŀ
9 A. I do. 10 Q. And then you respond, scrolling 11 back up, you say: There are two reports in the 12 e-mail chain, and you explain what you	<u>.</u>
Q. And then you respond, scrolling back up, you say: There are two reports in the e-mail chain, and you explain what you	ŀ
back up, you say: There are two reports in the e-mail chain, and you explain what you	<u>:</u>
12 e-mail chain, and you explain what you)
, 1	
understand what Pennsylvania is saying about th	
	ıe
disputed information; right?	
15 A. Sorry, I'm just scrolling down to	
make sure I understand the context of the chair	۱.
Okay. Sorry. Could you repeat the	ıe
18 question?	
Q. Sure. My question is: You	
20 provided clarification to the social media	
21 platform about what you believe the Pennsylvan:	.a
22 reporter meant; correct?	
23 A. I don't believe that is correct.	
Q. Well, did you say, for example, or	ì
25 the authenticity Pennsylvania states in the ver	

1	first e-mail that they believe the videos are
2	false and we're reaching out to our partners to
3	validate; correct?
4	A. Correct.
5	Q. Okay. And then, later that day, if
6	you scroll up, you say: Hey, to Twitter, just
7	came across this debunk of the video on Twitter;
8	correct?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. And then so you are looking
11	around to find information that would debunk it;
12	correct?
13	A. I don't know if that's correct.
14	It's possible somebody just let us know that
15	there was something there.
16	Q. And then 17 minutes later Twitter
17	responds, thank you so much, we applied a label
18	to the tweet; correct?
19	A. Yes, that's what they said back,
20	correct.
21	Q. Scroll down to page 8669.
22	A. What page of the PDF?
23	Q. 46.
24	A. 46?
25	Q. Yes. And here you've got a

1	
1	misinformation report from the secretary of
2	state of Arizona's office; do you see that?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. It says: This post is on a private
5	Facebook page, above. I've included a screen
6	<pre>shot; correct?</pre>
7	A. That's what the Arizona e-mail
8	says, yep.
9	Q. How did they was that unusual
10	for them to report statements on a private
11	Facebook page?
12	A. I don't I don't know. We didn't
13	do any analysis of that kind.
14	Q. Okay. So you don't know whether
15	someone was monitoring how posts appeared on a
16	private Facebook page containing alleged
17	misinformation?
18	A. I don't know how Arizona secretary
19	of state came across that information, no.
20	Q. Dropping ahead to page 864, now.
21	Here at 954
22	A. I'm sorry.
23	Q. Sorry.
24	A. 54?
25	Q. Oh, sorry, page 54 of the PDF, yes,

1	sorry. Actually, no, I'm sorry, that's not the
2	right page.
3	A. Okay.
4	Q. No, sorry, page 59 of the PDF?
5	A. 59? Okay.
6	Q. Here's a chain on Tuesday, November
7	10th, at 7:23 in the evening, you forwarded a
8	report of information misinformation to
9	Twitter; correct, at 7:23?
10	A. Yeah, that's what appears, there's
11	no he header on the e-mail, but considering the
12	responses is from Twitter, I assume that's who I
13	sent it to.
14	Q. And Twitter responds in two
15	minutes, we will escalate; right?
16	A. Yep.
17	Q. And then Twitter responds here a
18	few minutes later, after midnight, at 12:11
19	a.m., hey, we labeled all the tweets except two;
20	right?
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. So Twitter was working on this well
23	into the evening, along with were you guys
24	doing that well into the evening?
25	MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound.

1	BY MR. SAUER:
2	Q. Timeframe?
3	A. So was Twitter working on it well
4	into the evening? I mean, I guess. Were we?
5	Again, if somebody was checking the phone, most
6	of the post-election stuff would have been me.
7	We would have done something with it, but it
8	wasn't a requirement.
9	(Exhibit No. 11 was marked for
10	identification.)
11	BY MR. SAUER:
12	Q. And showing you Exhibit 11, which
13	should be in your inbox.
14	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, I think that's
15	right.
16	A. Okay.
17	Q. On the last page of this PDF,
18	there's an e-mail from Aaron Wilson?
19	MR. GARDNER: I'm sorry, John, do
20	you want to post it on the screen?
21	MR. SAUER: Oh, thank you.
22	MR. GARDNER: You don't need to, if
23	you don't want to, I mean, we have the
24	MR. SAUER: I got it, I mean, I
25	thought it was up.

1 BY MR. SAUER: 2 Last -- see it, last page of the Q. 3 PDF, there's a report from CIS. Α. Yeah. 5 Actually, this is, interstingly, a Q. 6 report from CIS to Gwinnet County; right? Where 7 they say: Hi Kristi, the EI-ISAC and our partners at the Election Integrity Partnership 9 are tracking a social media post that's getting 10 traction very quickly; right? 11 Α. Yes, that's what the e-mail reads, 12 yeah. 13 Q. So this is a situation where the 14 reporting was actually originated by CIS or EIP 15 or actually, according to this e-mail, both of 16 They're the ones who noticed the 17 misinformation, online, first; right? 18 MR. GARDNER: Objection to form. 19 BY MR. SAUER: 20 Q. Correct? 21 That's what -- that's what the Α. 22 e-mail appears to say, yeah. 23 Q. And they reached out, you know, 24 proactively to Gwinnett County asking them to 25 debunk it; right?

1	A. Yeah, they're just trying to get
2	what was actually going on, yeah.
3	Q. Yeah, they say: We're tracking a
4	social media post that's gaining traction very
5	quickly. It's likely a misunderstanding, but
6	being portrayed as a nefarious act. If you can
7	clarify for us what is being shown, if it even
8	happened, we can work with the social media
9	platforms to try to have the post removed as
10	misinformation; correct?
11	A. Yeah, that's what he wrote.
12	Q. And then Gwinnett County comes back
13	with a a an explanation of the post;
14	correct?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. And that's forwarded to Twitter by
17	CIS, along with their explanation; correct?
18	Well, actually, before they report
19	it to Twitter they report it to you; right?
20	Here's there's an e-mail that says
21	A. Yeah.
22	Q Brian and EIP
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Right? So Brian
25	A. Yep.

1	Q. And EIP is Election Integrity
2	Partnership; right?
3	A. Yep.
4	Q. And that's what CIS says, and they
5	sent this to
6	A. Yes.
7	Q your e-mail, two CISA e-mails,
8	their own e-mail and
9	tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; right?
10	A. Yep.
11	Q. So they sent this e-mail, where
12	they say: Brian and EIP, to you, two CISA
13	accounts, their own account, and
14	tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; right?
15	A. Yep.
16	Q. So it appears that that
17	<pre>tips@2020partnership e-mail is an EIP e-mail;</pre>
18	right?
19	MR. GARDNER: Objection, asked and
20	answered, multiple times.
21	BY MR. SAUER:
22	Q. Does that refresh your memory?
23	A. I wouldn't say refreshes my memory,
24	but it's going on CISA or CIS e-mail there, so
25	it's probably a reasonable assumption to make.

1	Q. Then you forward this on, having
2	received the report from CIS; right?
3	A. Yep.
4	Q. And then @Twitter reports back to
5	you, and says, they labeled the tweet and are
6	taking steps to limit trending; right?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. What does that mean to take steps
9	to limit trending; do you know?
10	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
11	speculation.
12	A. Yeah, I don't know. Twitter has a
13	range of tools that they use. I couldn't
14	possibly speculate on what they were doing here.
15	Q. Let's put Exhibit 12 back up.
16	These are the interrogatory
17	responses.
18	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, hold on one
19	second, John. You said 12?
20	MR. SAUER: Yeah.
21	MR. GARDNER: Hold on one second.
22	MR. SAUER: Go to page 38.
23	THE WITNESS: 38.
24	MR. SAUER: Yeah, if you would.
25	THE WITNESS: Okay. I'm on page

	<u>-</u>
1	
1	38, John.
2	BY MR. SAUER:
3	Q. Oh, sorry, I'm on page 28. My
4	mistake.
5	A. All right.
6	Q. 38 asks that here, you see where it
7	says CISA, and it says: CISA responds that
8	meetings taking place with the social media
9	platforms relating to misinformation include,
10	but are not limited to, and then there's a
11	<pre>bullet list; right?</pre>
12	A. I think that is 38, not 28.
13	Q. Yeah, it should be on page 38?
14	A. Sorry. I thought you said 28. Let
15	me get back down there.
16	Q. Oh, I meant I was mistaken.
17	A. Okay. So there's a table, am I
18	looking below the table or above the table?
19	Below the table?
20	Q. Yeah.
21	A. Got you. Okay.
22	Q. Okay.
23	A. I'm sorry, what am I looking for?
24	Q. Were you involved in identifying
25	meetings between CISA and social media platforms

1	relating to misinformation in responding to
2	discovery requests?
3	A. Yes, I believe I was.
4	Q. What meetings did you identify?
5	A. Certainly these, the recurring
6	meetings listed here, that we talked about, the
7	preparation meeting we talked about, going
8	through the list, MDM, joint MDM working group,
9	I think I missed those are the ones I would
10	have identified.
11	Q. Start with the first one, first
12	bullet point, a recurring meeting usually
13	entitled USG industry meeting, which has
14	generally had a monthly cadence; right?
15	A. Yep.
16	Q. And that is the one that you refer
17	to as the sync meeting between industry and
18	social media platforms; correct? I'm sorry,
19	industry
20	A. Right. Yes, that's correct.
21	Q. And you list there, I think seven
22	or eight social media platforms, and the
23	response, Google, Facebook, Twitter, Reddit,
24	Microsoft, and then Verizon Media, Pinterest,
25	LinkedIn and Wiki Media Foundation; correct?

1	A. Right, that's correct.
2	Q. And when you say this generally has
3	a had a monthly cadence, in fact, far away
4	from elections it was only quarterly, and then
5	it became monthly close to elections, and became
6	weekly before the 2020 election; right?
7	A. I would say from summer of 2018 to
8	2020 they were to early 2020 they were
9	quarterly. Sometime in 2020 they became monthly
10	and then as we got closer to the election in
11	2020 they became weekly.
12	Q. Why did they become weekly close to
13	the election?
14	A. They were mostly just touch points
15	in case anything kind of popped up. Those are
16	much less formal than the monthly ones. We
17	didn't have an agenda for those, just an
18	opportunity for folks to share, if they had any
19	questions or anything like that.
20	Q. What sort of stuff did folks share
21	in these weekly touch point meetings?
22	A. So from a CISA perspective, we
23	generally provide updates on any election
24	security-related issues. So if you know, if
25	there were any administrative kind of problems

1	that say we're having, speaking along those
2	lines, the other federal partners, if they had
3	any, again, kind of strategic, unclassified.
4	Intelligence reporting that they felt was
5	relevant, they might share that. And then the
6	platforms, I don't know what they were sharing
7	generally. I don't probably just general
8	trends that they might be seeing on the
9	platforms, but I don't recall specifically what
10	they talked about.
11	Q. And all these things that they
12	share are related to election misinformation and
13	misinformation on social media platforms?
14	A. No. It also included cyber
15	security, in fact, I would say most of it I
16	wouldn't say most of it a lot of it was cyber
17	security. And then there was a little bit on
18	any physical threats that were occurring.
19	Q. So that that's if someone was
20	actually threatening poll workers, something
21	like that?
22	A. Correct.
23	Q. And so in addition to physical
24	threats, there were cyber security and issues
25	related to misinformation and disinformation?

1	A. Correct.
2	Q. Is anything else discussed in these
3	meetings?
4	A. I mean, I think those are the
5	main main topics that I recall.
6	Q. Was was the risk of hack and
7	leak operations or hack and dump operations
8	discussed in these meetings?
9	A. I don't I don't recall a
10	specific incident of that, but it's definitely
11	possible. It's a tactic that had been used in
12	the past.
13	Q. Did you remember you raising
14	concerns about hack and leak operations?
15	A. Me, personally, I don't recall
16	myself raising that, but it's possible.
17	Q. How about how about Laura
18	Dehmlow, did she ever raise that, discuss hack
19	and leak operations?
20	A. Again, I don't know. It was a
21	tactic that had been used globally, previously.
22	So it wouldn't surprise me if there was some
23	discussion of that somewhere in these meetings.
24	Q. Do you remember anyone on the
25	government side discussing it?

1	A. Not specifically, no.
2	Q. How about on the industry side,
3	anyone from the social media platforms
4	discussing hack and leak operations?
5	A. Yeah, unfortunately, I just don't
6	have that kind of recollection of conversations.
7	So no, I don't specifically remember that.
8	Again, it's possible, and I wouldn't be
9	surprised.
10	Q. How about Elvis Chan, you know who
11	he is; right?
12	A. I do.
13	Q. Did he ever do you remember him
14	ever talking about hack and leak issues in these
15	meetings in 2020?
16	A. Again, I don't have any specific
17	recollection of that, but it's always possible,
18	for sure.
19	Q. How about Matt Masterson?
20	A. Same answer, you know, it's
21	possible, but I don't recall specific
22	conversations.
23	Q. Let me e-mail you a couple more
24	exhibits.
25	A. Sure.

1	Q. Do you know Yoel Roth is?
2	A. Yes, I know who Yoel Roth is.
3	Q. Do you know him personally?
4	A. Only in the fact that I've met him
5	a couple times. He was at meetings, you know,
6	some of these synch meetings he would be at.
7	Q. Were these meetings related to
8	misinformation with CISA?
9	A. Again, these are regular sync
10	meetings that we talked about, it's also I do
11	recall we had some Twitter-only calls, as well,
12	that he participated in, so again, it's general
13	meetings would be of conversations.
14	Q. What was what was discussed in
15	the Twitter-only meetings?
16	A. Similar, basic
17	relationship-building stuff would be some of it,
18	so, you know, just going and making sure we know
19	who's who, and having conversations about, you
20	know, just relationship-building sides. I also
21	believe we had some briefings from them on some
22	of their public reports, if I recall correctly,
23	so things like that. There wasn't a ton of
24	them.
25	Q. Is this public reporting related to

1	misinformation and disinformation issues?
2	A. Yeah, again, I don't know if that's
3	what they called it, but that was kind of our
4	interpretation of it. I think they used
5	coordinated and in-authenticated or so, but I
6	don't recall if Twitter if Twitter
7	articulated it.
8	Q. You would view those briefings in
9	those bilateral meetings with Twitter as
10	relating to misinformation and disinformation on
11	social media?
12	A. Yeah, some of that, and some of it
13	I'm sure kind of talking him through how
14	elections work, because a lot of education they
15	weren't super familiar with the election
16	administration, how they worked, and a different
17	role and responsibility, you know, about
18	elections. So again, we tried to educate as
19	much as we could.
20	Q. Were there bilateral meetings with
21	other social media platforms, like this, where
22	misinformation was discussed in any way?
23	A. Yeah, again, generally, from a
24	relationship-building standpoint, particularly
25	early on in the process, we would meet we met

1	with the platforms just to talk about kind of
2	what our role, what we would do, kind of how the
3	relationship should act.
4	So just as an example, we could
5	relate to the K-theoretical. You know, in those
6	meetings we wanted to make sure that the
7	platforms understood we would never ask them to
8	undertake any specific actions. So we would
9	reiterate that in all of our meetings. And, you
10	know, that was something we continued throughout
11	the process.
12	We would educate them on on
13	elections, as I mentioned. We would talk to
14	them a little bit about our resilience-building
15	work, as I discussed. They would just kind
16	of again, relationship-building type stuff,
17	very general kind of conversations.
18	Q. What you describe as the process,
19	is that the process of, you know, referring
20	disinformation concerns to them, that we've been
21	talking about today?
22	A. We did have conversations, but I
23	think I was referring to the election processes,
24	how the election processes worked.
25	Q. You said early, when you said early

1	in the process, you meant early in the election
2	process?
3	A. Oh, yeah, sorry.
4	Q. You would have you had meetings
5	with bilateral meetings with Twitter and
6	Facebook and other social media companies?
7	A. Right. So in 2018 we didn't have
8	any relationships with the platforms, at all.
9	So in our initial stages of trying to build
10	those relationships we would go meet with each
11	platform one-on-one, just to make sure we could
12	kind of talk to, understand what their concerns
13	are, and then, you know, basic
14	relationship-building stuff.
15	Q. Did those bilateral meetings happen
16	in 2020, as well?
17	A. I would say they probably
18	probably had bilateral meetings in 2020. I'm
19	not remembering any specific, off the top of my
20	head, but I believe prior to starting the
21	switchboarding work, in 2020, we had
22	conversations with each platform individually.
23	Q. Those would be when you talk about
24	what you would be doing in the switchboarding
25	area; right?

1	A. Yeah, kind of what we would be
2	doing, and again, to reaffirm our position that
3	we would never ask them to take any specific
4	actions, that they should make decisions based
5	on their term of service.
6	Q. So you're specifically talking
7	about the fact that you would be sending them
8	reports about disinformation during the election
9	cycle?
10	A. Yeah, we would be forwarding them
11	reports from different election officials, yeah.
12	Q. Just putting Exhibit 12 back up,
13	here.
14	Let me show you where in your
15	interrogatory responses you disclosed those
16	bilateral meetings with social media platforms
17	here in
18	MR. GARDNER: Hold on. We're
19	we're pulling 12 back up, John. Hold on.
20	MR. SAUER: Page 38 to 39, it
21	actually goes onto 40.
22	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, hold on. Whoa
23	whoa, whoa, whoa, yeah, almost there. You said
24	38, John?
25	MR. SAUER: Page 38.

1 BY MR. SAUER: 2 Q. There's a list of five bullet 3 points. Okay. I'm sorry, what was your Α. 5 question? 6 Ο. Can you show me where on this 7 interrogatory response you disclosed, for example, bilateral meetings between CISA and 9 Twitter or CISA and Facebook relating to the 10 misinformation reporting that we've been talking 11 about? 12 So I don't want to speak on behalf Α. 13 of whoever submitted the final product, but my 14 assumption would be that they would be on the 15 preparation meeting. But I'm not -- I'm not 16 sure how they captured those in here. 17 Ο. Were those the same as preparation 18 meetings for the USG industry meeting? 19 Α. I probably wouldn't consider them 20 to be the same, but there's -- there are similar 21 types of meetings. 22 (Exhibit No. 13 was marked for 23 identification.) 24 BY MR. SAUER: 25 Q. Let's get Exhibit 13 back up.

1	Do you see this as a document filed
2	before the FEC, entitled: Declaration of Yoel
3	Roth?
4	A. Okay.
5	Q. And scrolling, have you seen this
6	document before?
7	A. I have not.
8	Q. Scroll down to paragraph 11. Start
9	with paragraph 10. Mr. Roth says in this
10	declaration, he says, since 2018 I have had
11	regular meetings with the office of the director
12	of National Intelligence, the Department of
13	Homeland Security, the FBI, and industry peers
14	regarding election security; right?
15	A. Yep.
16	Q. Was this a description of the
17	the sync meetings that we talked about today,
18	between US government and social media
19	platforms?
20	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
21	foundation, calls for speculation.
22	BY MR. SAUER:
23	Q. Do you see that?
24	A. Yeah, I don't know what he's
25	talking about, obviously I can't tell for

1	certain what he's talking about.
2	Q. No? Since 2018 has the Department
3	of Homeland Security had regular meetings with
4	social media platforms
5	A. Yep.
6	Q ODNI and the FBI?
7	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
8	foundation.
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Yes, it has, because you've
11	testified about them repeatedly today, so there
12	obviously is a foundation, isn't there?
13	You have been personally involved
14	in multiple meetings, these sync meetings,
15	between USG and industry, and they involve seven
16	or eight social media platforms, ODNI, the
17	Department of Homeland Security, specifically
18	CISA, and the FBI, didn't they?
19	A. We had regular meetings, as I
20	talked about. Whether or not that is what Yoel
21	is also talking about, here, I can't say. But I
22	don't think that's a bad inference to make.
23	Q. Okay. Scroll down to paragraph 11:
24	During these weekly meetings the federal law
25	enforcement agencies communicated that they
	- -

1	expected hack and leak operations by state
2	actors might occur in the period shortly before
3	the 2020 presidential election, likely in
4	October; do you see that?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. Do you recall that kind of
7	communication occurring in any of these sync
8	meetings that occurred in 2020?
9	A. Again, I don't specifically recall.
10	But as I said earlier, it's certainly possible,
11	because it was a common tactic.
12	Q. But you don't remember any federal
13	agencies talking about hack and leak operations
14	in these meetings, but you don't dispute that it
15	could have happened?
16	A. That's correct, yes.
17	Q. Okay. Next sentence, Mr. Roth
18	says: I was told in these meetings that the
19	intelligence community expected that individuals
20	associated with political campaigns would be
21	subject to hacking attacks, and that the
22	material obtained through those hacking attacks
23	would likely be disseminated over social media
24	platforms, including Twitter; do you see that?
25	A. I do.

A. Again, it's I don't remember specifics, but it would not surprise me if this was discussed. Q. Next sentence, Mr. Roth says: These expectations of hack and leak operations were discussed throughout 2020. Does that ring a bell? Do you recall this being raised multiple times and repeatedly in these sync meetings? A. Again, it's the same response. I don't have specific memories of every item that was requested or very good memory of the conversations, in general. But I would definitely not be surprised if these were included in those conversations. Q. Okay. And then the very next sentence, spilling onto page 3, I also learned in these meetings that there were rumors that a hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter Biden in any of these meetings with social media	1	Q. Do you recall that being
specifics, but it would not surprise me if this was discussed. Q. Next sentence, Mr. Roth says: These expectations of hack and leak operations were discussed throughout 2020. Does that ring a bell? Do you recall this being raised multiple times and repeatedly in these sync meetings? A. Again, it's the same response. I don't have specific memories of every item that was requested or very good memory of the conversations, in general. But I would definitely not be surprised if these were included in those conversations. Q. Okay. And then the very next sentence, spilling onto page 3, I also learned in these meetings that there were rumors that a hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter	2	communicated in any of these sync meetings?
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recall this being raised multiple times and repeatedly in these sync meetings? A. Again, it's the same response. I don't have specific memories of every item that was requested or very good memory of the conversations, in general. But I would definitely not be surprised if these were included in those conversations. Q. Okay. And then the very next sentence, spilling onto page 3, I also learned in these meetings that there were rumors that a hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter	8	were discussed throughout 2020.
repeatedly in these sync meetings? A. Again, it's the same response. I don't have specific memories of every item that was requested or very good memory of the conversations, in general. But I would definitely not be surprised if these were included in those conversations. Q. Okay. And then the very next sentence, spilling onto page 3, I also learned in these meetings that there were rumors that a hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter	9	Does that ring a bell? Do you
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included in those conversations. Q. Okay. And then the very next sentence, spilling onto page 3, I also learned in these meetings that there were rumors that a hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter	15	conversations, in general. But I would
Q. Okay. And then the very next sentence, spilling onto page 3, I also learned in these meetings that there were rumors that a hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter	16	definitely not be surprised if these were
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in these meetings that there were rumors that a hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden; do you see that? A. I do. On you recall any mention of Hunter	18	Q. Okay. And then the very next
hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden; do you see that? A. I do. Do you recall any mention of Hunter	19	sentence, spilling onto page 3, I also learned
Biden; do you see that? A. I do. Do you recall any mention of Hunter	20	in these meetings that there were rumors that a
23 A. I do. 24 Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter	21	hack and leak operation would involve Hunter
Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter	22	Biden; do you see that?
~	23	A. I do.
Biden in any of these meetings with social media	24	Q. Do you recall any mention of Hunter
	25	Biden in any of these meetings with social media

1	platforms?
2	A. I don't.
3	Q. So you don't know do you do
4	you dispute that Mr. Roth remembers it
5	correctly?
6	A. I mean, I have no basis to dispute
7	or not dispute.
8	Q. Okay.
9	A. These aren't topics that CISA would
10	be briefing on, so it's possible another agency
11	did brief on them.
12	Q. How about the FBI, do you remember
13	the FBI, Laura Dehmlow and Elvis Chan, saying
14	anything about Hunter Biden during these
15	meetings?
16	A. I don't.
17	Q. How about ODNI?
18	A. I don't, no.
19	Q. How about DOJ, national security
20	division?
21	A. I don't, no.
22	Q. This is dated December 17th, 2020,
23	so that would have been within a couple of
24	months of these meetings, a month or two of the
25	<pre>last meeting; is that right?</pre>

1	A. I'm sorry, what was could you
2	repeat that? I just want to make sure I
3	understand what you're asking.
4	Q. I was just scrolling down to the
5	fourth page of the document, where it's dated
6	December 17th, 2020.
7	A. Oh.
8	Q. Do you see that?
9	A. Yep.
10	Q. So this declaration would be
11	executed close in time to the meetings that are
12	being discussed; correct?
13	A. Correct.
14	MR. SAUER: I'm going to e-mail you
15	Exhibit 14.
16	MR. GARDNER: John, did you say 14?
17	MR. SAUER: Exhibit 14, yeah, do
18	you have that?
19	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, we already have
20	that, the deposition of Elvis Chan.
21	MR. SAUER: Yeah. Sorry, guys.
22	(Exhibit No. 14 was marked for
23	identification.)
24	BY MR. SAUER:
25	Q. This is the third page of this

1	document.
2	A. Okay.
3	Q. There's an exchanges here where Mr.
4	Chan is asked he refers to the federal law
5	enforcement agencies, plura, in that sentence,
6	do you see that answer, yes; do you see where
7	that is?
8	A. Line four?
9	Q. Yeah.
10	A. Is that what you're referring to?
11	Yeah, you're referring to the
12	question at line four?
13	Q. Right.
14	A. Okay. Yeah, I see that.
15	Q. And Mr. Chan was asked the question
16	on line eight, whether other federal law
17	enforcement agencies, other than the FBI, talked
18	about hack and leak operations; do you see that?
19	A. I do.
20	Q. And he says he doesn't think of any
21	other federal law enforcement agencies, there at
22	line 15. The only federal law enforcement
23	agency I remember conveying our concern about
24	hack and leak operations was the FBI; right?
25	A. That's his response, correct.

1	Q. And then he was asked, how about
2	any other agency, not law enforcement. And he
3	answered, as I mentioned, I believe CISA would
4	have had the same concern as the FBI; right?
5	A. That was his response, yep.
6	Q. And I asked him: That was relayed
7	through Mr. Masterson and Mr. Scully, I think
8	you said, correct? And he answered, correct;
9	right?
10	A. Okay. Yep.
11	Q. Do you remember either you or
12	Mr. Masterson relaying a concern about hack and
13	leak operations in those meetings?
14	A. I don't.
15	Q. Next page of the document, page
16	222, fourth page of the PDF, you testify: I
17	believe that the senior election official from
18	ODNI would also flag flag that as a concern;
19	correct?
20	A. Yes. That's what he says, yes.
21	Q. Do you remember anyone from ODNI
22	raising a concern about hack and leak operations
23	in these meetings?
24	A. Again, as I said in your previous
25	questions, I don't recall specifics, but it

1	wouldn't surprise me if if they were
2	mentioned.
3	MR. SAUER: I'm sending you Exhibit
4	15 by e-mail.
5	(Exhibit No's. 15, 16 and 17 were
6	marked for identification.)
7	MR. GARDNER: John, are you
8	intending to screen share?
9	MR. SAUER: Yeah, I'm doing that
10	right now.
11	MR. GARDNER: We're still waiting
12	for the exhibit.
13	MR. SAUER: Sorry. I think I got
14	my exhibits switched up. Yeah, here, I'm
15	showing you exhibit I think it will be
16	Exhibits 15, 16 and 17. You know, the one that
17	I thought was 15 is 16, the one that I thought
18	was 16 is 15, so I'm showing you Exhibit 16.
19	MR. GARDNER: So when we receive
20	your e-mail do you want us to pull up the
21	document marked 16?
22	MR. SAUER: Yeah, you should have
23	received it already.
24	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, not yet.
25	MR. SAUER: There should be an

1	e-mail with 15, 16 and 17 all attached.
2	MR. GARDNER: Yeah, not yet.
3	MR. SAUER: Really? Well
4	MR. GARDNER: Oh, here we go.
5	Do you want us to pull up 16 first?
6	MR. SAUER: Yeah.
7	MR. GARDNER: Okay. John, I have
8	15 here, and I got set up I see what's
9	happening. Hold on. Yeah, sorry.
10	MR. SAUER: It's a one-page e-mail,
11	it should be up.
12	MR. GARDNER: Yep. Yeah.
13	BY MR. SAUER:
14	Q. Here's a Mr. Scully, you see an
15	e-mail here from Facebook to you and
16	Mr. Masterson, as well as Allison Snell and
17	Geoff Hale; correct?
18	A. I do.
19	Q. And there it indicates that there
20	it's called today's industry statement; right?
21	A. Joint industry statement.
22	Q. Right. And they say and
23	Facebook says to you, I wanted to ensure you had
24	the statement we will look to release following
25	<pre>today's meeting; right?</pre>

1	A. Correct.
2	Q. And then, under the joint industry
3	statement, it talks about how there are these
4	meetings that have been going on; right?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. And then it says the majority of
7	the statement says: At today's meeting we
8	specifically discussed three things; right?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. And the second one of those says:
11	Ways to counter targeted attempts to undermine
12	election conversation before, during, and after
13	the election; right?
14	A. It does.
15	Q. And the industry statement goes on
16	to say: This includes preparing for possible
17	so-called hack and leak operations, attempted to
18	use platforms and traditional media to amplify
19	unauthorized information drops; correct?
20	A. Correct.
21	Q. Does that and so the industry
22	prepared a public statement saying that hack and
23	leak operations were discussed at one of these
24	meetings; correct?
25	A. Correct. Yes.

1	Q. Does that refresh your memory, at
2	all, about hack and leak operations being raised
3	at these sync meetings in 2020?
4	A. Again, I don't have any specific
5	recollections of the conversations. But as I
6	said a few times, now, it doesn't surprise me
7	that they would discuss the common tactic used
8	globally.
9	Q. Were you aware of any pending
10	investigations, at that time, into possible
11	hack actual possible hack and leak
12	operations?
13	A. No.
14	Q. I'm showing you what should be
15	Exhibit 15.
16	MR. GARDNER: Got it.
17	THE WITNESS: Okay.
18	BY MR. SAUER:
19	Q. And here's an e-mail from Lauren
20	Protentis to people at Facebook and CISA, that
21	refers to the prep USG industry called monthly,
22	in the subject line; correct?
23	A. Yes, correct.
24	Q. And I think you testified earlier
25	that Facebook was kind of the point for the

1	industry. And so there would be a preparatory
2	meetings between CISA and Facebook to kind of
3	set the agenda for the big monthly meeting that
4	involved all the platforms and at least four
5	agencies; right?
6	A. That's correct, yeah.
7	Q. Okay. Here it says, among other
8	things, industry prompts, themes, narratives,
9	approaches you anticipate for races you think
10	will be targeted, right, is number two?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. Okay. What's that talking about,
13	are they asking that industry to report back on
14	what themes and narratives on social media they
15	anticipate may happen in certain election races?
16	A. So I'm not I'm not sure what,
17	specifically, they were talking about here.
18	It's possible they were trying to understand if
19	they were particularly they were being targeted
20	by foreign actors, but I don't know, that's
21	Q. How about themes and narratives?
22	A. Yeah, I think that would be
23	pretty
24	Q. Go ahead.
25	A. I think that would be the same kind

1	of idea. Again, as I mentioned earlier, in a
2	lot of these calls the intelligence community
3	would provide kind of high-level assessments of
4	unclassified reporting that they had done.
5	Q. What does industry prompts mean?
6	A. Generally speaking, it would be the
7	questions that industry had for government.
8	Q. So industry
9	A. For
10	Q. Go ahead.
11	A. Actually, let me rephrase. Sorry.
12	I think in this case it's
13	it's I'm not sure, that's how I would have
14	interpreted it, but based on where it is in the
15	agenda I'm not sure that's what Warren meant.
16	Q. In other words, these questions of
17	government for industry say, hey, social media
18	platforms tell us what themes, narratives,
19	approaches you're anticipating for the upcoming
20	election?
21	A. No, my my interpretation of this
22	is that it's industry questions for government,
23	because the government portion of the agenda.
24	So industry, if possible, would like to hear
25	government's perspective on these questions.

1	
1	Q. Did government share that with the
2	social media platforms in these meetings? Did,
3	you know, the federal agencies talk about what
4	themes and narratives and approaches they
5	anticipated on social media for election races?
6	MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound.
7	THE WITNESS: Yeah, can you just
8	kind of break that question down for me?
9	BY MR. SAUER:
10	Q. In the actual meetings did the
11	federal agencies provide information to the
12	social media platforms about the themes and
13	narratives they anticipated seeing on social
14	media for particular races, election races?
15	A. I don't think it was ever broken
16	down by particular races. I think there were
17	again, there was intelligence. If there's
18	intelligence that was unclassified they could be
19	shared about, targets and things like that, the
20	intelligence community would share that.
21	But generally speaking, I don't
22	think that we would necessary get down to the
23	individual race level, but again, I'm not I
24	don't have a memory of every specific item that
25	was discussed.

1	Q. How about do you remember themes
2	and narratives being discussed, like, hey, we
3	expect people to be, you know, talking about
4	expect, you know, social media postings to
5	
	reflect this theme or that narrative?
6	A. So I think there are two components
7	to this one. I believe there are some
8	discussion about would we have seen historically
9	in the past, and may see going forward. So
10	so I believe there might have been some
11	discussion around that.
12	And then if again, if the intel
13	communities had reporting talked about foreign
14	actor efforts, they would share those.
15	I don't recall, specifically, what
16	was discussed. So I I don't know if what
17	level of detail, if any, they got down to in
18	those conversations.
19	And I'm not even to be honest,
20	I'm not even sure if I attended this meeting. I
21	think I either just got back from my detail or
22	it was right before I got back to my detail, so
23	I'm not sure I attended this one.
24	Q. I'm going to share Exhibit 17.
25	A. Okay.

1	Q. And this is a collection of
2	e-mails, again.
3	Here on the first page, in April of
4	2022, this year, Lauren Protentis is sharing the
5	agenda for one of these USG sync meetings. And,
6	among other things, she says: One-pager
7	reminder; do you know what she's talking about?
8	A. Yeah, she we had asked industry
9	to provide a one-page summary of their content
10	moderation rules that we could share with
11	election officials.
12	Q. What's the purpose of that, a
13	one-page summary of their content moderation
14	rules?
15	A. So we we would receive a lot of
16	questions from election officials about how
17	different platforms made decisions about their
18	terms of service. And we thought this was a way
19	to help the platforms be more transparent with
20	election officials. So we asked them to just
21	put together kind of a one-page summary.
22	Q. A one-page summary of basically
23	what their content moderation policies were as
24	applies to election misinformation?
25	A. Yeah, that we could share with

Q. I take it, then, the election officials when they see something on social media that they view as disinformation or misinformation would be educated on whether or not it violates that platform's policy; is that right? A. I'm not sure that was the full expectation, but I think it was just to try to provide some transparency and some understanding of how the platforms make a decision. Q. And why is it useful? I take it this was your idea, CISA's idea, not it wasn't something that the election officials have asked for? A. To be honest, it asks of maybe before I returned, so I'm not entirely certain, but I suspect it was some combination of election officials asking. We got a lot of questions over the years about that, and us just, you know, raising it with the platforms the way they're trying to help the election officials. Q. Jumping ahead, 15743, should be on	1	election officials.
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Q. Jumping ahead, 15743, should be on	22	the way they're trying to help the election
	23	officials.
	24	Q. Jumping ahead, 15743, should be on
tne /th page of the PDF, there's a discussion in	25	the 7th page of the PDF, there's a discussion in

1	the April
2	MR. GARDNER: Are you at that now?
3	THE WITNESS: Sorry, I just
4	accidentally got out. I'm going to the page. I
5	think I'm there.
6	BY MR. SAUER:
7	Q. There's a discussion, a bullet
8	point in the agenda for the August 2020 USG
9	industry meeting of election-day coordination.
10	Do you know what what that was
11	discussed under that?
12	A. Yeah, and just to be clear, you
13	know, we just jumped from 2022 back to 2020;
14	right?
15	Q. Yeah.
16	A. Okay. Yeah, so CISA regularly set
17	up an operation center on election day, around
18	the election. And the platforms and some of the
19	other agencies do the same. But I think it was
20	just a conversation about how all the different
21	organizations were going to be managing on
22	election day.
23	Q. What is the nature of a what is
24	CISA's election day operation do, does it
25	receive disinformation reports?

1	A. It's more of a so just taking a
2	step back, right, essentially what CISA does is
3	it invites key stakeholders to CISA to
4	facilitate information sharing about what's
5	going on within the elections.
6	Most of it is cyber related, but
7	the NAV and NAFTA that we talked about earlier
8	were there, and so if they heard reporting up
9	through their members, they might mention it.
10	Generally speaking, you might
11	have in 2020 it was a little different,
12	because of COVID. But generally speaking, we
13	would have somebody from our team there who we
14	would have a team kind of working on the chats.
15	And so the switchboard reporting
16	might come in and in 2018, for example, our guy
17	was sitting in the room, in 2020 I think I was
18	the only one in the room, maybe one other from
19	our team. And then they would you know, so
20	that's I don't know if that helps clarify. I
21	think I just talked in mode right there.
22	Q. When you say in the room, is there,
23	like, a physical location where CISA and NASED
24	and NASS and social media platforms all have
25	people or what room are we talking about?

1	A. Yeah, so in 2020, CISA had a room
2	where we had some of our stakeholders attend in
3	person. I don't have a full list of who was
4	there. It was obviously not substantial, due to
5	COVID restrictions. But we would have federal
6	partners, and we have NASS and NASED there.
7	I don't know who else was there,
8	but I believe there was a couple other, you
9	know, maybe election security vendors, folks
10	like that, just to facilitate information
11	sharing in case an incident occurred.
12	Q. Who were the federal partners?
13	A. I don't I don't believe in 2020
14	we had too many in the room, but CISA's watch
15	center operations for CISA central I talked
16	about earlier, they're our liaisons for many of
17	the different agencies, and then we had
18	connectivity with FBI, DOJ, NEI, I&A, things
19	like that. Again, 2020 all you need due to the
20	pandemic.
21	Q. And part of what happens in this
22	election-day operation is that NASED and NASS
23	may receive misinformation reports from their
24	members and report them up to you guys; right?
25	A. Generally speaking, it would

1	they would handle them themselves, with the
2	platforms, but I'm sure there were examples of
3	where they sent it to us.
4	Q. And then would you guys perform the
5	same misinformation routing function and pass
6	that along to the platforms?
7	A. Yeah, correct.
8	Q. Okay. This happened again in 2022,
9	was there an election-day operation?
10	A. It was an election operation center
11	in 2022. We didn't do switchboarding in 2022,
12	as we discussed earlier.
13	Q. You say you didn't do
14	switchboarding in 2022, did you relay
15	A. Correct.
16	Q misinformation or disinformation
17	concerns to social media platforms at any time
18	during the 2022 election cycle?
19	A. Not that I recall, no.
20	Q. How did the state and local
21	election officials relay those concerns to the
22	social media platforms, did they do a
23	A. Yeah, my understanding was
24	two-fold, one, I think some of the platforms
25	developed a little more robust infrastructure to

1	engage with election officials, themselves. And
2	then I also believe that CIS was up and running,
3	but I'm not certain what kind of how it all
4	worked.
5	Q. So you believed that CIS continued
6	to receive disinformation/misinformation reports
7	from state and local election officials during
8	the 2022 election cycle, and relay them directly
9	to social media platforms?
10	A. Yeah, I'm speculating a bit on
11	that, because I'm not particularly familiar with
12	what they actually did in 2020, but that was the
13	general understanding I had.
14	Q. Did they copy you on those reports,
15	like they were doing in 2020?
16	A. They were not, no.
17	Q. Why not? Did you tell them not to?
18	Did you say: Don't copy us on these or did they
19	just stop?
20	A. Yeah, we discussed earlier, CISA
21	didn't was not doing switchboarding in 2022,
22	so there's no reason for them to copy us.
23	Q. And did you tell
24	A. But I
25	Q. Go ahead.

1	A. So I didn't have a conversation,
2	myself, with CIS about it, so I'm not sure who
3	told them not to do it.
4	Q. Turning back to the 2022 election
5	day operation, was that another case where CISA,
6	NASED, NASS, and other federal agencies all had
7	representatives in one room?
8	A. I I think there was some federal
9	representative there, like I said, most of that
10	would would be in the ops center. There were
11	other nongovernment partners there, like like
12	I said, like the the vendors, election
13	security, election system vendors and folks like
14	that.
15	Q. What what's the ops center?
16	A. That's essential, that's kind of
17	the 24/7 situational awareness that CISA runs.
18	And my understanding is that it has liaisons
19	from across the federal agencies.
20	Q. And were you there at the at the
21	ops center in 2022 election day?
22	A. So the room we would be in would be
23	a separate room. We wouldn't actually be on the
24	ops center floor. We called it a situational
25	awareness room.

1	Q. On election were you there?
2	A. I was in the situational awareness
3	room on election day in 2022, yep.
4	Q. Any misinformation or
5	disinformation concerns arise on election day in
6	2022?
7	A. I don't think there was too much.
8	I'm not recalling specific incidents. I would
9	imagine the two were, but I don't think there
10	was very much, if there was.
11	Q. What happened?
12	A. I'm sorry, that's not very clear.
13	I just don't recall if there's
14	anything specific. I have a general sense that
15	there were a couple of items, but I don't think
16	there was very much.
17	Q. What happened to the ones that did
18	occur or that did arise, did they get routed to
19	different platforms?
20	A. No, I think it no, if any of
21	those were mentioned, I think it was just in
22	general conversation of what might be happening,
23	but we didn't have anything on social media
24	platforms.
25	Q. Did NASED and NASS route things to

1	social media platforms?
2	A. I don't I don't know for
3	certain. I would I would guess they did.
4	Q. Jumping ahead in Exhibit 17, page
5	14545, it's page 12 of the PDF, and here's an
6	agenda from one of these sync meetings from July
7	of 2022; do you see that?
8	A. Is it 14545?
9	Q. Yeah, page 12 of the PDF.
10	A. Just making sure. Sorry, it's
11	weird how it shows the pages here. Yeah, okay.
12	Yep.
13	Q. And then Lauren Protentis, here, is
14	circulating an agenda for a sync meeting;
15	correct?
16	A. This looks like it's for a prep
17	meeting.
18	Q. Prep meeting? Okay.
19	And then here in item four, it
20	says: CISA elections infrastructure risks,
21	Scully; correct?
22	A. Yep.
23	Q. So is that referring to the plan
24	that you and do you have a briefing on
25	election infrastructure risks at the big sync

1	meeting?
2	A. Yeah, I believe normally Geoff Hale
3	would do that, I believe this meeting Geoff was
4	going to be unavailable, so they asked me to
5	cover the election infrastructure portion of the
6	agenda.
7	Q. Now, what you said about them, what
8	does that mean, election infrastructure risks,
9	does that refer to informational infrastructure?
10	A. No, that's again, that's kind of
11	the broader understanding of how elections
12	function, so the systems, physical security,
13	things like that. It would just be an update on
14	kind of where things stand across kind of the
15	broader election infrastructure community.
16	Q. Below that, item six, it says:
17	FBI, domestic, adversarial actor update, down
18	below; do you see that?
19	A. I do.
20	Q. Do you recall Laura Dehmlow giving
21	a briefing at that meeting you were at about a
22	domestic adversarial actor?
23	A. I don't, and I I if I recall
24	correctly, and I don't know if you have the
25	actual agenda for the meeting, I think the

1	that changed.
2	Q. Oh, you don't think she gave
3	that that that briefing?
4	A. I don't believe so, no.
5	Q. What kind of domestic adversarial
6	actors is the FBI's foreign influence task force
7	concerned about?
8	A. I don't know.
9	Q. Let's jump ahead to page 7599.
10	MR. GARDNER: John, before we go
11	on, we've been going about two hours, again. I
12	think now would probably be a good time for a
13	break.
14	MR. SAUER: I just got a few more
15	questions about this document. Can you keep
16	going for a couple more minutes.
17	MR. GARDNER: Sure, we can do that.
18	BY MR. SAUER:
19	Q. Let's just here, 7599.
20	A. What page are we on?
21	Q. That is page 16 of the PDF?
22	A. Okay.
23	Q. Do you see here on the bottom half
24	of the page, on July 1st, 2020, Facebook sends
25	e-mail to you and Matt Masterson, Matt and

1	
1	Brian, thank you so much for the outreach on our
2	next sync; right?
3	A. Yep.
4	Q. And then she gives a proposed
5	agenda for a meeting that she proposes having on
6	July 15th of 2020; correct?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. And then, in that agenda, there's
9	an item here, under number two, that says:
10	Hack/leak and USG attribution speed/process; do
11	you see that?
12	A. Yep.
13	Q. What was that referring to?
14	A. I I don't recall. You know, I
15	would have to speculate based on what it says
16	here.
17	Q. So you don't remember hack/leak
18	being put on the agenda for one of these
19	meetings?
20	A. Again, as I said earlier, I don't
21	remember all the agenda items on the meetings or
22	specific discussion points. But I'm not
23	surprised that it's on here, no.
24	Q. Do you know why Facebook would have
25	put that on?

1	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
2	speculation.
3	BY MR. SAUER:
4	Q. If you know.
5	A. I don't know.
6	Q. And then what is
7	A. I mean, again
8	Q. Go ahead.
9	A. Sorry, just as I said, you know, a
10	few times, right, it's not surprising, it was a
11	common tactic that was used globally. But I
12	don't know why they if there was a specific
13	reason that they put it on here.
14	Q. What how about that, in the
15	second half of that line, USG attribution
16	speed/process; right? Do you know what that
17	means?
18	A. I don't, CISA doesn't do
19	attributions, so I'm not sure what that could be
20	related to.
21	Q. Attribution, when you say CISA does
22	not do attribution, what does that mean?
23	A. Well, the way I would look at
24	attribution would be attributing specific actors
25	to something.

1	Q. That was
2	A. In the MDM context CISA does not do
3	attribution.
4	Q. So attribution is figuring out who
5	is the actual source of the social media
6	posting?
7	A. I mean, if you're talking about a
8	social media posting, that would be attribution.
9	If you're talking about hack and leak, I assume
10	that would be known as the attribution to who
11	the hacker and leaker was.
12	Q. So this, then, could be a
13	discussion of you know and by the way,
14	this is listed there under 40 minutes deep dive
15	topics; right?
16	A. Mm-hmm.
17	Q. Do you know if you participated in
18	that July 15th, 2020 meeting?
19	A. I would imagine I did, but I you
20	know, I would have to go back and look at my
21	calendar. I don't know for certain.
22	Q. You don't know sorry.
23	You don't know about whether there
24	was a deep dive on hack/leak and USG
25	attributions, the process?

1	A. I don't know for certain. I mean,
2	I would have to go back. Do you have the actual
3	agenda that we used for the meeting or just the
4	proposed one by by Facebook?
5	Q. No, let me ask you this: I take it
6	you you interpret, in the context of hack and
7	leak, USG attribution, USG is United States
8	<pre>government; right?</pre>
9	A. Yeah, that's what I would assume it
10	is.
11	Q. Attribution, I take it, is having
12	the USG, the government, figure out who did the
13	hack and the leak; right? That's what
14	attribution means in this context?
15	A. Assuming I was connected to hack
16	and leak, I obviously don't know what this is
17	specifically referring to, but if I were reading
18	that bullet point that's how I would read it,
19	that the attribution was USG attributing a hack
20	and leak.
21	Q. Okay. And then the question is
22	how how fast speed and how USG would go about
23	<pre>doing it; right, speed/process?</pre>
24	A. Again, that's what the agenda says.
25	I don't know exactly what that means.

1	MR. SAUER: Let's take a break
2	there.
3	MR. GARDNER: 10 minutes good?
4	MR. SAUER: Yeah. How long have we
5	been on the record.
6	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
7	3:34 p.m. We are off the record.
8	(Recess.)
9	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
10	3:50. We are back on the record.
11	MR. SAUER: Before we go back to
12	questioning, I'm formally requesting, on the
13	record, a supplementation of the document
14	production directed to CISA custodians. If you
15	look at those pages where the key custodians are
16	disclosed, we've had testimony today that that
17	list of custodians at ESI should have been
18	searched, should have included the five names
19	that the witness has testified to today, Chad
20	Josiah, Rob Schaul, Adam Zaheer, John Stafford
21	and Pierce Lowary.
22	And, in fact, I think it's
23	astonishing that four of those names are
24	specifically identified as copied on e-mails
25	from the key custodians, but whose ESI was not
1	

1 searched. 2 So I request supplementation by 3 tomorrow, which is the close of fact discovery. We were entitled to that going back to August. And this is the first time we've heard about 5 6 this, one day before the close of discovery. 7 So I'm asking for those e-mails from those custodians, including their 9 communications with social media platforms, and 10 it now appears there were communications with 11 the EIP, potentially, those be produced by 12 tomorrow. 13 MR. GARDNER: I understand your 14 request. We'll take it back. 15 MR. SAUER: Thanks. 16 (Exhibit No. 18 was marked for 17 identification.) 18 BY MR. SAUER: 19 Q. Let's go to Exhibit 18, it should 20 be in your e-mail. 21 MR. GARDNER: Yeah, hold on one 22 second. BY MR. SAUER: 23 24 Q. This document is another one of 25 these collective exhibits of a bunch of CISA

1	e-mails involving you.
2	If you look at the first page, in
3	the middle, here, it indicates there's reporting
4	that you are forwarding from the state
5	department's global engagement centers about
6	disinformation on YouTube, and you're forwarding
7	it onto to social media platform; do you see
8	that?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Yeah. Let me ask this: What role
11	does the state department's global engagement
12	center have in addressing misinformation and
13	disinformation on social media?
14	A. I don't know what the specific
15	authorities are.
16	Q. Do you know what they do,
17	generally?
18	A. Yeah, but also, just to be clear,
19	that this e-mail is regarding a State Department
20	employee that was targeted overseas, I believe.
21	So I to answer your to answer your
22	question, I believe they they have a mandate
23	to deal with information operations overseas.
24	Q. Do you interact with them, at all,
25	in your MDM team activities?

1	A. Yes.
2	Q. How do you interact with them?
3	A. In a couple ways. So one, they do
4	a lot of reporting on what they're seeing
5	overseas, particularly as it relates to actions.
6	So it's a good source of understanding tactics
7	and things like that, that are occurring
8	overseas.
9	We often see what happens overseas
10	end up showing up domestically. So it's a good
11	source of information for that.
12	They also have a tech demo program
13	that they run, where they bring in different
14	tech companies that work in the information
15	operations space. So we'll go we have
16	members of the team that will go and watch some
17	of the demo.
18	So I think those are the two main
19	ones. We trying to think if there's others.
20	Q. Do you know George Beebe,
21	B-e-e-b-e?
22	A. Do I know George? I'm sorry, could
23	you spell that again?
24	Q. B-e-e-b-e.
25	A. The name does not sound familiar.

1	Q. Do you know if the GEC was involved
2	in the Election Integrity Partnership in any
3	way?
4	A. I don't. I know you showed me a
5	document earlier, that they were listed, but I
6	don't know what they did.
7	Q. Okay. Second page, here, where
8	this lists information report, you said it
9	indicates, in the last sentence there, the
10	journalist tells me there's a YouTube channel
11	run by Americans falsely claiming that this
12	diplomatic officer is patient zero for COVID-19;
13	correct?
14	A. I'm sorry, what page are you on?
15	Q. Second page of the PDF.
16	A. Okay. Yes, that's what the e-mail
17	says.
18	Q. So you said well, maybe
19	overseas, it looks like the thing they're
20	challenging is something posted by Americans;
21	correct?
22	A. I I don't know. I mean, that's
23	just a YouTube channel run by Americans, that's
24	what they say, yeah.
25	Q. You forward this onto him; right?

1	A. I believe that's true, yes.
2	Q. Scrolling down to page 10718 by
3	the way, did you flag these accounts? If you
4	look here on the 11th page of the PDF for a
5	section
6	A. Sorry, page 11 of the PDF?
7	Q. Yeah, here there's a screen shot of
8	unofficialcogov, and the Twitter handle, says:
9	DM us your weed store location, open
10	parentheses, hoes be mad, but this is a parody
11	account; correct?
12	A. It appears I forwarded it to
13	Twitter, yes.
14	Q. Okay. And then that was the only
15	one, and the next page there's one you forwarded
16	to Twitter that says: Smoke, weed, erry day, I
17	think they mean every day. The official
18	(unofficial) Twitter account of the State of
19	Colorado; right?
20	A. Yeah, it seems to be part of the
21	same e-mail in Colorado.
22	Q. Those two accounts you forwarded to
23	Twitter, you forward those to Twitter for
24	consideration; correct?
25	A. Yeah.

1 Q. And then, sorry, mo	ving back a
2 little bit of the document, I ap	ologize, on the
3 9th page there's an e-mail on Se	ptember 25th of
4 2020, from you to Twitter, sayin	g, good morning,
5 do you all have five minutes for	a quick call
6 today. I'd like to give you a q	uick update on
7 our reporting process this year.	Do you know
8 what that was about?	
9 A. I don't	
10 Q. It looks like	
11 A know specificall	y what it's
12 about, no.	
Q. It looks like the s	pecific subject
14 you mentioned was: Election dis	info reporting;
15 correct?	
16 A. Let me scroll down.	Do you have
17 the rest of the e-mail chain? O	bviously it
18 appears to be a reply to somethi	ng. Am I
19 missing something, here?	
Q. Well, this is all w	e've got. It
21 says	
22 A. Oh, there's no t	here's no
23 header, again.	
Q. But but Twitter'	s response to
25 you, says: Re: Election disinf	o reporting?

1	A. Yeah.
2	Q. Okay. Do you know do you
3	remember having a call with them about your
4	process reporting election disinformation on
5	that date?
6	A. I don't.
7	Q. Next page, 9703, tenth page of the
8	PDF, there's an e-mail from Twitter to you and
9	Matt Masterson, in September of 2020, where it
10	says: Hi Matthew and Brian, hope you're doing
11	very well. We want to give you an update today.
12	We're updating our civic integrity policy. Our
13	existing policy does such and such, and it says,
14	starting next week we will label or remove false
15	or misleading information intended to undermine
16	public confidence in an election or other civic
17	<pre>process; right?</pre>
18	A. Yep.
19	Q. Do you know why they gave you this
20	report?
21	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
22	speculation.
23	A. Yeah, I don't know why they
24	specifically it looks like there's ways to
25	public information about it, so as I mentioned

1	earlier, sometimes they would they're putting
2	things out publicly they would just give us a
3	heads up.
4	Q. Now, have you ever asked them to
5	give you a heads up or Matt Masterson ask them
6	to give you a heads up about changes in their
7	content moderation policies?
8	A. Not that I recall.
9	Q. Page 8519, sorry, I'm in the wrong
10	spot on the document.
11	Let me ask you this: Do you
12	remember sharing a with Facebook, a
13	disinformation report about CISA and Director
14	Krebs, does that ring a bell, where the
15	disinformation was disinformation about your own
16	agency?
17	A. I don't recall that, specifically,
18	no.
19	Q. Here it is, 19th page of the PDF.
20	A. 19?
21	Q. Yeah, page 19 of the PDF.
22	A. Okay.
23	Q. And it says: Good afternoon you
24	sent an e-mail on November 5th of 2020 to
25	Facebook, saying, good afternoon Facebook,

1	wanted to share this disinfo report about CISA
2	and Director Krebs; do you know what that was
3	about?
4	A. I don't.
5	Q. And your second
6	A. I don't recall.
7	Q. The second line says: IG disinfo
8	report; do you know what IG means?
9	A. It appears, based on the link in
10	the e-mail, that it was referring to Instagram.
11	Q. By you don't remember you don't
12	remember a specific anything specific
13	relating to Director Krebs, do you?
14	A. No, I don't.
15	Q. Let's scroll ahead a few pages, to
16	10394.
17	Well, let me ask this: Do you
18	remember disinformation about Director Krebs
19	circulating in that timeframe, just after the
20	2020 election?
21	A. I recall that he was named on an
22	Iranian-driven enemies of the people list.
23	Beyond that, I don't I don't recall any other
24	specific MDM related to the director, no.
25	Q. Okay. Scroll down to the 22nd page

1	of the PDF.
2	A. Okay. Okay.
3	Q. Do you see here, you sent an e-mail
4	to Facebook on November 10th, 2020, saying:
5	Good morning, Director Krebs is particularly
6	concerned about the hammer and scorecard
7	narrative that is making the rounds; do you see
8	that?
9	A. Yep.
10	Q. Do you know what that was, the
11	hammer and scorecard narrative?
12	A. If I remember correctly, it was
13	something about the NSA, and maybe a different
14	federal agency, conspiring to change votes or
15	something along those lines. Like there's new
16	technology that the NSA developed. I forget the
17	specifics of the narrative, itself, but it's
18	something along those lines.
19	Q. So this is a narrative on social
20	media suggesting that the federal government is
21	engaging in intellectual or sort of election
22	interference in some way?
23	A. I think it could have been social
24	media, it could have been other media. I'm not
25	sure what I was referring to when I said making

1 th	ne rounds. I don't recall.
2	Q. Okay. Well, your next sentence
3 s a	ays: Wanted to see if you all, meaning
4 F a	acebook, have been tracking this narrative and
5 i i	f there's anything you can share around
6 ar	mplification; right?
7	A. Yep.
8	Q. What does amplification mean?
9	A. If a particular narrative is being
10 ar	mplified.
11	Q. So, in other words, you wanted to
12 k r	now you're asking Facebook to tell you
13 wh	nether or not that narrative is being amplified
14 or	n its platform?
15	A. Correct. That's how I read that,
16 ye	eah.
17	Q. Okay. And then Facebook responds
18 b y	y saying: Our teams are actively actively
19 m o	onitoring developments on this at this time and
20 t o	the extent you or USG have information about
21 co	onfirmed misinformation or other information of
22 n o	ote, we absolutely welcome that; correct?
23	A. Yep, that's what they wrote.
24	Q. And they follow up by saying:
25 W a	anted to follow up on the below to say that our

1	teams have confirmed that we have third-party
2	fact checker verification that the "hammer and
3	scorecard" narrative is false; right?
4	A. Yes, that's what they say.
5	Q. And they go on to report to you:
6	Our systems are labeling and downranking the
7	contents as identified; correct?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. Is that consistent with other
10	e-mails, where they report back to you on how
11	they've taken action against a content that you
12	have flagged?
13	A. Yeah, generally consistent, I
14	think.
15	Q. Let's jump ahead to the 10390, that
16	is going to be page 24 of the PDF, and here at
17	the bottom of the page you sent the very same
18	e-mail to Twitter, as well; right?
19	A. Yep.
20	Q. Director Krebs is very concerned
21	about the hammer and scorecard narrative, and
22	I'm wondering if you have been tracking this
23	one, if there's anything you can share in terms
24	of sharing and amplification; correct?
25	A. Yeah, that's what I wrote.

1	Q. The usual context says: We have
2	been tracking this issue. I will allow Yoel to
3	follow up with detailed information; right?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. And that's Yoel Roth; right?
6	A. I believe so, yeah, that's let's
7	see, yep.
8	Q. He was then the chief content
9	modulation officer for Twitter, right, ahead of
10	their trust and safety team?
11	A. I don't recall what his title was,
12	but he certainly was in charge of some trust and
13	safety, safety stuff.
14	Q. Trust and safety, that means
15	enforcing content moderation policies; right?
16	A. I suspect that's one of the
17	responsibilities.
18	Q. He comes back to you with a kind of
19	detailed report here at the top of the page
20	about what Twitter's been doing on this, he
21	says, we've been tracking the hammer/scorecard
22	issue closely, particularly since Director
23	Krebs's tweet on the subject, which is pretty
24	unambiguous as debunks go; correct?
25	A. That's what he wrote, yeah.

1	Q. Do you recall Director Krebs
2	debunking this in a tweet?
3	A. I suspect, and I keep on, let me
4	just add, I don't recall Director Krebs'
5	specific tweet. Two, its possible, as part of
6	our universe reality page, and Director Krebs
7	would put a new item up on our universe reality
8	page, he would tweet out the new universe
9	reality entry, but I'm not aware of the specific
10	tweet, but that would be my guess as to what was
11	going on.
12	Q. Were you aware that the social
13	media platforms were following the rumor page
14	posted by CISA and using that as a debunking
15	method for content on their platforms?
16	A. We had a sense they were doing
17	that, yeah.
18	Q. And that's kind of the point of it,
19	right, the point of the rumor page is to debunk
20	things; right?
21	A. No. The point of the page is just
22	to provide accurate information about rumors
23	that we were hearing.
24	Q. Okay. You were aware, I think you
25	just said, that the social media platforms, like

1	Twitter, were following the page and using it to
2	fact check, essentially, things that people were
3	posting on their platforms?
4	A. Yeah. So the platforms are looking
5	for a place to get accurate information about
6	different things that they were seeing on their
7	platforms. And I know some of them used the
8	universe reality page to do that.
9	Q. And, in fact, this e-mail indicates
10	that they used it to debunk the hammer/scorecard
11	narrative, if the tweet that Director Krebs did
12	refers to the rumor page; correct?
13	A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the
14	question?
15	Q. Actually, let's move on to the page
16	8625, it's a couple pages down, on page 27 of
17	the PDF. Here you're flagging, on Friday,
18	November 13th of 2020, you've been flagging a
19	tweet for Twitter. And at one point you say, at
20	11:26 p.m. on a Friday night, you e-mail Twitter
21	and say: Some Friday night fun for the two of
22	us, hope you are well; right?
23	A. Yeah.
24	Q. So you were forwarding and routing
25	disinformation concerns to social media

1	platforms near midnight on a Friday?
2	A. It appears so.
3	Q. And they were responding in
4	realtime, for example, 7 minutes later, at 11:33
5	p.m., Twitter's responding to you late on a
6	Friday night; correct?
7	A. Yeah.
8	Q. And she says, among other things,
9	we have labeled so many tweets tonight, so I'm
10	afraid that the answer is there isn't any
11	tonight; correct?
12	A. I'm sorry, what are you asking?
13	Q. Directly above, she said: We've
14	labeled so many tweets tonight that it isn't
15	ending tonight; correct?
16	A. We have labeled so many tweets
17	tonight, so I am afraid that for now the answer
18	is that it isn't ending tonight?
19	Q. Right.
20	A. Yes, that's what she wrote.
21	Q. This is based on an exchange a
22	little lower down, that you flagged something on
23	Dominion machines for her, at 11:20 p.m. And
24	she responded at 11:21 p.m., within one minute,
25	saying, thanks, Brian, we will escalate;
1	

1	correct?
2	A. Yep, that's what the timestamps
3	say.
4	Q. Were you getting you were kind
5	of reporting misinformation on social media late
6	at night to social media platforms during this
7	timeframe?
8	A. I accidently closed that's page
9	24?
10	Q. Yeah.
11	A. Sorry. Yeah, as I said, if I were
12	on my phone, and I saw something come in, I
13	would push it along.
14	Q. Jump ahead to and was it common
15	for Twitter or Facebook or other platforms to
16	respond almost immediately, even near midnight
17	on a Friday?
18	A. I mean, it's hard to say common. I
19	know it happened. They were generally pretty
20	responsive. Common's a pretty loose term so,
21	you know, I don't know how to respond to that.
22	Q. But you say they were generally
23	responsive, and that includes prompt in their
24	responses to you?
25	A. Correct. Right. So they were

1 prompt in letting me know that they had received 2 any e-mail that I sent them, that's essentially 3 what I was talking about. Let's go to 8557, it's page 42 of Ο. the PDF. 5 6 42? Okay. Α. 7 Here it looks like Facebook is Ο. e-mailing Lauren Protentis and saying that: Ι 9 wanted to share our account security doc that 10 we've been working on, and we're grateful for 11 any feedback; right? 12 Α. Yep. 13 Do you know what account security 14 document they're talking about, here in April 15 15th of 2022? 16 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for 17 speculation. 18 Α. Yeah, I don't know what specific 19 documents they're talking about. 20 Is it possible this is the Q. 21 one-pager that we were talking about earlier, 22 does that ring a bell? 23 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls -objection, calls for speculation. 24 Yeah, I don't -- I don't -- I don't 25 Α.

1	know.
2	Q. Okay. Next page, Lauren Protentis,
3	thanks so much for sending, this looks great.
4	The only thing I recommend is any steps for
5	flagging or escalating MDM content, if possible;
6	right?
7	A. Yeah, that's what Lauren said.
8	Q. And she said: I think then that
9	this I think, then, that would make this a
10	comprehensive product on both the critical needs
11	of officials, account security, and MDM
12	concerns; correct?
13	A. Yeah, that's what she wrote.
14	Q. She says: We discussed this a bit
15	in our in-person meting a few weeks ago; right?
16	A. Yep.
17	Q. Okay. Were you aware of Lauren
18	asking for Facebook to produce a document and
19	asking them to include steps for planning or
20	escalating MDM content for officials?
21	A. I was not aware of this document,
22	no. I know that the I knew those
23	conversations about the one-pagers we discussed
24	earlier, but I'm not I'm not entirely sure
25	what this is referring to.

1 Well, I think you said earlier the Q. 2 one-pagers would talk about what their content 3 moderation policies are? 4 Α. Right. 5 If you look higher, on that same Q. 6 page, Facebook is replying to Lauren and saying, 7 would it be -- would it work to just provide my e-mail when you share out this one-pager; right? 9 Do you see that? 10 Α. So I'm scrolling up. 11 Q. When you share out this one-pager; 12 do you see that? 13 Α. Yes. 14 Okav. So -- so does it seem that Ο. 15 Lauren is talking about the one-pager that all 16 the social media platforms were asked to provide 17 for state and local elections; is that what's 18 going on? 19 Α. Again, I'm not sure. It could be 20 two different one-pagers that she's talking 21 about, one on account security and one that 22 Lauren was working on, I wouldn't be -- again, I 23 wouldn't be surprised if they were similar, but I -- I can't -- I don't know. 24 25 Ο. Regardless, for the purpose of this

1	one-pager, Lauren is specifically asking that
2	they add to it a procedure for state officials
3	to flag and escalate MDM content; correct?
4	A. It appears she's asking for a
5	process for election officials to report MDM
6	content to Facebook, yeah.
7	Q. Jump ahead to 12223, here on the
8	starting at the 48th page of the PDF and
9	spilling to the 49th page, there's another
10	e-mail from Lauren Protentis, this time to
11	people at Microsoft, which is subject is
12	one-pager for election officials; do you see
13	that?
14	A. Did you say 48?
15	Q. Yeah, 48, spilling over onto 49,
16	it's the header's on 48 and the oh, I'm
17	sorry, 43. Bad eyesight. Sorry. It really
18	looks like an 8.
19	A. That's okay.
20	Q. Sorry, 43.
21	A. I understand that.
22	Okay. So one-pager for election
23	officials, got the header, okay.
24	Q. And in this e-mail Lauren says to
25	Microsoft: META is working with industry

1 partners to create one-pagers for election
officials, in the lead-up to the midterms, that
<pre>3 provide steps to create secure accounts</pre>
4 secure accounts and to report MDM; do you see
5 that?
6 A. I do.
Q. And she said: We'll be sharing
8 these products at our various engagements with
9 officials, presumably meaning state and local
10 election officials; right?
11 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
12 speculation.
13 A. Yeah, I mean, obviously, I don't
14 know what she means by officials, but I think
15 that's a fair assumption.
Q. And that's a one-pager for election
officials; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Skipping ahead to 22053, page 45 of
the PDF, going onto 46.
21 A. Okay.
22 Q. You see here, on May 11, 2022,
23 Lauren Protentis is writing to Twitter: Hope
this e-mail finds you well, wanted to circle
25 back on this and see if you have any questions.

1	The team has a few upcoming engagements with
2	elections officials for this one-pager, would be
3	particularly helpful to share as a leave behind;
4	correct?
5	A. Yes, that's what she's written.
6	Q. And Twitter goes back and says:
7	I'll have a one-pager for you later today, just
8	getting the final signoff; right?
9	A. Correct.
10	Q. And then, once he sends it to him,
11	scrolling back up, first, she says: State and
12	local officials in New Hampshire, Illinois, will
13	be the first recipients of this; right? There
14	at the top of the page.
15	The first line on page 45 of the
16	PDF Lauren says
17	A. Yeah, the e-mail chain is a little
18	funky, so I was just trying to read and make
19	sure the e-mails were connected.
20	Okay. So Twitter provided the
21	one-pager. Lauren said thanks. State and local
22	officials in New Hampshire and Illinois will be
23	the first recipients to this? Okay. Sorry.
24	Q. Then she follows up with another
25	e-mail, saying: Actually, one question, is

1	there a way to include something about how to
2	report disinformation; do you see that?
3	A. Yep. Yep.
4	Q. And Twitter says: The best way for
5	them to do that is to contact gov@twitter.com;
6	right?
7	A. Yep.
8	Q. And I can add that to the doc if
9	that would be helpful; correct?
10	A. Correct.
11	Q. And Lauren says: That would be so
12	helpful if you could add that to the doc. Thank
13	you; right?
14	A. Yep.
15	Q. And Twitter says: They do; right?
16	A. Mm-hmm.
17	Q. So that's the second time she's
18	pushed the social media platform to expand the
19	one-pager to include a reporting process for MDM
20	for the state and local election officials;
21	correct?
22	A. I'm not sure that's how I would
23	characterize it. I think she's just trying to
24	make sure that election officials have the
25	information they need if they want to report.

1 I'm not sure it's expanding. I don't know. 2 You're making it more dramatic than it was, I 3 think. Well, suffice to say that she's Ο. 5 asking Twitter to include information 6 specifically about how do you report MDM; 7 correct? About how election officials should Α. 9 support MDM, correct. 10 And Twitter had not included that Q. 11 in theirs, and she asked them to put it in and 12 they did; right? 13 Α. It appears so, yeah. 14 Same thing happened, actually, with Ο. YouTube in your earlier e-mail, right, they 15 16 hadn't included it in a one-pager, and she asked 17 them to put it in; correct? 18 Α. I don't recall that e-mail. Which 19 e-mail is that? 20 (Exhibit No. 27 was marked for 21 identification.) 22 BY MR. SAUER: 23 Q. Let's move on, actually. 24 I'm going to e-mail you some new 25 exhibits.

1	I'm pulling up Exhibit 27, which
2	should also be popping up in your inbox.
3	There's a news report entitled: CISA expands
4	efforts to fight election disinformation ahead
5	of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that?
6	MR. GARDNER: Yeah. I'm sorry,
7	John, we're still waiting for your oh, just
8	got it. Hold on. Hold up. You said 27?
9	MR. SAUER: Yeah.
10	MR. GARDNER: Here you go.
11	THE WITNESS: Okay.
12	BY MR. SAUER:
13	Q. Do you see the headline: CISA
14	expands efforts to fight election disinformation
15	ahead of challenging 2024 vote; do you see that?
16	A. I do.
17	Q. What steps are you aware of CISA
18	taking to expand its efforts to fight election
19	disinformation going into the next election
20	cycle, 2024?
21	A. At this time, I'm not aware of any.
22	Q. This is dated August 12th, 2022, if
23	you scroll down.
24	A. Sure.
25	Q. Were you aware of any discussions

1	or efforts any efforts at that time?
2	A. When this was written, in August of
3	2022? I'm sorry, what time?
4	Q. Well, I'm just saying, are you
5	aware, around August of 2022, did CISA was
6	CISA expanding efforts to fight disinformation?
7	A. No, no specific efforts, that I'm
8	aware of, I believe there might have been some
9	additional funding requested in the budget, but
10	I'm not sure if that actually went up or not.
11	Q. What what efforts did CISA
12	undertake to fight election disinformation
13	during the 2022 election cycle?
14	A. We put out a couple of sets of
15	products.
16	Q. Anything else?
17	A. Not not that I recall. We
18	honestly we didn't do a ton in 2022.
19	Q. What were you guys doing, you're
20	the MDM team, what did you do to fight MDM?
21	A. So again, our as I mentioned,
22	our role is to build resilience, so we put out
23	the two sets of products, as I mentioned.
24	Earlier in 2022, we put out additional products.
25	I'm sure we gave some stakeholders to build

1	relationships.
2	But generally speaking, we did a
3	lot of foundational work to better understand
4	how it functions, those sorts of things, as
5	opposed to very election-specific activities.
6	Q. Here in the article it says: The
7	danger in the second paragraph it says:
8	The danger of disinformation has become an
9	incredibly difficult problem, CISA Director Jen
10	Easterly said on Friday; do you see that?
11	A. I do.
12	Q. And it goes on in his report: That
13	Easterly has taken several specific steps to
14	fight the problem, including bringing Kim Wyman,
15	former Secretary of State of Washington into
16	CISA to bolster its election work; correct?
17	A. That's what the article says, yep.
18	Q. What has Kim Wyman done to fight
19	election-related disinformation at CISA?
20	MR. GARDNER: Objection.
21	Objection, lack of foundation, calls for
22	speculation.
23	BY MR. SAUER:
24	Q. You may answer.
25	A. Yeah, can you be more specific

1	about what you're trying to get to?
2	Q. Well, what does Kim Wyman do at
3	CISA?
4	A. Kim Wyman is essentially the new
5	Matt Masterson. So she's a senior advisor to
6	the director on election security. Most of her
7	work has been engagement with election
8	officials. I also think she was CISA's
9	representative on the CSAC for MDM.
10	So beyond some public speaking
11	and and the CSAC work, I'm not sure what else
12	she would have done, would have been doing on
13	MDM.
14	Q. Down here at the very last
15	paragraph, second page of the document, sorry,
16	this is hard to highlight, very last paragraph,
17	it says: While it's not CISA's role to police
18	social media Easterly said her team has
19	discussions with platforms, but they're more to
20	understand large trends, not specific tweets; is
21	that right?
22	A. That's what the article says, yeah.
23	Q. Do you have discussions with
24	platforms discussing large trends of online
25	disinformation?

1	A. Yeah, I think that's consistent
2	with what we talked about from the sync meetings
3	and the discussions around the public reporting
4	that the platforms have done.
5	Q. Any other time when there would
6	be where there was discussions with platforms
7	about disinformation trends?
8	A. I think it's just the two, the
9	normal sync meetings we discussed, and then the
10	normal if they were putting up public reporting
11	we might get a briefing on it. I'm trying to
12	think if we ever received yeah, I think those
13	are the big things. We may have done a briefing
14	where we had a platform maybe talk about talk
15	with election officials, but I'm not sure if I'm
16	remembering that correctly, so just those two, I
17	think, would be the main ones.
18	(Exhibit No. 28 was marked for
19	identification.)
20	MR. SAUER: Exhibit 28.
21	MR. GARDNER: Should be right
22	there.
23	THE WITNESS: Okay.
24	BY MR. SAUER:
25	Q. Should be on the screen share, too.
1	

1	Here's an e-mail chain, starting
2	with Facebook sending an e-mail directly to Jen
3	Easterly, saying she had spoken to Facebook
4	about receiving a briefing from us on 2022
5	election approach; do you see that there, the
6	second page of the document, the beginning of
7	the chain?
8	A. I do.
9	Q. Were you aware that Easterly had
10	reached out to Facebook directly and asked for,
11	I guess in January of 2022, a briefing on how
12	Facebook planned to approach the election?
13	A. I was not.
14	Q. Facebook says: We're happy to do
15	this with your team at your convenience, and
16	we'd also love to discuss further how we might
17	help support the JCDC effort; do you see that?
18	A. I do.
19	Q. What does JCDC stand for?
20	A. I was afraid you were going to ask
21	me that. I don't know exactly what it what
22	it stands for, I think it's joint cyber
23	something or another. Sorry, I I forget the
24	exact acronym, too many acronyms.
25	Q. Is it a committee or a subdivision

1 within CISA or within DHS?
2 A. I believe it's a it's an effort
3 by CISA to to collaborate with private sector
4 on cyber defense.
5 Q. Okay. And Director Easterly
6 responds to Facebook saying: Looping in Kris
7 and teammates to please follow up; do you see
8 that?
9 A. I do.
Q. And then Kris Rose; do you know who
11 Kris Rose is?
12 A. My understanding is counselor for
13 the director, for Director Easterly.
Q. So and he says: Thank you,
Director. Moving you to BCC; does that stand
16 for blind carbon copy?
17 A. That would be my understanding.
Q. And he says per Geoff, G-e-o-f-f, I
19 presume that's a Geoff Hale; right?
20 A. Yeah.
Q. Sounds like we may want to discuss
three primary topics that include 2022
23 elections; right?
24 A. Mm-hmm.
Q. Risk management in the face of

1	influence of enemations, do you know what that
2	<pre>influence of operations; do you know what that means?</pre>
3	A. I mean, I don't know what context
4	he was saying it here, but generally speaking,
5	that's CISA's mission to reduce risks to
6	critical infrastructure. So I assume it's risk
7	management from critical infrastructure to
8	influence of operations.
9	Q. And JCDC, that's the thing you
10	testified before?
11	A. Yeah.
12	Q. Do you know let me ask you this:
13	Were you included in this meeting between
14	Director Easterly and Facebook?
15	A. I was not, in fact, I don't know if
16	the meeting actually ever occurred.
17	Q. Do you know if Geoff Hale
18	participated?
19	A. I I don't.
20	(Exhibit No. 29 was marked for
21	identification.)
22	BY MR. SAUER:
23	Q. Let's look at Exhibit 29.
24	A. Okay.
25	Q. Here's a series of text messages

1 that were produced to us as coming from Director 2 Easterly. 3 So do you see the blue text, that 4 would be Director Easterly, the other side, in 5 the gray, is the interlocutor here on the first 6 page is this gentleman from Facebook; do you see 7 that? Α. Yeah. 9 This -- he -- he issued a Ο. 10 series of texts. Do you know why he would be 11 texting Director Easterly, does he know her? 12 MR. GARDNER: Objection, compound. Objection, calls for speculation. 13 14 Yeah, I -- I don't know is the 15 short answer. I don't know what their 16 relationship is. 17 Q. Do you know him, Mr. Gleicher? 18 Α. Yeah, I know Nathaniel Gleicher, 19 yeah. 20 Does he interact with CISA about Q. 21 misinformation issues on Facebook? 22 He does, he participates in the 23 monthly regular meetings that we talked about. 24 What else does he do, do you know, Q. 25 for Facebook on --

1	A. I'm sorry, what was the last part?
2	Q. What else does he do for Facebook
3	on misinformation?
4	A. Again, I think he would articulate
5	the inoffensive behavior, coordinating
6	inoffensive behavior. So I don't know if he
7	would talk about it in the context of
8	disinformation. But my understanding is he
9	leads the team one of the teams that deals with
10	the coordinated inoffensive behavior.
11	Q. Let me ask you about Rob Silvers.
12	Do you know who Rob Silvers?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Who's Rob Silvers?
15	A. He heads up the DHS office of
16	policy. I don't know what his back title is,
17	assistant secretary or secretary, something like
18	that.
19	Q. So he's in the secretary's office?
20	A. I believe he reports up to the
21	secretary, yeah.
22	Q. He he and Mr. Gleicher says
23	to Jen Easterly: Do you have any context you
24	can share in the role Rob Silvers is playing on
25	disinfo; right?

1	A. Yep, that's what the text says.
2	Q. I understand his team is a task
3	force set up, and it was suggested that his team
4	is handing policy on disinfo while CISA is
5	handling operations; right?
6	A. Yeah, that's what Nathaniel wrote.
7	Q. What is what was your
8	understanding of Rob Silver being involved in
9	policy on disinformation?
10	A. So that is the DHS office of
11	policy. He would be involved in most, I would
12	say, policy activities related to any topic that
13	crossed the department, including
14	disinformation.
15	Q. And Director Easterly says she's
16	happy to chat with Mr. Gleicher; right?
17	A. Yep.
18	Q. You don't know if they actually
19	talked to each other, do you?
20	A. I don't.
21	Q. She goes on to say: Rob is running
22	a governance board to look at potential new
23	areas of confronting MDM; correct?
24	A. That's what she wrote, yeah.
25	Q. Then she says: It doesn't change

1	or impact anything, we, meaning CISA, are doing
2	or have already established; right?
3	A. Yes, that's what she wrote.
4	Q. What were the potential what
5	potential new areas of confronting MDM were
6	discussed, do you know?
7	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
8	foundation.
9	A. I don't have any clue.
10	Q. Next page, there's an e-mail from
11	Matt Masterson to the director; right?
12	A. Yep.
13	Q. This is a Matt Masterson know
14	the director well, I take it he was a political
15	appointee, did you say that?
16	A. In previous administration
17	excuse me yeah, he was a political appointee.
18	I don't know what his relationship with the
19	director was, so I don't know how well he knew
20	her.
21	Q. What was the director's role in the
22	previous administration, was she at CISA?
23	A. No. Director Easterly was not at
24	CISA, no.
25	Q. Who was she?

1	A. I'm sorry?
2	Q. Was she in government?
3	A. Prior to the in the previous
4	administration?
5	Q. Yeah.
6	A. I don't know. I think her
7	immediate previous job was in the private
8	sector, but I don't know how long and if she
9	spent any time, at all, in the in the
10	previous administration in government.
11	Q. And here, Director Easterly says to
12	Matt Masterson, just trying to get us in a place
13	where FED can work with platforms to better
14	understand the mis, dis trends so relevant
15	agencies can try to prebunk/debunk as useful;
16	correct?
17	A. That's what she wrote, yeah.
18	Q. And that discussion of trends is
19	similar to her statement in the media article we
20	just looked at about how CISA is interacting
21	with social media platforms to identify trends;
22	correct?
23	A. She mentioned trends in both,
24	correct.
25	Q. And here she the reason she

1	wants to understand the trends from the
2	platforms is so that the relevant agencies can
3	try to prebunk or debunk the mis and
4	disinformation; correct?
5	A. Yeah, I think that's what she's
6	saying.
7	Q. Can you do that at CISA, when you
8	find out about a trend do you go try to work
9	with another federal agency to prebunk or debunk
10	it?
11	A. So again, from a resilience-
12	building perspective, you know, what we try to
13	do is provide accurate information about those
14	issues and topics that are relevant to us. So
15	from an election perspective we would try to
16	provide appropriate information about elections,
17	so that the universe reality page would be an
18	example of that, it would fall more potentially
19	into the debunking side.
20	Prebunking is trying to understand
21	ahead of time what could happen so you could
22	fill information gaps.
23	And so that's generally kind of how
24	resilience works. So yeah, we would we would
25	try to do some of that.

1	I don't know so we worked a
2	little bit with the FBI, on products or
3	resilience-based products, as I mentioned. I
4	say that's probably we worked, as I mentioned
5	earlier, we worked with the GAC initiative about
6	tactics and such.
7	So those are the types of things
8	that we would do to, again, help people
9	understand how MDM works and steps they can take
10	to reduce the risks.
11	Q. Her next text here, Director
12	Easterly's next text says: Not our mission, but
13	was looking to play a coord role so not every
14	D/A is independently reaching out to platforms
15	which could cause a lot of chaos; right?
16	A. That's what she wrote, yep.
17	Q. What does D/A mean, is that
18	department or agency?
19	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
20	speculation.
21	BY MR. SAUER:
22	Q. If you know.
23	A. That's that is one of our common
24	abbreviations for department and agency, but I'm
25	not sure if that's what she's referring to here.
1	

1	Q. Do you know let me ask this: Do
2	you believe that if every federal department and
3	agency is independently reaching out to the
4	platforms that could cause chaos?
5	A. Yeah, I think chaos might be a
6	little strong. But, you know, it does create
7	challenges and provides the platforms
8	opportunities to play departments off each
9	other.
10	Q. Does does CISA try to play a
11	coordinating role in that, in other words,
12	coordinating between the federal agencies and
13	the social media platforms on disinformation and
14	misinformation issues?
15	A. So we did do that as it relates to
16	the sync meetings we discussed throughout the
17	testimony. Beyond that, we didn't we didn't
18	attempt to play a substantial role in terms of
19	coordinating between.
20	Q. Let me ask you this: Matt
21	Masterson responds to this e-mail or this text
22	and says: We'll get there, and that kind of
23	leadership really helps. Platforms have got to
24	get more comfortable with government. It's
25	really interesting how hesitant they remain;

1	correct?
2	A. That's something I wrote.
3	Q. Is that consistent with your
4	experience that the social media platforms have
5	to be kind of pushed or encouraged to coordinate
6	with the government on misinformation issues?
7	A. I don't think that's how I would
8	characterize it. You know, we operate in a
9	voluntary kind of manner, so it's voluntary
10	whether for CISA, again, for CISA, the MDM
11	team, so it's always up to the platforms what
12	level of engagement they want to have with us.
13	Q. Do you know whether Masterson and
14	Easterly had any further discussion of these
15	issues?
16	A. I don't know.
17	Q. Let me send you a couple more
18	exhibits. And while they are coming, do you
19	know, were you involved, at all, in the
20	formation
21	MR. GARDNER: I'm sorry, John, I'm
22	sorry, the witness just asked me if we can take
23	a break.
24	MR. SAUER: Oh.
25	THE WITNESS: Just a few minutes,

1 bathroom break. 2 MR. SAUER: Well, why don't we make 3 it five, and try to make it the last break of the day. How long have we been on the record? 5 MR. SCOTT: We got back on at 3:50, 6 so it's 4:40, so it's 50 minutes in, we have an 7 hour and 10 minutes left. MR. GARDNER: He's been reliable. 9 We need to do this off the record, first of all. 10 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 11 4:42. We are off the record. 12 (Recess.) 13 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 14 4:53. We are back on the record. (Exhibit No. 30 was marked for 15 16 identification.) BY MR. SAUER: 17 18 Q. Exhibit 30 should be in your inbox. 19 I'll put it up on the screen share. 20 Here's an article in The Intercept 21 called Truth Cops, Leaked Documents Outline 22 DHSA's Plans to Police Disinformation; do you 23 see that? 24 Yeah, we don't have it on here, but 25 I saw the headline in your screen share.

1	Q. Okay. Sorry. But scrolling down,
2	still on the first page, it says: The
3	Department of Homeland Security is quietly
4	broadening its effort to curb speech it
5	considers dangerous; do you see that?
6	A. I see that in the article, yep.
7	Q. Are you aware of DHS broadening its
8	efforts to address disinformation?
9	A. I am not, no.
10	Q. Has CISA been expanding its MDM
11	team?
12	A. As I mentioned earlier, we have
13	not.
14	Q. Let me ask you this: Scrolling
15	down here, third page of the document, it says:
16	There is also a formalized process for
17	government officials to directly flag content on
18	Facebook or Instagram and request that it be
19	throttled or suppressed through a special
20	Facebook portal that requires a government or
21	law enforcement e-mail to use; do you see that?
22	A. Yeah, I see that in the article.
23	Q. And it actually provides a link for
24	it, Facebook.com/Xtakedowns/login; are you aware
25	of that reporting channel for government

1	
1	officials?
2	A. I am not, no.
3	Q. On the next page, fourth page of
4	the document, it says: According to a draft
5	copy of DHS's quadrennial Homeland Security
6	review, DHS's capstone report outlining the
7	department's strategy and priorities in the
8	coming years, the department plans to target
9	inaccurate information on a wide range of
10	topics; do you see that?
11	A. Yeah, I see that in the article.
12	Q. Are you aware of the document
13	that's a draft of the quadrennial Homeland
14	Security review?
15	A. I know it says quadrennial Homeland
16	Security review is, I don't know if I've seen
17	the draft of the most recent one.
18	Q. Have you seen any drafts of the
19	most recent one?
20	A. Not that I recall.
21	Q. When does it when does it get
22	finalized?
23	A. I I I don't know.
24	Q. It says: Including the origins of
25	the COVID-19 pandemic and the efforts of the

1	COVID-19 vaccines, racial justice, US withdrawal
2	from Afghanistan, and the nature of US support
3	for Ukraine, in quotes; do you see that?
4	A. I do.
5	Q. Are you aware of discussions
6	anywhere in DHS about addressing misinformation
7	about the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic?
8	A. I am not.
9	Q. So how about the efficacy of
10	COVID-19 vaccines?
11	A. Yes, I'm aware of some discussions
12	on that.
13	Q. What discussions are you aware of?
14	A. So it was a as I mentioned
15	earlier, our building critical infrastructure
16	help in public health is one of the sectors of
17	critical infrastructure, so we engage with CDC
18	and HHS to help them. We've also put out one
19	product, sometime in mid 2020, for
20	infrastructure stakeholders about COVID-related
21	disinformation.
22	Q. What do you do to assist CDC and
23	HSH?
24	A. For the most part, not a lot, to be
25	honest. Like I said, we did the one product

1	related to them, and we just participate in
2	meetings with them. From our perspective,
3	again, we're trying to understand trends, how
4	this information is spreading tactics so we can
5	help the public, the public and organizations,
6	critical infrastructure organizations, as well
7	as some others, understand the risks from MDM
8	and how it works and what they can do about it.
9	Q. Do you do you obtain information
10	from CDC and HHS about how COVID vaccine
11	misinformation spreads?
12	A. I believe that they provided some
13	briefings on that, yeah.
14	Q. And do you also provide briefings
15	to them or information to them?
16	A. We did some work on the kind of
17	bio-lab narratives, so this is essentially
18	foreign governments, whenever anything happens,
19	whether biological and sometimes not, they will
20	point to US biolabs as being the culprit behind
21	it, and so as part of our resilience-building
22	efforts we're trying to understand how foreign
23	actors have used that narrative over time.
24	And so we, starting back in the
25	

1	Russians were using that. Usually they're
2	saying at Fort Detrick or some other kind of US
3	entity is a biolab, and that's where whatever it
4	starts.
5	We saw this with COVID. We saw
6	this Monkey Pox. We saw this around Ukraine.
7	And so, again, just helping people understand
8	that a lot of these disinformation narratives
9	are recycled over time, for different issues, as
10	a way to help build resilience.
11	Q. How about racial justice, are you
12	doing anything to address misinformation about
13	racial justice issue?
14	A. CISA has not, to my knowledge, done
15	anything related to racial justice.
16	Q. How about other DHS components, do
17	they do anything on that?
18	A. Not that I'm aware of, but
19	obviously I don't know everything that they do.
20	Q. How about US withdrawal from
21	
	Afghanistan, does CISA work on that?
22	Afghanistan, does CISA work on that? A. Not that I'm aware of.
22 23	
	A. Not that I'm aware of.

1	A. Yeah, I I'm not aware of what
2	other components are doing.
3	Q. And then the nature of US support
4	to Ukraine?
5	A. So there was a department stood
6	out, what's called the Unified Coordination
7	Group, when Russia invaded Ukraine, to
8	coordinate DHS activities related to the crisis.
9	As a part of that there was an MDM component,
10	and a member of the MDM team was detailed to
11	lead the MDM component of the Russian/Ukraine
12	work. I believe it lasted about two months.
13	Q. What did they do?
14	A. The Unified Coordination Group.
15	Sorry.
16	Q. What did that group do?
17	A. So most of it took place while I
18	was out, so I don't have a super clear
19	understanding of everything, but generally
20	speaking, they provided a they would monitor
21	open source researching.
22	So we talk about third-party
23	researchers, we put out reports, and things like
24	that, and they would provide situational
25	awareness, at least from our perspective, CISA

1	perspective, they would provide situational
2	awareness up to the MDM Unified Coordination
3	Group.
4	Q. Who at CISA participated in that?
5	A. So Rob Schaul from the MDM team was
6	detailed to the Unified Coordination Group, and
7	then several members of the team would have been
8	monitoring open source.
9	So we have the open source
10	reporting. These are third-party research
11	reports, things like that, to point to
12	information to just make leadership aware.
13	Q. Did they did that group
14	communicate with social media platforms about
15	disinformation relating to Ukraine?
16	A. By that group, do you mean Unified
17	Coordination Group?
18	Q. Correct.
19	A. I I don't know.
20	Q. Rob Schaul would know that?
21	A. He led the team, so I suspect he
22	might.
23	Q. Do you know if that team
24	communicated with social media platforms, at
25	all?

1	A. I don't know. There was a call, at
2	some point, early, between between critical
3	infrastructure and I believe some social media
4	around that, but I wasn't around for that call
5	so I don't really know the nature of what was
6	discussed or anything along those lines.
7	Q. There was a call between and I'm
8	sorry, I couldn't hear clearly what you said
9	there was a call between social media platforms
10	and and who?
11	A. So I believe the way I understand
12	the call is it facilitated a call with critical
13	infrastructure, the critical infrastructure
14	community, to private sector companies, sector
15	risk management agencies, folks that were
16	involved in critical infrastructure security. I
17	believe, my understanding is that call did
18	include some social media platforms.
19	Q. And you but you don't know what
20	was said in that call?
21	A. No, I wasn't I wasn't back at
22	CISA yet.
23	Q. Do you know when the call occurred?
24	A. It would have been in probably the
25	February February time timeframe, I would
1	

	•
1	# la -l -n la
1	think.
2	Q. February 2022?
3	A. Correct.
4	(Exhibit No. 31 was marked for
5	identification.)
6	BY MR. SAUER:
7	Q. I'm putting up Exhibit 31 on the
8	screen share. You should have it in front of
9	you.
10	A. Okay. I got it.
11	Q. Here's a report from the Office of
12	the Inspector General, entitled: DHS needs a
13	unified strategy to counter disinformation
14	campaigns; do you see that?
15	A. I do.
16	Q. Are you familiar with this OIG
17	report?
18	A. Mostly familiar with it, yeah.
19	Q. Were you aware that they do you
20	know what the day of the report is?
21	A. Says August 10th, 2022.
22	Q. And I take it this report is
23	recommending that here to what we have found,
24	DHS needs unified strategy or to address
25	disinformation; right? Right here, it says:

1	DHS does not yet have a unified department-wide
2	strategy to effectively counter disinformation
3	that originates from both foreign and domestic
4	sources; correct?
5	A. I'm trying to find that. Okay.
6	Q. Yeah.
7	A. DHS does not yet have a unified
8	strategy. Correct, yeah, that's what's written
9	there.
10	Q. Do you share that view, do you
11	think DHS lacks a department-wide strategy?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Do you think that different
14	components of DHS are engaging in different sort
15	of MDM-related activities without coordinating
16	with each other?
17	A. Yeah, I think that's a fair
18	assumption.
19	Q. Were you aware that this
20	recommendation was made for DHS to do internal
21	and external coordination better?
22	A. Was I aware that this report was
23	stating that DHS needs to do better in internal
24	and external coordination?
25	Q. Yeah.

1	A. I I don't know if that's what it
2	says, is there a page in here where that
3	recommendation is or those recommendations?
4	Q. Let's go to page 7.
5	A. Is this PDF 7 or document page 7?
6	Q. Good question. It's PDF 9,
7	document
8	A. PDF 9? Okay.
9	Q. It's here underneath the graphic
10	novels images, there's a paragraph that begins:
11	More recently; do you see that?
12	A. Yep.
13	Q. It says: In January 2021 CISA
14	transitioned its countering foreign influence
15	task force to promote more flexibility to focus
16	on general MDM; right?
17	A. Mm-hmm, that's what it says.
18	Q. And that CISA's got 15 dedicated
19	part- and full-time staff; is that still true?
20	A. No.
21	Q. I'm sorry, the MDM team has 15
22	staff; is that still true?
23	A. No.
24	Q. How many does it have?
25	A. Right now, we have five full-time

1	staff plus one on maternity leave, so six. And
2	then we have one, two, two contractor's
3	support no, three contractor's supporting us.
4	Q. Did at some time you have 15 people
5	working on this on the MDM team?
6	A. I suspect at the height of the team
7	if you add in all the contractors there it
8	probably got close to 15, but I'm not sure of
9	the exact number.
10	Q. When was the height of the team?
11	A. Staff plus contractors was
12	probably good question. When was the height
13	of the team? We didn't have much contract
14	support in 2020, so I would probably say 2021,
15	while I was gone.
16	Q. It says: The MDM team focuses on
17	disinformation activities targeting elections
18	and critical infrastructure. According to a
19	CISA official, the MDM team counters all types
20	of disinformation, to be responsive to current
21	events; is that right?
22	A. That's what the document says, yep.
23	Q. Is that true that the MDM team
24	counters all types of disinformation to be
25	responsive to current events?
i)	

1	A. We, again, try to build resilience
2	and reduce risks to critical infrastructure. So
3	I you know, if the event could impact
4	critical infrastructure, that would be something
5	we would consider addressing.
6	Q. Does critical infrastructure
7	include cognitive infrastructure?
8	A. Not through national policy.
9	Q. Okay. Let me go two pages further,
10	paragraph page 9, it says: For example,
11	according to an ODNI official, prior to the
12	November 2020 elections CISA and I&A joined in
13	weekly teleconferences to coordinate
14	intelligence community activities to counter
15	election-related disinformation; correct?
16	A. That's what the document says, yes.
17	Q. Were you aware of those calls,
18	that's a coordinating call between CISA, I&A and
19	ODNI?
20	A. No, that was a coordinate so
21	yeah, from the call, but the calls were DNI-led
22	coordination calls of the intelligence
23	community. CISA was there mostly from an
24	observer standpoint, to do as an election
25	security lead. But it was it was an intel

1	community-focused coordination and conversation.
2	Q. Who from CISA participated in those
3	calls?
4	A. I think it was just a random a
5	random mix. Geoff did not generally participate
6	in them. I didn't generally participate in
7	them, although I think I did maybe once or
8	twice, normally somebody at the staff level.
9	Yeah, we have an intel office in
10	CISA, so I suspect that at least somebody from
11	the intel office was on the calls. But I think
12	it was just, you know, it was who's available at
13	the staff level would go participate at that
14	time.
15	Q. Was disinformation, you know, how
16	to combat disinformation on social media, is
17	that discussed in these calls?
18	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
19	speculation, lack of foundation.
20	A. My understanding, my recollection
21	of the calls, at least the couple I was on, it
22	was generally the intel community talking about
23	what products they were developing, what
24	analysis they were doing, things along those
25	lines.

1	Q. The next sentence says: The office
2	of the DNI official stated the teleconferences
3	continue to occur every two weeks after the 2020
4	elections, and were still taking place at the
5	time of this audit in August of 2022; do you see
6	that?
7	A. I do.
8	Q. Yeah, what are those calls still
9	going on today, every two weeks?
10	A. I don't know. That was that's
11	a THAT they're still continuing to November
12	of 2022 is news to me. So yeah, I don't as
13	far as I know, we weren't participating in them.
14	I wouldn't be surprised if there was some calls
15	going on, but I don't recall. The intel
16	community doesn't tell community things when I
17	was involved in that.
18	Q. Why don't I e-mail you another
19	exhibit, 27.
20	MR. GARDNER: John, if you just
21	spoke, I couldn't hear you, but sound wasn't
22	coming through.
23	MR. SAUER: I'm sorry. Yeah,
24	actually, I'm going to skip that one. I meant
25	Exhibit 23, which I'm now e-mailing you.

1	MR. GARDNER: Not Exhibit 27?
2	MR. SAUER: 27 should look familiar
3	to you. We talked about it already.
4	MR. GARDNER: Okay. Just to be
5	clear, are we talking about 27 now or a
6	different exhibit?
7	MR. SAUER: 23.
8	MR. GARDNER: Okay. Don't have
9	that yet, but as soon as we do.
10	MR. SAUER: And I'm putting it up
11	on the screen share, too.
12	(Exhibit No. 23 was marked for
13	identification.)
14	BY MR. SAUER:
15	Q. Here's a November 2021 report on
16	public comments by Director Easterly and The
17	Hill; do you see that?
18	A. Yes.
19	Q. It says: The title is cyber agency
20	beefing up disinformation misinformation team;
21	correct?
22	A. Correct.
23	Q. And in the first paragraph says:
24	CISA is beefing up its disinformation and
25	misinformation team in the wake of a dismissive

1	precedential election that saw a proliferation
2	of misleading online information; correct?
3	A. Yeah, that's what the article says.
4	Q. Were you aware of efforts to beef
5	up the misinformation team in November of '21?
6	A. No, not specific efforts. I was
7	over at the National Security Council at the
8	time.
9	Q. When did you come back from that
10	detail?
11	A. The detail officially ended in
12	early March, and I took some leave and started
13	back at CISA in early to mid April.
14	Q. And the director says in the next
15	paragraph: I'm actually going to grow and
16	strengthen my misinformation and disinformation
17	team; do you see that?
18	A. I do.
19	Q. I know you were on detail then, are
20	you aware of efforts to grow and strengthen the
21	team, for example, by adding new people?
22	A. Again as I mentioned earlier in my
23	testimony, my understanding is there was some
24	budget increase that was proposed. I don't I
25	don't know if that moved forward or not, from

1	the department.
2	Q. Is the do these remarks coincide
3	with what you said was kind of the high point,
4	when you had 15 people on the MDM team, was that
5	around, you know, November 2021?
6	A. It's hard to say for sure. I'm
7	not I'm not sure how they're counting
8	positions. So I don't think we ever had 15
9	federal employees. So there's, you know, it
10	seems to me like they were probably counting
11	contract support, so so it's hard for me to
12	say exactly when that would have been.
13	Q. You say there was, in this
14	timeframe, some attempt to get budget authority
15	to add people to the MDM team?
16	A. It was my understanding that there
17	was a request for additional funds made to the
18	budget. But again, I don't know, the budget
19	process is a little bit of a mystery to me, so
20	I'm not sure what exactly happened along the
21	way, if it ended up in the you know, in the
22	budget requests or what.
23	Q. The next paragraph says that
24	Easterly noted that earlier this week she had a
25	meeting with six of the nation's experts in that

1	misinformation and disinformation space; do you
2	see that?
3	A. I do.
4	Q. Do you know who she met with?
5	A. I don't.
6	Q. Do you know who are six of the
7	nation's experts in disinformation and
8	misinformation?
9	A. I mean, I could come up with a list
10	of experts. I don't know if that's who she met
11	with.
12	Q. She stressed her concerns around
13	this being a top threat for CISA; correct?
14	A. That's what the article says, yep.
15	Q. And it goes on to quote her,
16	saying: One could argue we're in the business
17	of critical infrastructure, and the most
18	critical infrastructure is our cognitive
19	infrastructure; correct?
20	A. That's what the quote says, yep.
21	Q. Do you do you does
22	the MDM team view protecting our cognitive
23	infrastructure as part of its mission?
24	A. No. We look at the again, the
25	international policy there's, like, 16 sectors,

1	and those are the critical infrastructure
2	factors we look to protect. So we wouldn't
3	include cognitive infrastructure in that list.
4	Q. One of them is election
5	infrastructure; is that right?
6	A. Election infrastructure is actually
7	a subsector of the government's stability
8	structure.
9	Q. So if someone posts information on
10	social media implying that, you know, ballots
11	were being shredded by poll workers, what
12	infrastructure is that a threat to?
13	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
14	a hypothetical.
15	A. Yeah, I would rather not answer
16	hypotheticals.
17	Q. You have no instruction not to
18	answer, please answer the question.
19	MR. GARDNER: Same objection.
20	A. Yeah, I'm not answering a
21	hypothetical.
22	Q. Please answer the questions. If
23	someone posts on social media
24	A. Can you give me an example of the
25	post?

1	Q. If you look at all the posts we
2	looked at earlier in your e-mails, where, for
3	example, suppose someone posts the hammer and
4	scorecard conspiracy on social media, and
5	Director Krebs tells you to reach out to social
6	media platforms to see what they're doing about
7	it, how does the posting about the hammer and
8	scorecard narrative on social media threaten
9	critical infrastructure?
10	A. So it so generally speaking,
11	this mis, mal-information threatens critical
12	infrastructure in a number of ways, it could be
13	operational impact, so in the case of the
14	elections, disrupting election operations,
15	things along those lines. It could be human
16	impact, so again, see election example, there's
17	a lot of threats of violence made against
18	election officials, making it harder to do their
19	jobs.
20	So a multitude of ways that
21	disinformation could impact critical
22	infrastructure, like I said, we you know,
23	there's financial, there's reputational, there's
24	just a multitude of ways that this
25	disinformation could affect critical

1	. n £ a b a b a b
1	infrastructure.
2	Q. Does infrastructure have a
3	reputational interest?
4	A. Does infrastructure have a
5	reputational interest?
6	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.
7	THE WITNESS: Yeah, could you be a
8	little more specific.
9	BY MR. SAUER:
10	Q. You just used the word, you said
11	there's financial, there's reputational, what do
12	you mean by that? What is the reputational
13	threat to critical infrastructure from social
14	media postings?
15	A. Well, I wouldn't I wasn't saying
16	specifically from social media postings. I was
17	saying from fraud, from mis, dis and
18	mal-information, a reputational risk could come
19	about if the integrity or the public confidence
20	in a particular sector was critical to that
21	sector's functioning.
22	So I think the financial services
23	would probably be a good example. So if there's
24	a loss of confidence by the American public in
25	financial services, financial systems of the

1	United States, that could create national
2	security concerns.
3	Q. Explain that to me, how would a
4	loss of confidence in the financial system
5	create national security concerns?
6	A. Lots of ways, you can have runs on
7	banks, such as the banking, you could have, you
8	know, other sorts of issues related to that, so
9	yeah, so there's you know, if there's a loss
10	of confidence, if there's a run on banks and
11	there's a run on the financial systems, those
12	sorts of things can create physical harms,
13	operational harms.
14	So again, if we go back to the list
15	of potential harms, the reputational could lead
16	to operational, right? So banks could be
17	overwhelmed with people showing up trying to
18	take money out. They could be overwhelmed with
19	people showing up elsewhere at other facilities
20	and disrupt our operations. So it's a full
21	range of potential risks. A lot of these are
22	cascading, and so, yeah.
23	Q. So is it part of the MDM team's job
24	and CISA's job to counter disinformation that
25	creates reputational risks to, for example, the

1	financial services industry?
2	A. So again, our mission is to build
3	resilience. And so we would work if the
4	financial services sector wanted us to work with
5	them, to develop products to help them
6	understand how mis, dis and mal-information
7	could impact their their sector, we would
8	we would work with them on that yes.
9	Q. What sorts of mis, dis and
10	mal-information might undermine confidence in
11	the financial services?
12	A. I don't know. We haven't we
13	haven't dealt with that. We're not financial
14	services experts, so we generally defer to a
15	department or agency.
16	So in this case, Treasury, the
17	sector risk management agency responsible for
18	the financial services sector, so our expertise
19	with the MDM team is understanding MDM and
20	potentially to mitigate risks and to build
21	resilience, and so we wouldn't be the experts on
22	the actual financial services MDM.
23	Q. So everything you just said about
24	the financial services was a lengthy
25	hypothetical?

1	A. Like I said, I don't like getting
2	into hypotheticals.
3	Q. You did for awhile, there.
4	Scrolling down in the same
5	document, it says there's a quote from
6	Director Easterly, where she says now
7	MR. GARDNER: Sorry, hold on.
8	MR. SAUER: Can you guys hear me
9	now?
10	MR. GARDNER: Yeah.
11	MR. SAUER: Okay.
12	BY MR. SAUER:
13	Q. Quote from Director Easterly, we
14	now live in a world where people talk about
15	alternative facts, post truth, which I think is
16	really, really dangerous, if you get to pick
17	your own facts, and it's particularly corrosive
18	when you talk about matters of election
19	security; right?
20	A. That's the quote, yeah.
21	Q. And is that kind of consistent with
22	what the MDM team does, it tries to prevent a
23	situation where Americans get to pick their own
24	facts?
25	MR. GARDNER: Objection, vague.

1 Α. I -- I -- that's -- no, that's not 2 consistent with what we do. 3 Ο. So that's -- that's not a -- you 4 don't think Director Easterly's description is 5 very fair? 6 MR. GARDNER: Objection, 7 mischaracterizes the witness's previous testimony. 9 Yeah, if I understand your question 10 you said that CISA played a role in alternate 11 facts and post truths and things like that, and 12 CISA does not do that sort of thing. 13 MR. SAUER: Sending you a few more 14 exhibits by e-mail. You should be getting two 15 e-mails, the first one with three attachments, 16 and the second one with one. 17 It may take a minute. It's loading 18 slowly on my end. Okay. I'm opening Exhibit 19 49, and I'll put that on the screen share. (Exhibit No. 49 was marked for 20 21 identification.) 22 BY MR. SAUER: 23 Ο. Did you give an interview to the 24 Berkman Klein Center on June 18th of 2020? 25 I don't recall the specific date, Α.

1	but I did give them an interview, so that's
2	probably about right.
3	Q. And this is an interview by The
4	Breakdown. And do you recall doing this
5	interview?
6	A. I do.
7	Q. On the third page of the document,
8	you say: For us, in particular oops, it
9	didn't highlight well for us, in particular,
10	you see here, it's the second bullet for us,
11	in particular, we're trying to reduce the amount
12	that Americans engage with disinformation;
13	right?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. Is that to your mind, is that a
16	good summary of what the MDM team does, it tries
17	to reduce the amount that Americans engage with
18	disinformation?
19	A. That's the general idea behind
20	resilience-building, yeah.
21	Q. What is engaging with
22	disinformation?
23	A. Amplifying it, re-tweeting it,
24	resending it, things like that.
25	Q. How about liking it on social

1	media, is that a form of engagement?
2	A. Yep.
3	Q. How about just reading it, is that
4	a form of engagement?
5	A. No.
6	Q. So if you're reading disinformation
7	is not engagement with it?
8	A. Correct.
9	Q. But but so engagement is taking
10	some affirmative step further, like you said,
11	amplify, like, repost, that's kind of
12	disinformation, in your view, I'm sorry, that's
13	engagement; correct?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. And it's part of CISA's or the
16	CISA's job to try to reduce the amount that that
17	happens; right?
18	A. I wouldn't characterize it that
19	way. I would say the ultimate goal of building
20	resilience is that people are less likely to
21	amplify mis and disinformation.
22	Q. And that's what you're trying to do
23	at the MDM team, is reduce the amount that
24	Americans engage with disinformation?
25	A. Yeah, through public awareness and

1 public engagement and things like that, yep. 2 The last page of the document, you 3 say -- here there's a paragraph where you say: The question is, we have people calling for more 5 monitoring of speech on platforms. And then you 6 go on to say: We have to built the platforms 7 that this is a lie and they need to take it down or we're asking the platforms to do that; right? 9 Yeah, that's what -- that's what 10 the quote is, yep. 11 Okay. Is that, in fact, what the Q. 12 MDM team is doing or I guess it was countering 13 foreign influence task force team was doing in 14 2020 when it was routing disinformation concerns 15 to Facebook, were you telling them to --16 Α. No. 17 Go ahead. Ο. 18 Α. Essentially what this quote is 19 saying is that in the general conversation about 20 how to address mis and disinformation there are 21 a lot of people saying that we should -- the 22 government should be the ones taking things 23 down, or the government should be asking the platforms to do certain things, and that's not 24 25 necessarily the right spot for government to be.

1	Q. So when you say: We have to tell
2	the platforms that this is a lie and they need
3	to take it down, you're attributing that view to
4	other people, not yourself?
5	
	A. Yeah, so that's generally what we
6	hear a lot, you go out and you talk to different
7	groups about disinformation that's just a common
8	theme that we would hear from people that we
9	should be doing.
10	And as I mentioned, the rest of the
11	quote is is it's just not a question of
12	what we should be doing. There's lots of issues
13	and things like that there. So that's what I
14	was trying to get across there.
15	(Exhibit No. 52 was marked for
16	identification.)
17	BY MR. SAUER:
18	Q. Exhibit 52.
19	A. 52? I've got it.
20	MR. SAUER: How long have we been
21	on the record.
22	MR. SCOTT: So I have an unofficial
23	tally of six hours and 32 minutes.
24	MR. SAUER: Okay. Exhibit
25	MR. GARDNER: I agree.

1	BY MR. SAUER:
2	Q. Exhibit 52, if we go in this
3	e-mail excuse me, there's an e-mail from
4	Lauren Protentis copying Allison Snell and Geoff
5	Hale and Rob Schaul to a contact at Google; do
6	you see that?
7	A. Mm-hmm.
8	Q. And she says, this is in February
9	17th of 2022; do you see that?
10	A. I do.
11	Q. And she says: Hi Richard, I hope
12	this e-mail finds you well. The Department of
13	Treasury has asked our team for an appropriate
14	POCs I assume that means points of contact
15	to discuss social media and influence matters.
16	We would like to make a connection to Google, if
17	you're amenable; do you see that?
18	A. I do.
19	Q. What do you know why Treasury
20	reached out to CISA to get a contact for at
21	social media platforms to discuss social media
22	and influence matters?
23	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
24	foundation.
25	A. I I don't know why Treasury

1	reached out, but CISA obviously, as we discussed
2	earlier, has points of contact in various social
3	media companies.
4	Q. Does that happen from time to time,
5	that other agencies would reach out to CISA and
6	say: Can you put us in touch with a social
7	media contact?
8	A. It's it's happened a couple
9	times. I don't I don't I don't recall how
10	many, and it's it's been awhile, I think,
11	but so if that qualifies as time to time.
12	Q. Do you know what Lauren Protentis
13	meant when she talked about social media
14	influence matters, do you know what that means?
15	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
16	speculation.
17	A. Yeah, I don't know what she means.
18	Q. Were you on detail when this e-mail
19	was sent?
20	A. I was.
21	Q. Do you remember any discussions
22	with anyone about the Department of Treasury
23	reaching out to discuss I'm sorry wanting
24	to be put in place in contact with social media
25	platforms?

1	A. I don't, no.
2	Q. There's a follow up e-mail from
3	Ms. Protentis, saying: Apologies for the second
4	e-mail, this is somewhat time sensitive. Do you
5	know why Treasury was raising a time sensitive
6	concern concern?
7	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
8	speculation.
9	A. I don't know.
10	Q. Do you know if Treasury ever
11	connected with the social media platform?
12	A. I don't know.
13	(Exhibit No. 46 was marked for
14	identification.)
15	BY MR. SAUER:
16	Q. I'm pulling up Exhibit 46. It
17	should be in the second e-mail I sent you a
18	moment ago.
19	A. I got it.
20	Q. Here's a draft report to the CISA
21	director, dated June 22nd, 2022; correct?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. This is from the CISA cyber
24	security advisory committee; correct?
25	A. It appears so, yep.

1	Q. I believe you said in your
2	interrogatory responses that this also has an
3	MDM subcommittee; is that right?
4	A. Yes, that's correct.
5	Q. Do you participate in those
6	committees, either the security advisory
7	committee or the MDM subcommittee?
8	A. I don't.
9	Q. Who participates from does
10	anyone participate from the MDM team in those
11	those committees?
12	A. Not from the MDM team, no.
13	Q. So no one on the MDM team
14	participates in the committees?
15	A. No.
16	Q. Who from CISA participates, do you
17	know?
18	A. Kim Wyman is, as I mentioned
19	earlier, I think, that was one of her
20	responsibilities, and then Geoff Hale
21	participated.
22	Q. And then who else, from outside
23	CISA, participates in these meetings?
24	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
25	foundation.

1	A. I don't know who's I don't know
2	who's in the the participant list. I believe
3	it's all publicly available online.
4	Q. Turning to the second page of this
5	document.
6	A. Okay. Recommendations?
7	Q. Yeah. First bullet point, do you
8	see there, it says: CISA should focus on MD
9	I assume that's mis and disinformation?
10	A. Is that a question?
11	Q. Yeah. Is that
12	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
13	speculation, lack of foundation.
14	BY MR. SAUER:
15	Q. Does MD refer to mis and
16	disinformation?
17	A. In the context, I would say that it
18	does, but I don't I don't know what they
19	meant by it.
20	Q. It says: CISA should focus on MD
21	that risks undermining critical functions of
22	American society, including sub-bullet one, MD
23	that suppresses election participation or
24	falsely undermines confidence in election
25	procedures and outcomes; correct?

1	A. Correct.
2	Q. So the advisory committee is
3 recon	mmending that CISA focus on election-related
4 disir	nformation; right?
5	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
6 found	dation.
7	A. That's how I would read that
8 sente	ence, correct.
9	Q. Okay. Second bullet point says:
10 MD th	nat undermines critical functions carried
11 out h	by other key democratic institutions, such
12 as th	ne courts or by other sectors, such as the
13 finar	ncial system or public health measures;
14 right	:?
15	A. That's what it says, yep.
16	Q. You talked about the financial
17 syste	em, earlier, and interestingly that's raised
18 in th	nis recommendation. Are you aware of CISA
19 doing	g anything to address MD that undermines the
20 finar	ncial system?
21	A. So we've as I mentioned earlier,
22 we	- we're working with Treasury to develop a
23 produ	act to help the financial services sector
24 under	estand MDM risks to the sector.
25	Q. What risks have there been to that

1 sector? And I don't remember any runs on banks, 2 you know, recently, what risks? 3 Α. So again, as I mentioned earlier, we're not the experts in financial services, so 5 we, you know, depend on the financial services 6 sector to kind of work us through, help us work 7 through what those risks are, we're pretty early in the process, so we're still kind of working 9 through those sorts of questions. 10 Q. Do you know what, what was the 11 impetus for doing that product in the first 12 place? Was someone worried about MDM that would 13 undermine financial services? 14 I -- I don't -- I don't know why 15 Treasury reached out to us and discussed that, I 16 don't recall. 17 Is that unrelated to the last Ο. 18 e-mail we saw, where they wanted to talk to 19 social media platforms about social media and 20 influence matters? 21 MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for 22 speculation, lack of foundation. 23 Α. Yeah, I don't know. I don't know 24 if the two are connected. 25 Ο. Okay. The bottom of the same page,

1	there's a bullet recommending that CISA should
2	consider MD across the information ecosystem;
3	right?
4	A. Yep.
5	Q. And it goes down in the second
6	sub-bullet there, it says: CISA should approach
7	the MD problems with the entire information
8	ecosystem in mind, this includes social media
9	platforms of all sizes, mainstream media, cable
10	news, hyper partisan media, talk radio and other
11	online resources; do you see that?
12	A. I do.
13	Q. Has CISA been taking steps to
14	consider or address misinformation in these
15	other venues, besides social media, for example,
16	mainstream media?
17	A. No. What I would say is that,
18	generally speaking, we we I believe it's
19	generally too much of a focus on just the social
20	media platform, and MDM that kind of flows
21	through social media. When potentially it's MDM
22	that flows through all different sources of
23	media communication.
24	So that's kind of how we think
25	about it, we try not to just focus on MDM, but

1	vo donit do oprething governo to come soint
1	we don't do anything counter to your point.
2	Again, we built resilience helping people
3	understand what's going on and how to mitigate
4	the risks.
5	Q. Do you try to build resilience to
6	MDM on in cable news?
7	A. I mean, generically speaking, all
8	of our resilience activity would be useful
9	regardless of how we try to make it as broad
10	as possible so it's applicable anywhere that
11	somebody may come across MDM.
12	Q. How about hyper partisan media,
13	what does that mean, do you know?
14	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
15	speculation.
16	A. I don't know what it's meant in
17	this context, but again, we try to be general
18	enough in our kind of guidance to help people
19	understand.
20	We're essentially agnostic of where
21	it's coming from, we just want people to be able
22	to understand where what it is, how it works,
23	and things they can do to mitigate those risks.
24	Q. I take it, then, the MDM team would
25	agree with this recommendation that CISA should
	•

1	approach the MDM problem, you know, with a whole
2	information universe in mind, including
3	mainstream media, cable news, hyper partisan
4	media, talk radio, and other online resources?
5	MR. GARDNER: Objection, form.
6	A. What I would say, from a
7	resilience-building standpoint, we generally
8	don't try not to hone too much on any one
9	particular medium for communication. There's
10	obviously tactics that fall across multiple, but
11	we don't generally try to hone in on any one in
12	particular.
13	(Exhibit No. 59 was marked for
14	identification.)
15	BY MR. SAUER:
16	Q. I'm pulling up Exhibit 59.
17	A. Okay.
18	Q. And then here's a cyber security
19	advisory committee e-mail to a group, I assume
20	it's the committee members; does that look right
21	to you or do you not know?
22	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
23	foundation, calls for speculation.
24	A. Yeah, I don't I don't know who
25	all the members are, so it would be hard for me

1	to say if that's the case.
2	Q. Here's some people that are copied
3	on this e-mail from the CISA cyber security
4	advisory committee e-mail, the first one is Kate
5	Starbird; right?
6	A. Yeah.
7	Q. Do you know who she is?
8	A. She's a professor at the University
9	of Washington.
10	Q. She was involved in the Election
11	Integrity Partnership that we talked about
12	earlier; right?
13	A. I believe so, yeah.
14	Q. Next one is Vijaya Gadde or Gadde,
15	do you know who she is?
16	A. I don't know.
17	Q. Was she a senior official at
18	Twitter, at the time, do you know?
19	MR. GARDNER: Objection, calls for
20	speculation.
21	A. I don't know.
22	Q. I see you've got Kim Wyman and
23	Geoff Hale on this e-mail. They were the two
24	that you testified earlier are involved in the
25	cyber security advisory committee for CISA;

1	right?
2	A. Yep.
3	Q. And then lower down, there's a list
4	of we have identified a list of potential
5	subject matter experts to potentially brief at
6	our biweekly meetings, bios attached; do you see
7	that?
8	A. I do.
9	Q. So and that's a list of, I take
10	it, experts who would provide briefings at the
11	advisory committee's meetings; is that how you
12	read that?
13	MR. GARDNER: Objection, lack of
14	foundation, calls for speculation.
15	A. So the paragraph reads: Identify a
16	list of subject matter experts. Please be
17	prepared to provide your feedback. I'm sorry,
18	what was your question again?
19	Q. Let me just ask: Is the third
20	expert on the list is Renée DiResta; right?
21	A. Yeah.
22	Q. And she's at Stanford Internet
23	Observatory; right?
24	A. Correct.
25	Q. You were involved in conversations

1	with her, because she was a part of the Election
2	Integrity Partnership; right?
3	A. We should have Stanford Internet
4	Observatory, we were certainly involved in
5	conversations with her, as I talked about
6	earlier.
7	Q. And those conversations were
8	related to the commencement of the Election
9	Integrity Partnership; right?
10	A. I I don't know if she was
11	involved in the early conversations, before it
12	stood up. I know Stamos was there, I don't know
13	if Renée was there in those early conversations.
14	Q. Was she in some conversations
15	between with you about the EIP?
16	A. As I mentioned before, she briefed
17	us about the 2022 EIP work. I don't recall
18	conversations in 2020, but again, it wouldn't
19	surprise me if she was involved in those.
20	MR. SAUER: Let's go off the
21	record.
22	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
23	5:46 p.m. We are off the record.
24	(Recess.)
25	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now

	5:53 p.m. We're back on the record.
2	MR. SAUER: Are we back on the
3	record?
4	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Yes.
5	MR. SAUER: Oh, sorry.
6	(Exhibit No. 19 was marked for
7	identification.)
8	BY MR. SAUER:
9	Q. Exhibit 19, I put it on the screen
10	share.
11	Here's a proposal from CIS, Center
12	For Internet Security, to create an election
13	misinformation reporting portal, and it talks
14	about the benefits to election officials being
15	in a single place for reporting mis and
16	disinformation across multiple social media
17	platforms.
18	Do you know if this proposal was
19	ever implemented to create a single election
20	misinformation reporting portal?
21	A. I I don't know. I'm not
22	entirely sure. I don't know that I've seen
23	this, I don't know if I've seen this proposal
24	before, so I'm not certain.
25	
20	Q. So you don't know?
1	

1	A. It sounds like what they were
2	trying to do, that we discussed earlier, but I
3	don't know to what extent it was, to your
4	question, to what extent it was stood up or
5	established.
6	Q. You don't know to what extent that
7	CIS managed to implement this proposal for an
8	elections misinformation reporting portal?
9	A. Yeah, or if they if they did it
10	at all.
11	(Exhibit No. 21 was marked for
12	identification.)
13	BY MR. SAUER:
14	Q. Exhibit 21, it's on the screen
15	share, this is a CNN political report, September
16	of 2022. If you go to the third fourth page
17	of the document, in this report it says: While
18	the anti-doxing and foreign influence parts of
19	the proposal remain stalled, work on the online,
20	quote, portal for election officials to flag
21	misinformation to social media platforms
22	predated the proposal and continues today,
23	according to people familiar with it.
24	So are you aware of ongoing work,
25	at least as of September of 2022, to set up an

1 online portal for election officials to flag 2 misinformation to social media platforms. 3 So I think as I testified to Α. 4 earlier, my understanding is that CIS did do something along the lines, I just don't know the 5 6 extent of it. 7 Ο. And you don't know whether or when it -- it might be completed? 9 Α. Correct. 10 (Exhibit No. 24 was marked for 11 identification.) BY MR. SAUER: 12 13 Q. Exhibit 24, here's a CISA bulletin 14 that's on your website called --15 Α. Mm-hmm. 16 -- misinformation, you go to the Q. 17 third page. 18 Α. Correct. 19 Q. Are you familiar with this 20 bulletin? 21 Actually, I think this may be our Α. website. I'm not sure if it's a bulletin. 22 23 It is on your website. I don't Q. 24 know if it's a bulletin, either. 25 Let me ask you this: Here on the

1	third page, it says: Bridging election
2	stakeholders and social media, and under there
3	it says: The MDM team serves as a switchboard
4	for routing disinformation concerns to
5	appropriate social media platforms and law
6	enforcement; correct.
7	A. It does, yep.
8	Q. You guys refer stuff to law
9	enforcement, too?
10	A. Yes, if there was particularly
11	if there was violence, promoted in whatever was
12	sent to us from an election official.
13	Q. Anything else involved that would
14	be reported to law enforcement, other than
15	threats of violence?
16	A. So we would generally share
17	whatever we received from the election officials
18	with the FBI, in case there was an ongoing
19	investigation related to whatever it was that we
20	forwarded to them.
21	Q. And is this still true, I mean,
22	it's on your website today, is it still true
23	that the MDM team serves as a switchboard for
24	routing disinformation concerns to appropriate
25	social media platforms?

1	A. No. Like I said earlier, we didn't
2	do this in 2022, so we should change that to
3	served. Thank you for finding that.
4	Q. And I take it you you testified
5	earlier that that decision was made in late
6	April or early May of 2022?
7	A. That's my recollection.
8	Q. Do you know why the decision was
9	made?
10	A. I don't, but as I also mentioned,
11	it was something that we were comfortable with,
12	from the MDM team perspective, because of heavy
13	burden on our resources.
14	Q. You anticipate serving in a
15	switchboard in the future or do you not know
16	whether you will?
17	A. That's not my decision to make,
18	so so I don't want to speak on behalf of the
19	director or future directors.
20	Q. You don't know what the director's
21	plans are for the future when it comes to
22	serving as a switchboard for routing
23	disinformation concerns?
24	A. I don't know what direct
25	Director Easterly's position is, and obviously I

1	wouldn't know any future director's position on
2	that, either.
3	(Exhibit No. 6 was marked for
4	identification.)
5	BY MR. SAUER:
6	Q. Exhibit 6?
7	A. Okay.
8	Q. Here's a public comments by Renée
9	DiResta about about the Election Integrity
10	Project. And let me put it on the screen share.
11	On the third page, call which is
12	called page 2 of the transcript, she talks or
13	sorry, it's quoting Alex Stamos, saying that the
14	EIP started with our team at Stanford sending a
15	group of interns to work with CISA; right? Do
16	you see that?
17	A. Yep.
18	Q. It talks about the sort of stuff we
19	talked about the gap earlier, about how there's
20	a lack of capability, about disinformation.
21	But Stamos says they lack a funding
22	and legal authorization to do the kinds of work
23	that will be necessary to truly understand how
24	election disinformation was operated; correct?
25	A. That's what he says, yep.

1	Q. And he goes on to say: Our
2	partners in government, most particularly those
3	in CISA and DHS, but also state and local
4	governments whom we worked with; correct?
5	A. He says that, yes.
6	Q. Were CISA and DHS partners of the
7	EIP, in your view?
8	A. We generally describe any external
9	organization that we have a relationship as a
10	partner. So I think that probably, you know
11	so yeah.
12	Q. Okay. So in a sense that you were
13	a partner of the EIP, fair to say?
14	A. Again, we would say that of any
15	external entity that we have a relationship
16	with.
17	(Exhibit No. 7 was marked for
18	identification.)
19	BY MR. SAUER:
20	Q. On the screen share I put Exhibit
21	7, which is now public comments from Renée
22	DiResta from the EIP; do you see it up there?
23	A. Sorry, you are an on Exhibit 7?
24	Q. Yeah.
25	A. Yep.

1	Q. If you go to page 2 of the
2	transcript, which is page 4 of the PDF, and
3	it it quotes Renée DiResta, again, talking
4	about the students from Stanford doing an
5	internship at CISA and identifying a gap, right,
6	that was the word we used earlier?
7	A. Mm-hmm.
8	Q. It talks about how there was no
9	clear federal lead to coordinate, and it wasn't
10	prepared to identify it; correct?
11	A. I don't
12	Q. It says that gap, the federal
13	government wasn't prepared to identify and
14	analyze election mis and disinfo; correct?
15	A. Correct. That's what she says,
16	yep.
17	Q. And she says there was no clear
18	federal lead to coordinate the work and so
19	forth?
20	A. Correct.
21	Q. And she says: There were unclear
22	legal authorities, including very clear first
23	amendment questions; right?
24	A. That's what she says.
25	Q. That's a reference to the federal

1	government taking the leadership role and
2	analyzing to respond to election mis and
3	disinformation; correct?
4	A. I'm not seeing that in here, is
5	that a sentence or are you asking me to
6	Q. I'm just
7	A interpret what Renée is saying?
8	Q. Yeah, interpret, is that how you
9	read it? That's how I read it.
10	MR. GARDNER: I'm sorry, can you
11	John, can you re-ask that question?
12	BY MR. SAUER:
13	Q. Let me ask you this: Were there
14	any discussions of that you're aware of,
15	relating to the EIP, that related to unclear
16	legal authorities, including very real first
17	amendment questions, when it comes to direct
18	involvement of the federal government?
19	A. I'm not aware, but, in general,
20	conversations about MDM, first amendment comes
21	up.
22	Q. Did it come up with the CISA
23	interns who originated the idea of the EIP?
24	A. I don't I don't recall that
25	being the nature of the conversation. I think

1	it was really mostly around gaps for election
2	officials. But as you probably picked up, I
3	don't remember in detail the conversations that
4	well that long ago.
5	MR. SAUER: I think that's all the
6	questions I have.
7	MR. GARDNER: Well, the government
8	has no questions. We just, again, we emphasize
9	that the witness will read and sign.
10	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This
11	concludes this concludes the deposition of
12	Brian Scully. The time is now 6:04 p.m. We are
13	off the record.
14	THE REPORTER: Mr. Sauer, when do
15	you need the transcript?
16	MR. SAUER: Could we have it
17	expedited within two days, that's Ben, I
18	think our standard request for these is two
19	business days?
20	MR. GARDNER: Yes.
21	THE REPORTER: And Mr. Gardner,
22	will you be purchasing a copy.
23	MR. GARDNER: Yes, ma'am, we'll be
24	purchasing a copy.
25	THE REPORTER: And you want the

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-	
1	same delivery?
2	MR. GARDNER: Yes, ma'am.
3	THE REPORTER: Is it okay if I
4	e-mail you spelling questions on Monday?
5	MR. GARDNER: You have until
6	
7	Tuesday, with the holiday.
	(Signature having not been waived,
8	the deposition of BRIAN SCULLY was concluded at
9	6:04 p.m.)
10	ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEPONENT
11	I, BRIAN SCULLY, do hereby acknowledge
12	that I have read and examined the foregoing
13	testimony, and the same is a true, correct and
14	complete transcription of the testimony given by
15	me and any corrections appear on the attached
16	Errata sheet signed by me.
17	
18	
19	(DATE) (SIGNATURE)
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER
2	I, Cassandra E. Ellis, Registered
3	Professional Reporter, the officer before whom the
4	foregoing proceedings were taken, do hereby
5	certify that the foregoing transcript is a true
6	and correct record of the proceedings; that said
7	proceedings were taken by me stenographically and
8	thereafter reduced to typewriting under my
9	supervision; and that I am neither counsel for,
10	related to, nor employed by any of the parties to
11	this case and have no interest, financial or
12	otherwise, in its outcome.
13	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
14	my hand this 17th day of January 2023.
15	
16	
17	Campudra F. Ellio, LSR
18	CASSANDRA E. ELLIS, CSR-HI, CSR-VA, CCR-WA, RPR,
19	CRR
20	REALTIME SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR
21	NOTARY PUBLIC
22	
23	
24	
25	

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1
                             LEXITAS LEGAL
 2
     January 17, 2023
 3
 4
 5
     JOSHUA E. GARDNER, ESQUIRE
     DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
 6
     1100 L STREET, NORTHWEST
     WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
 7
 8
     IN RE: THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et al. v. JOSEPH R.
            BIDEN, JR., et al.
 9
10
     Dear JOSHUA E. GARDNER:
     Please find enclosed your copies of the deposition of
11
12
     BRIAN J. SCULLY taken on January 12, 2023 in the
     above-referenced case. Also enclosed is the original
13
     signature page and errata sheets.
14
15
     Please have the witness read your copy of the
16
     transcript, indicate any changes and/or corrections
     desired on the errata sheets, and sign the signature
17
     page before a notary public.
18
19
     Please return the errata sheets and notarized
20
     signature page within 30 days to our office at 1608
21
     Locust Street, Kansas City, MO 64108 for filing.
22
     Sincerely,
2.3
    Lexitas Legal
24
2.5
    Enclosures
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1	ERRATA SHEET
2	Witness Name: BRIAN J. SCULLY
3	Case Name: THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et al. v. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., et al.
4	Date Taken: JANUARY 12, 2023
5	Page # Line #
6	Should read:
7	Reason for change:
8	
9	Page # Line #
10	Should read:
11	Reason for change:
12	
13	Page # Line #
14	Should read:
15	Reason for change:
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17	Page # Line #
18	Should read:
19	Reason for change:
20	
21	Page # Line #
22	Should read:
23	Reason for change:
24	
25	Witness Signature:

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1	STATE OF)
2	 ,
3	COUNTY OF)
4	
5	I, BRIAN J. SCULLY, do hereby certify:
6	That I have read the foregoing deposition;
7	That I have made such changes in form
8	and/or substance to the within deposition as might
9	be necessary to render the same true and correct;
10	That having made such changes thereon, I
11	hereby subscribe my name to the deposition.
12	I declare under penalty of perjury that the
13	foregoing is true and correct.
14	Executed this,
15	20, at
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	BRIAN J. SCULLY
21	
22	
23	NOTARY PUBLIC
24	My Commission Expires:
25	

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